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1. CHAPTER ONE: THE MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF IDENTITY 
CONFLICTS 
 
1.1     Introduction 
 
From Chiapas to Chechnya, from India to Indonesia and from Algeria and 
Angola to Afghanistan, the world has and continues to witness the "cult of 
origins" where difference has often meant destruction, destitution, despair and 
death.1 This can most graphically be illustrated by the Rwandan genocide of 
1994 where almost one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed. The 
power of ethnicity and ethnic or identity politics has been eloquently put forth 
by the truism best captured by Richard Davies as follows:  
 
"As with other forms of identity, ethnicity provides a sense of belonging 
and a way of knowing `who we are'. This enables identification with 
other individuals of a similar background, something which it can be 
argued is essential to the security of the individuals. This sense of 
community may be of increasing importance in an age of 
bureaucratisation and impersonal mass societies, and a world of 
political alienation and isolation".2  
 
The relevance of ethnic or identity politics is amplified by the fact that the 
world is divided into approximately 5000 distinct ethnic groups and only 9.1 
percent of independent states are ethnically homogenous.3 The situation 
seems particularly profound in Africa, than in most other parts of the world 
                                            
1  Jill Krause and Neil Renwick, Identities in International Relations (Basingstoke, 
MacMillan, 1996), xiii. 
2  Richard Davis, The Myth of Black Ethnicity: Monophylety, Diversity and the Dilemma 
of Identity, (Denton, Ablex Publishing, 1997), p.87.  
3  Davis, The Myth of Black Ethnicity, p.88; Agyemang Attah-Poku, The Socio-Cultural 
Adjustment Question: The Role of Ghanaian Immigrant Ethnic Associations in 
America, (SUNY at Old Westbury and Albany, 1996) p.181. 
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more so with the continent’s legacy of arbitrarily drawn boundaries which has 
given rise to situations such as that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) where over 250 ethnic groups exist.4 It follows that the challenge for 
politicians, policy-makers and intellectuals is how to transform the politics of 
identity along more benign routes from violence and exclusion to peaceful co-
operation and accommodation. This thesis aims to provide insight into this 
transformation process by firstly examining what could be done within states 
and second, how the international community can assist in constructively 
intervening in the search for sustainable peace.  
 
1.2   Clarification of Concepts 
 
A lack of conceptual clarity in a discussion such as the one at hand can lead to 
ambiguity and, hence obfuscation, to one's analysis. The first concept that 
deserves clarification is ethnicity. According to Davis,  
 
"Ethnicity is the condition of belonging to an ethnic group, the sense of 
ethnic identity felt by members of an ethnic community. … The term 
derives from the Greek word “ethnos” meaning a group of people 
characterised by common descent and therefore a basic human 
category in itself as opposed to a sub-group of a larger unit".5  
 
This definition is supported by other authors such as Morris Hale who argues 
that ethnicity encompasses some combination of race, religion, culture and 
group identity6; and Schrire who proposes that the essential component of 
                                            
4  Attah-Poku, The Socio-Cultural Adjustment Question, p.184.  
5  Davis, The Myth of Black Ethnicity, p.80-81.  
6  Morris-Hale Walter, Conflict and Harmony in Multi-Ethnic Societies: An International 
Perspective. (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), p.xv. 
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ethnicity is assumed common descent.7 This definition of ethnicity largely 
coincides with the concept of an ethnic group. Thus Thomson describes an 
ethnic group as;  
 
"a community of people who have the conviction that they have a 
common identity and common fate based on the issues of origin, 
kinship ties, traditions, cultural uniqueness, a shared history and 
possibly a shared language".8  
 
Also significant, Poku notes that ethnic group "pertains to organised activity by 
persons linked by a consciousness of a special identity, who jointly seek to 
maximise their corporate, political, economic and social interests".9 
Importantly, both Rothchild and Poku note that ethnicity is subjective rather 
than objective - it is a perceived sense of common origins and interests.10 This 
is an important point to muster before embarking on any efforts aimed at 
defusing virulent ethnic conflicts. The concept that underlies conflict 
management and settlement is that ethnic conflicts are anchored on 
perceptions sometimes justified and in other instances unfounded. From the 
foregoing, a belief in the change of perception is key to conflict resolution 
efforts.  Secondly, and a concomitant of the previous point, is that identities 
are never static, rather, they are dynamic and therefore malleable. According 
to Krause and Renwick "… identities are constructed and can therefore be 
                                            
7  Schrire Robert "The Nature of Ethnic Identity” in Schrire Robert and HW Van der 
Merwe (Eds.) Race and Ethnicity: South African and International Perspectives, (Cape 
Town: Juta and Company, 1980), p.6. 
8  Alex Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics, (London, New York: Routledge, 
2000), p.58. 
9  Attah-Poku, The Socio-Cultural Adjustment Question, p.180. 
10  Donald Rothchild Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for 
Cooperation, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p.4; Attah-Poku, The 
Socio-Cultural Adjustment Question, p.180. 
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deconstructed and reconstructed anew".11 Ethnicity, like other identities, is 
similarly malleable. In fact ethnicity is " … transformed over time by processes 
of immigration, social reproduction and change, nation-building and national 
integration".12 This is an important point for the conflict resolution practitioner 
since the transformation of ethnic identities could open up new avenues of 
peace in `intractable' conflicts. At the same time however, it could complicate 
delicate peace negotiations as the demands and/or needs of belligerents 
change.  
 
Another issue that presents a challenge to the management and settlement of 
ethnic conflicts is the fact that the causes of ethnic conflagrations are diverse 
and multiple ranging from cultural differences to minority politics, religion to 
territorial disputes. Often conflicts arise where ethnic identities coalesce with 
class or other identities; where, for instance, an ethnic group feels that they are 
not receiving the benefit of economic production. A good example of this is the 
case of the Ogoni people in the oil-rich Delta state of Nigeria. Supporting this 
view, Davies argues that where inequalities "… result from ethnic discrimination 
and also affect material interest, ethnicity provides a cohesive basis for 
mobilisation because of the power of its subjective attachments".13 Further 
lending credence to such a view, Rupesinghe and Anderlini clearly illustrate the 
varied and multiplicity of variables fuelling the 1994 genocide:  
 
"… in Rwanda, one of the world's poorest nations, a rapidly increasing 
population coupled with decreasing agricultural productivity, few 
opportunities and uneven government support for rural areas 
                                            
11  Jill Krause and Neil Renwick, Identities in International Relations, p.xii. 
12  Davis, The Myth of Black Ethnicity, p.81. 
13  Davis, The Myth of Black Ethnicity, p.81. 
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exacerbated social tensions. This, combined with a drop in tea and 
coffee prices in the late 1980s and structural adjustment policies 
implemented in 1990, led to even harsher living conditions and eroded 
the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the people. These factors in 
themselves did not create sufficient conditions for the outbreak of civil 
war or the genocide of 1994. Within the wider context, however, they 
were instrumental in the build-up of tension and grievance in a country 
with a history of social and ethnic divisions and recurrent communal 
violence".14  
 
Other scholars also note the uniqueness of other variables exacerbating ethnic 
conflicts on the African continent:  
 
"… throughout the continent states preside over divided societies 
containing widely divergent ethnic groups. This has made it particularly 
difficult for post-colonial states to generate a moral basis for 
government which endows rulers with legitimacy or authority, rather 
than with the mere control of the state machinery … The weakness of 
the African state institutions and the fragile nature of its public 
acceptance provides a unique socio-political environment which 
encourages informal networks of personal relationships between 
powerful and well-placed individuals (patrons) and the rest of their 
ethnic communities”.15  
 
The scope and the intensity of the variables driving ethnic conflicts often lends 
greater complexity to the issues of identity at hand thereby contributing to 
some conflicts being labelled as intractable. For the conflict resolution 
practitioner, this implies that such conflicts must be approached in a holistic 
fashion in order to understand the interplay between the factors resulting in 
virulent ethnic nationalism.  
 
 
 
                                            
14  Kumar Rupesinghe and Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Civil Wars Civil Peace: An 
Introduction to Conflict Resolution, (London, Pluto Press, 1998), p.14. 
15  Attah-Poku, The Socio-Cultural Adjustment Question, p.184, 186. 
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1.3   Understanding Ethnic Conflicts in Africa 
 
Many constructivist and instrumentalist scholars have demonstrated that 
ethnicity assumes an important aspect in African conflicts but does not per se 
explain their emergence. Understanding the major causes of the conflicts that 
have plagued Africa requires a time-space collocation. This implies locating the 
conflict region in a multidimensional space, both geographically and 
historically. The case of Sudan provides an fitting case study, not only for the 
understanding of the characteristics of post-independent African states and 
therefore of the political behaviour that has triggered conflict but also the 
common changing features of conflict in Africa. The use of the term Africa does 
not want to minimize the complexity and uniqueness of the different states 
and ethnicities of the continent, but only attempts to trace a common thread, 
which is useful to have a more in-depth comprehension of the conflicts in 
Africa, and especially of the so-called ethnic conflicts. The causes for conflict in 
Africa are numerous. However, the historical period and events (such as 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union) explain some of the policies and choices that African countries made. 
 
Conflicts in Africa can generally be classified as Stefano Bellucci, Professor of 
Comparative African Systems at the University of Pavia, Italy says into two main 
categories: the postcolonial and the neoliberal conflicts. The postcolonial era 
conflicts can be located in a time framework which goes from the 
independence of most African states (the sixties) to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (1991). The root causes of conflict in this category generate from socio-
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political, cultural and economic conflicts, from the failure of state-building and 
consequently of nation building, and from militarism and militarization.  
 
The neoliberal epoch conflicts belongs to those of the ongoing global era. This 
era is characterized by political and economic changes, the crisis of the state 
and the end of the Cold War. It is noteworthy that both types of conflict have 
an economic dimension to their existence, in particular the misallocation of 
resources and power. Stefano Bellucci points out that “the causes of civil 
conflicts come from social, cultural and political factors, which hide economic 
aspects: between those who are in power and those who experience its 
consequences; economic aspects, which result in growing poverty and 
economic inequality, and which finding armed conflict the only solution.”16 
Biafran scholar and PhD in Political Science, Emmy Godwin Irobi, argues, 
“economic factors have been identified as one of the major causes of conflict in 
Africa. Theorists believe that competition for scarce resources is the common 
factor in almost all ethnic conflicts in Africa. In multi-ethnic societies like 
Nigeria and South Africa, ethnic communities violently compete for property, 
rights, jobs, education, language, social amenities and good health care 
facilities.”17 In a similar way, Ernest Harsch wrote in African Renewal: 
 
“Inequality does matter for achievement of the MDGs,” noted Mr. 
Arjan de Haan, a social development adviser with the UK’s Department 
for International Development, in an article in NEPAD Dialogue, a 
publication of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
                                            
16  Bellucci Stefano, Storia Delle Guerre Africane: Dalla Fine del Colonialismo al 
Neoliberalismo Globale, p.56 (Rome: Carrocci Editore, 2006). 
17  Irobi, Emmy Godwin, Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Comparative Study of 
Nigeria and South Africa, Research Paper, May, 2005, at Beyond Intractability.org of 
the University of Colorado, at: 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/nigeria_south-africa.jsp?nid=6720 
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a continental plan adopted by African leaders in 2001. “Inequality — 
particularly in assets and gender — can even reduce rates of growth, 
hence indirectly limiting poverty reduction.” “Ignoring inequality in the 
pursuit of development is perilous,” states UN Under-Secretary-General 
for Economic and Social Affairs José Antonio Ocampo. “Focusing 
exclusively on economic growth and income generation as a 
development strategy is ineffective, as it leads to the accumulation of 
wealth by a few and deepens the poverty of the many.” Besides 
impeding poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs, Mr. 
Ocampo adds, failure to address inequalities means that “communities, 
countries and regions remain vulnerable to social, political and 
economic upheaval.”The World Bank, which for years emphasized 
market liberalization as the best route to economic growth and poverty 
reduction, now also recognizes the role that inequalities play in 
hindering those goals. “Equity considerations need to be brought 
squarely into the centre of both diagnosis and policy,” says the Bank in 
the 2006 edition of its annual World Development Report, which this 
year focuses on the theme “Equity and Development.”18 
 
1.3.1  The Postcolonial Period: Postcolonial African States and the 
Emergence of Conflict 
 
In order to understand postcolonial African conflicts, it is essential to 
appreciate the main characteristics of post-independent African states. These 
features have been influenced by pre-independence historical events, such as 
colonialism, and by the global trends, changes and events, which took place 
after World War II. These characteristics are the main cause for uneven 
economic distribution, political and social unrest which led to the majority of 
African conflicts. Independence instilled in African societies immense optimism 
for the future. Due to the numerous structural problems inherited from the 
past, the new African governments were unable to meet the growing requests 
                                            
18  Harsch, Ernest, Combating Inequality in Africa, Africa Renewal, Vol.20 #2 (July 2006), 
page 16. From: http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol20no2/202-
combating-inequality.html 
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of their people. The failure of the new states to fulfil their obligations towards 
their citizens led to disillusionment. The new states failed because “in the 
absence of a state with efficient institutions, it was difficult for the new African 
governments to counterbalance the economic and social disequilibrium 
inherited from colonialism.”19 Unmet expectations, rising poverty, economic 
underdevelopment, political unrest, together with increased militarization and 
the exploitation of ethnicity as the appealing tool for the mobilization of the 
masses led to conflict. Conflict was the result of the intertwining of internal and 
external factors.20 Aside from, the structural problems inherited from 
colonialism, ethnicity and religion played a major role in shaping conflict in 
Africa, because “ideology was used by many African leaders as a means to 
achieve power, and power granted the control of the economy.21  
 
1.3.1.1  Postcolonial African States and the Legacy of Colonialism  
 
The impact of colonialism on the African continent is certainly relevant in 
characterizing postcolonial states and conflicts. In talking about ethnic conflict, 
Emmy Godwin Irobi affirms that “it is important to note that most of these 
ethnic conflicts were caused by colonialism, which compounded inter-ethnic 
relations by capitalizing on the isolation of ethnic groups. The divide-and-
conquer method was used to pit ethnicities against each other, thus keeping 
the people from rising up against the colonizers. Distribution of economic 
                                            
19  Bellucci, Stefano, Storia Delle Guerre Africane: Dalla Fine del Colonialismo al 
Neoliberalismo Globale, p.57-8 (Rome: Carrocci Editore, 2006) 
20  Bellucci, Stefano, Storia Delle Guerre Africane: Dalla Fine del Colonialismo al 
Neoliberalismo Globale, p.41 (Rome: Carrocci Editore, 2006) 
21  Bellucci, Stefano, Storia Delle Guerre Africane: Dalla Fine del Colonialismo al 
Neoliberalismo Globale, p.63-64 (Rome: Carrocci Editore, 2006) 
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resources was often skewed to favour a particular ethnic group, pushing 
marginalized groups to use their ethnicity to mobilize for equality.”22 Bellucci 
agrees that colonialism has had a tremendous impact on postcolonial states, 
because it transferred to these states its patterns of violent and exploitative 
administration.23 The causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa are more often than 
not historical and traceable to the European penetration in Africa and in 
colonial slave trade which introduced models of violent exploitation and 
domination in African societies that since then have taken root in the 
continent. All through the decolonization period, the new states have grappled 
with scarce institutional and human resources. The underdevelopment caused 
by colonialism and neo-colonialism is at the base of social and political conflict 
in Africa between the poorer masses and the rich elites. These imbalances have 
generated the social discontent that has subsequently fuelled civil wars.24 
Colonialism has shaped the postcolonial state in five main ways:  
 
a) It left it with a fragile economy;  
 
b) it left it with weak political institutions;  
 
c) it legitimized patterns of violent coercive and exploitation;  
 
                                            
22  Irobi, Emmy Godwin, Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Comparative Study of 
Nigeria and South Africa, Research Paper, May, 2005, at Beyond Intractability.org of 
the University of Colorado, at: 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/nigeria_south-africa.jsp?nid=6720 
23  Bellucci, Stefano, Storia Delle Guerre Africane: Dalla Fine del Colonialismo al 
Neoliberalismo Globale, p.56 (Rome: Carrocci Editore, 2006) 
24  Bellucci, Stefano, Storia Delle Guerre Africane: Dalla Fine del Colonialismo al 
Neoliberalismo Globale, p.56 (Rome: Carrocci Editore, 2006) 
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d) it disrupted the African geopolitical scenario by introducing artificial 
borders; it has created or consolidated ethnically homogeneous elites, 
despite multicultural heterogeneousness of societies;  
 
e) it has set in motion mechanisms of identity awareness, such as Pan-
Africanism and pan-Arabism, in response to a Western imperialist 
domination based on racial and cultural superiority. 
 
On the first point, postcolonial states in Africa have been left with very fragile 
economic economies which in turn has caused their economies to be 
dependent on the import of refined goods and on foreign capitals. This is 
important because this dependence has hindered the process of economic 
growth and development. De facto, these colonies, when created, were not 
meant to be independent. The only raison d’être for the colonies had been 
their economic exploitation to the advantage of the imperial power. They 
produced and exported raw materials, which were then sent off to the colonial 
power to be manufactured. Because of the lack of refined goods, the colonies 
had to import them and in so doing benefiting the colonial power exporter. The 
construction of scanty infrastructure, such as railroads and roads, was intended 
to easily access and exploit the resources of the colony to the advantage of the 
colonial power and not for the development of the colony. Areas with few or 
no resources were largely neglected and marginalized, causing regional 
underdevelopment and great disparities within a same country. As a 
consequence, when independence came, the economies of the former colonies 
in this case the new African states were dependent on the import of refined 
goods and on the only form of income that they had: the export of raw 
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materials at a paltry cost. Economic backwardness caused these states to be 
dependent also on foreign capitals, which were the only form of investment 
and the only possible solution for achieving economic growth and 
modernization. 
 
Secondly, most of the former colonies have retained a Western system of 
political organization, which is alien and is not adaptable to the postcolonial 
reality. These political institutions are by and large inadequate to face the 
multiethnic reality of African states. Wallace-Bruce has stated that “the new 
Republic could not disguise the stark bi-reality. It had ‘two different judicial 
systems, different currencies, different organization and conditions for service 
for the army, the police, and civil servants…The governmental institutions, both 
at the central and local level, were differently organized’…”25 For this reason, in 
the absence of a previous process of common political and social organization, 
postcolonial governments have been alienated from the beginning from the 
overall majority of the population, consequently hindering the process of state 
building and of nation building. In most African colonies a large bureaucratic 
apparatus has come to develop, which had previously been unknown to them. 
Posts within the bureaucratic machine are the only and the best alternative to 
more customary forms of employment (farming, herding, trade, etc.). Thus, 
they are highly competitive. This has fuelled corruption and political patronage. 
Corruption in turn has hampered efficiency, and the large expenditures for the 
maintenance of such a huge apparatus has  even weakened the economy 
                                            
25  Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, “Africa Since 1800”.p.97 5th Edition. Cambridge: 
University Press, 2005 Ref. Op. Vii Wallace-Bruce, The Statehood of Somalia and the 
United Nations. 
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more. Further, colonialism brought with it an administrative apparatus which 
offset the traditional organization of local communities. When most colonies 
became independent during the mid-1960s, they took on and maintained a 
system, which could not have deeply taken root in less than a few decades. In 
addition, this fragile systems had to co-exist with the more traditional societal 
organizations, the communities or “tribes”. One type of organization had now 
to manage and rule what was once a large variety of different systems of 
organization with differing interests. In Somalia, for instance, immediately after 
independence, around 60 political parties were created, each of which 
reflected the interests of various Somali groups. In the absence of a strong 
sense of ‘stateness’, politics came to represent not a point of cohesion among 
groups, but a tool for individual interest groups, represented by the various 
ethnic communities. Local elites on their part did nothing to better the 
situation and move towards cohesion by granting favours and benefits to their 
kinsmen and allies, who usually belonged to the same ethnic group. In this 
respect, they appealed to common origins and ancestry to politically mobilize 
ethnicities in their favour.  
 
The fragility of the postcolonial economies and the specific historical 
momentum led to see the state as the only provider of power, status and 
wealth. Therefore, conflict over resources became a competition for power, 
which assumed ethnic overtones due to the mobilization of ethnicities by 
political elites. A failure of sustained state and nation-building efforts led to the 
proliferation of numerous dictatorships and failed democracies in post-
independent Africa. In the post colony, democracy was bent out of shape to 
suit the interests of the military, the bureaucracy, feudal and other powerful 
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interest groups. It was either basic, guided or otherwise appropriately prefixed 
to deny its central function of articulating the will of the people not to mention 
key processes such as accountability. Among other things, this also meant that 
a genuine system of political accommodation could not be put into place.”26  
Thirdly, colonialism legitimized patterns of coercion, violence and exploitation. 
These vices were retained by the African postcolonial elites then in power 
following the customary form of enforcement they had attained during 
colonialism. Given the failure of state and nation-building, postcolonial 
governments were unable to gain the consensus of their whole population. 
Thus, these methods were seen as necessary to maintain order in the post 
colony. In the absence of strong and effective state institutions, which could 
provide efficient enforcement mechanisms, the elites in power maintained 
their power through terror and violence. In this sense, colonialism reinforced 
and legitimized forms, which were typical of the feudal system. 
 
Fourth, the colonial empires disrupted the geopolitics of the African continent 
by introducing artificial borders. The Berlin Conference of 1884-5 partitioned 
Africa in what some scholars have referred to as “spheres of influence” among 
the colonial powers. African states had been artificially created by drawing 
borders, which did not take into account the ethnic component and plurality on 
the territory. The colonisers did not take into consideration the local people’s 
subsistence activities (be it farming or herding or nomadic) and the geological 
conformation of the ground, either. In addition, colonial administrations had 
                                            
26  Rashid, Abbas and Shaheed, Farida, Pakistan : Ethno-Politics and Contending Elites, 
Discussion Paper No. 45, June 1993 Prepared for the United Nations Research 
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made little or no effort to create a sense of unity and in fact worked against it. 
Thus, when independent, the newly formed governments had to struggle  to 
create a sense of national unity in a heterogeneous society. The ethnography 
on the continent was completely subverted in that different ethnic groups had 
now to coexist within the same territory with other ethnic groups, with which 
there had previously been little or no interaction. Given the fragility of the 
economy, the competition for access over resources, and the failure of state-
building, nation-building, too, failed.  
 
A fifth important feature is that the colonial administrations created or 
consolidated power to ethnically homogeneous elites sowing the deadly seed 
of negative class politics. Colonial powers had sought the help of a small part of 
the population to administer the country. They either created new elites or re-
confirmed the power of pre-existing elites. The negotiation with these elites 
served the purpose of maintaining order in the colony, and consisted of 
educating them in Western-like education, granting them posts in the new 
administrations, benefits, and impunity. When independence was not the 
result of insurrection and war, independence was negotiated between the 
colonial administration and the elites. Therefore, independence re-confirmed 
these elites as the new ruling actors in postcolonial countries. This had two 
effects: it led to a lack of legitimacy by the whole population and created 
competition for access over resources. The fact that the elites represented 
specific interest groups and neglected others caused the new states to lack 
legitimacy by the whole society from the beginning. Second, because the state 
was the main provider of wealth, local elites came to exploit ethnicity as the 
main engine for political mobilization and therefore for access over resources. 
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Governing elites came to be associated with the ethnic group to which they 
belonged, and marginalization came to be seen not as the failure to evenly 
distribute resources, but as the domination of ethnically homogeneous elite 
over a heterogeneous society.  
 
Sixth, another effect of colonialism, which is usually underestimated, is that it 
set in motion complex mechanisms of social and identity awareness (existing 
beyond geographical borders), such as pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism, in 
response to Western imperialism. At first, in the decolonization process, these 
movements served as ideological glue against the ideas of African cultural and 
racial inferiority that Western colonial powers had tried to instil. Later on, 
though, post-independence economic underdevelopment and disparities in 
income distribution were distorted through the prism of ethnicity, making 
these movements ethnic coalitions for political and economic claims. Because 
these two movements coexisted within the same territorial borders in certain 
large regions of Africa such as Sudan, clashes became inevitable, as each of 
them gained more strength from the idea of superiority, especially in the light 
of a larger context, such as the Middle East. 
 
It ought to be mentioned that pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism played an 
important role in the process of integration in the immediate post 
independence period because they positively strengthened cultural and ethnic 
identities. The concept of pan- Africanism was embraced by the African Union, 
which was created in 1963 and was able to philosophically link African leaders. 
Despite its failures, the African Union gave and continues to give African 
leaders the chance to mingle and to spread their ideas throughout the 
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continent. It has not only created self-awareness among African elites but also 
expounded and drawn more attention to pertinent issues such as ethnic 
conflict. However the downside of these movements is that they have since 
become the “legitimate” causes for war thereby sidelining the real causes such 
as economic marginalization and failed nation and state-building. At the 
domestic level, ‘Africanness’ has created polarization, where marginalization 
has taken the form of ethnic discrimination.  
 
Exemplifying this point, Alex de Waal provides an explanation of how 
significant Africanism and Arabism are in the Sudanese context. He argues that 
the incorporation of Darfur not only in Sudanese processes but also in wider 
African and Middle-Eastern processes, has caused Darfur’s ethnic identities to 
be “radically and traumatically simplified, creating a polarized ‘Arab versus 
African’ dichotomy that is historically bogus but disturbingly powerful. The 
ideological construction of these polarized identities has gone hand-in-hand 
with the militarization of Darfur, first through the spread of small arms, then 
through the organization of militia and finally through full-scale war. The 
combination of fear and violence is a particularly potent combination for 
forging simplified and polarized identities, and such labels are likely to persist 
as long as the war continues. The U.S. government's determination that the 
atrocities in Darfur amount to ‘genocide' and the popular use of the terms 
‘Arab' and ‘African' by journalists, aid agencies and diplomats, have further 
entrenched this polarization, to the degree that community leaders for whom 
the term ‘African' would have been alien even a decade ago, now readily 
identify themselves as such when dealing with international interlocutors.”27At 
                                            
27  De Waal Alex, Who Are The Darfurians, Justice Africa. 
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the same time, pan-Arabism appears to have created the idea of superiority 
amongst the Arabs. The fact that pan-Arabism has at times mixed with pan-
Islamism at the level of ideas seems to have given pan-Arabists an even more 
legitimate belief of their superiority. The idea of descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad and centuries of cultural and economic splendour that has given a 
unitary aspect to the Arab world has just served to entrenched this idea of 
superiority. In similar vein, pan-Africanism has strengthened the feeling of 
African awareness in most rebel groups, who have for long felt themselves 
oppressed and discriminated by their own governments in the same way as 
colonialism had done. When the reality of bad governance and regional 
marginalization has come into contact with the ideas of pan-Africanism and 
pan-Arabism, this potent concoction has created immeasurable hatred, 
resentment and finally conflict. 
 
Also, pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism have become important tools for 
leaders, intellectuals and elites, who have been able to appeal to a renowned 
consciousness of their origins and used these ideas as a point of strength in civil 
wars to gain consensus. In this sense, what was created as a movement of 
protest against the imperialist era of the West has was used and continues to 
be used as a double-edged knife manifesting in the revolt against other of 
ethnic groups within the same countries. The appeal to and exploitation of 
ethnicity as well as the appeal to religion, have become dreadful weapons 
where national unity has been non-existent or the basement on which states 
are created are fragile as is mostly the case.  
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1.3.1.2  Postcolonial African States and the Impact of the Cold War 
Period  
 
Post-colonial African states inherited from colonialism elitist, coercive 
governments, large bureaucratic apparatuses, fragile political and economic 
institutions  all of which have led to failed prospects of nation-building. The 
cold war period contributed in many ways to the shaping of postcolonial 
African states. For example, global trends and theories emphasized the role of 
the state as central in development and modernization. Secondly, military 
confrontation between the two superpowers resulted in militarization of allied 
states and rebel movements. On the first point, global trends and theories 
throughout the sixties strongly emphasized the role of the state as central in 
development and modernization. The major challenge for neo-independent 
African states was modernization. In order to achieve this objective, highly 
centralized states were seen as the only feasible solution. In fact, centralization 
served the purpose of hiding the problem of national disunity and of fragile 
political institutions. Thus, African countries in the sixties and seventies were 
highly centralized both economically and politically. Centralization did not solve 
the existing problems, but led to an enormous concentration of power and 
wealth in the hands of an elite, which was consequently perceived as the 
domination by a specific ethnic group.  
 
This centralization of power led to the neglect of issues of nation-building in a 
multiethnic society by the new governments. Centralization of political and 
economic power during the Cold War period was not uncommon to the rest of 
the world. Global trends had, in fact, emphasized the central role of the state 
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not only in the political but also in the arena of economics. In the first place, 
the Keynesian theories had become very popular in most Western countries.28 
The main idea that spread after the Great Depression was that unemployment 
had finally led to the rise of fascism all over Europe.29 In looking at the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, Keynes had speculated that the free oscillation of 
markets could not adjust on its own to full employment. He considered the 
economic downturn as attributable to a lack of demand and had proposed that 
governments stimulate the same through fiscal policies aimed at either cutting 
taxes or increase in government expenditures. Throughout much of Europe, 
the nationalization of the economy had yielded admirable results, especially 
when considering the economic miracles of Germany and Italy during the early 
sixties.30 Europe being the mother of a social welfare system, in which the state 
was the main provider for health and education services and having d itself 
been very successful, some postcolonial states borrowed leave from their 
domestic measures adopting state-centred economic structures. 
 
On the second point, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a political, military 
and economic superpower was central in the determination of global political 
and economic trends. The perceived success of the 5-year plans, the emphasis 
on heavy industry, the collectivization of land, and the creation of the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) contributed to raise the Soviet 
Union to the rank of an economic superpower. Ideologically and politically 
speaking, the Soviet Union was the only alternative to Western capitalist 
                                            
28  Heywood, Andrew, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, MacMillan Press Ltd, 
London, 1998. 
29  Bellucci, Stefano, Storia Delle Guerre Africane: Dalla Fine del Colonialismo al 
Neoliberalismo Globale, p.21(Rome: Carrocci Editore, 2006). 
30  Heywood as note 28 above. 
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democracy which recalled ideas of a colonial exploitative past. Not by chance, 
Karl Marx had seen imperialist colonialism as an inherent feature of capitalism - 
which required a continuous consumption and consequently a continuous 
market expansion - and also of the concept of “surplus value,” which could only 
result from the exploitation of the labour force. Furthermore, the military 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the 
militarization of geo-strategically important states and rebel movements. De 
facto, the two superpowers were not formally at war with each other, but their 
confrontation resulted in the militarization and financing of allied states 
including former colonies in Africa and therefore in the emergence of proxy 
wars. These two superpowers not only financed states, but also rebel groups 
that aimed at overthrowing regimes, which could support the opposite bloc. 
There are plenty of examples in Africa of these instances for example the Soviet 
support and armament of the Somali regime of Siad Barre, of the Marxist 
liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau and in Mozambique; or the United 
States support to Hissené Habré of Chad, Congo-RD, Congo-Brazzaville, etc.31 
Militarization characterized African societies and gave conflicts an incredible 
power of destruction.  
 
1.3.2   Ideologies of the Cold War Period 
 
Thus, African states were guided in their choices by global trends, which saw 
the state as the central apparatus. The tendency of most African states towards 
socialism was strengthened ideologically by three theories, which either saw 
                                            
31  Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of 
Democratization in Nigeria," Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (June 1996): 193-
225. 
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the former colonial powers as hegemonic or criticized the exploitative 
inclination of capitalism. These are neo-colonialism, the dependency and the 
structuralist theories. Neo-colonialism emerged in response to the economic 
dependence of postcolonial states on the former colonial powers as they were 
the only available source of investment for economic growth and 
modernization. Neo-colonialism emphasized and criticized the central role that 
the former colonial rulers retained in the economic growth of former colonies 
as a new form of imperialism. In Bellucci’s words, neo-colonialism “indicates 
new forms of hegemony of the more advanced former colonial powers on the 
ex colonies. The former colonial powers tended to substitute the old direct rule 
with a relation of economic, technological and political dependency.”32 
Secondly, the dependency theory is the that which neo-colonialism finds its 
economic basis. It can be summarized in the words of Brazilian scholar, 
Theotonio Dos Santos: “By dependence we mean a situation in which the 
economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and 
expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected.”33  
 
The relation of interdependence between two or more economies and 
between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some 
countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while 
other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that 
expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their 
immediate development.”34 Most scholars of this school of thought saw 
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33   Id. 
34  Quoted in: Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations, p.282 
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dependence as the main cause for underdevelopment in Africa. “Although 
different dependency theories lean in one direction or another – toward 
Marxism or nationalism- they all share several assumptions and explanations 
regarding the causes of and the solution to the problems of less developed 
countries. This position is captured by Andre Gunder Frank’s statement that ‘it 
is capitalism, both world and national, which produced underdevelopment in 
the past and which still generates underdevelopment in the present.’35 As 
Thomas Weisskopf has opined, ‘the most fundamental causal proportion 
associated with the dependency literature is that dependence causes 
underdevelopment’”.36 However, Gilpin argues that “the less developed 
countries have a high degree of dependence and continue to be vulnerable 
precisely because they are underdeveloped rather than vice versa. (…) Their 
foremost problem is not external dependence but internal inefficiency.”37  
 
The third theory is structuralism. In view of the foregoing, a liberalist capitalist 
world economy tends to preserve or actually increase inequalities between 
developed and less developed economies. Whereas trade was indeed an 
engine of growth in the nineteenth century, structuralists argue that it cannot 
continue to perform this role because of the combined effects of free trade and 
the economic, sociological, and demographic conditions  prevalent among less 
developed economies in the twentieth century.38 These conditions include the 
combination of overpopulation and subsistence agriculture, rising expectations 
                                            
35  Same as note 32 above. 
36  Quoted in: Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations, p.282 
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37  Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations, p.304 (Princeton, NJ: 
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38  Ragnar Nurkse, “Towards the Law of Economics and Development”, European 
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causing a low propensity to save, excessive dependence on unstable 
commodity exports and political domination by feudal elites. These structures 
trap less developed countries in a self-perpetuating state of underdevelopment 
equilibrium from which they cannot escape without outside assistance.39 The 
structuralist argument is that the world economy is composed of a core or 
centre of highly industrialized countries and a large underdeveloped 
periphery.40 In the non-industrial periphery, however, technical progress is 
introduced from outside and is restricted primarily to the production of 
commodities and raw materials that are exported to the core.41  
 
Although the dependency and the structuralist theories differ on the causes of 
underdevelopment, what they both point out is that less developed countries’ 
economies are dependent on the economies of more industrialized countries. 
Indeed, the lack of internal capital for investment has been one of the main 
structural problems in the continent. Externalities (typically in the form of neo-
colonialism) that often resulted from alliances that the same African 
governments wanted, impeded the actuation of progressive policies, because 
the ex-colonial powers and the superpowers (USA and USSR) strongly 
encouraged militarism, that is; disproportionate military expenditures, which 
has took resources away from important development sectors, such as 
education and infrastructures.”42 
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1.3.3   The Neoliberal Period 
 
As illustrated above, the Cold War period was characterized by a large 
concentration of power in the hands of the state; in fact, the state was seen as 
the only actor capable of achieving economic growth and development. African 
states were thus highly centralized but because centralization could not solve 
Africa’s structural problems, this did not lead to economic growth and 
development. Indeed, Africa’s budget deficit increased and economic 
underdevelopment led to a competition over resources, which came to be seen 
as a competition among ethnic groups. The eighties and nineties marked a 
period of transition between the postcolonial and the neoliberal period and 
signalled the crisis of the state. At both the international and domestic level, 
the state lost its importance as central actor in the development process. These 
two decades were marked by an era of free market and liberalization.  
 
The Reagan-Thatcher ideologies43, the Washington Consensus44 and the 
concept of conditionality promoted economic liberalism and democratization. 
Especially during the Nineties, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, we 
assisted to the triumph of democracy. Conditionality came thus to be 
associated with good governance, in order to promote the respect of human 
rights and of international law. Anyhow, “conditionality and the economic 
neoliberal reforms,” argues Stefano Bellucci, “had curbed the budget deficit 
from one side, but had worsened even more the economic situation and the 
living conditions of the populations. Because of the liberalization of trade and 
of the money market, both inflation and unemployment increased; whereas, 
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the decreased state intervention caused a diminishing financing of educational 
and health infrastructures.”45 The crisis of the state corresponded also to an 
increase in “illegality, criminality, and informal economic exchanges”.46 The 
collapse of the Soviet Union is an important factor which must be necessarily 
mentioned. It is relevant in two respects. First, with the end of the balance of 
power between the two superpowers, and therefore of their military 
intervention in Africa, African states started to interfere more and more in 
neighbouring countries’ domestic affairs. Second, Stefano Bellucci argues that 
“the end of ideological confrontation at a global level exacerbated the political 
crisis of the post-colonial nation-state.”47 De facto, the ideological dimension 
ceased to be the consolidating factor of African politics, and the post-colonial 
period came to an end. Crisis of Postcolonial States and Democratization The 
Eighties and Nineties saw two important events, which signalled the end of the 
postcolonial era: the end of the Cold War and a renewed spread of free market 
ideologies, in the guise of conditionality and structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs).  
 
The end of the Cold War and the policies of conditionality and structural 
adjustment, induced by the IMF and the World Bank, led to two fundamental 
phenomena in the development of African states and conflicts: the crisis of the 
postcolonial state and the democratization process. The end of the Cold War 
also ended the financial, military, and ideological support of the two 
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superpowers to strategically important African states and rebel movements. 
This had two consequences: a political and an economic one. Politically, the 
ideological struggle between communism/socialism and democracy/capitalism 
came to an end. These ideologies had in a way constituted the glue on which 
many postcolonial states held. Indeed, the balance of power between the two 
superpowers had prevented the intervention of states in neighbouring 
countries’ internal conflicts. Consequently, the lack of this glue made 
postcolonial African states more vulnerable to the interference by other states 
and by internal interest groups. Economically, the end of the financial and 
military support by the two superpowers not only exasperated even more the 
already bad economic conditions of African societies, but also meant that 
African states were more dependent on international lenders and donors. After 
the oil crisis of the Seventies, and despite a worldwide economic recovery, 
African budget deficits and consequent economic underdevelopment 
deteriorated even more. Because of this, even their dependence on 
international aid increased. The policies of conditionality and structural 
adjustment, which were started in the Eighties, found their ideological 
foundations in the Reagan-Thatcher programs of liberalization and 
privatization. Conditionality is an economic program, according to which an 
international financial institution lends money to a developing country on the 
condition that the last engages in structural adjustment programs.  
 
Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) are those programs, which profess the 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances and that allow for the market, and 
not for the state, to allocate goods available for purchase. With the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and thus the end of its ideological confrontation, the 
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community of Western lenders and donors “intensified their campaign for 
multi-partyism in Africa where the balance of the Soviet Union was no longer 
available to African governments in their quarrels with the West.”48 SAPs, the 
end of the ideological, military and financial support of the Soviet Union 
contributed to weaken the foundations of authoritarian, one-party and 
dictatorial regimes in Africa. The loss of funds to fuel the machine of 
patrimonialism, patronage and corruption, which kept these regimes alive, was 
no longer available, and led to their crisis. 
 
Pressure by the international community, i.e. Western financing communities, 
contributed to the process of disintegration of postcolonial states and fuelled a 
movement of protest for change in Africa. During 1990 and 1994, these 
movements of protest led to an unprecedented wave of democratization. The 
key event was the peaceful overthrowing of the Kérékou regime by the civil 
society and NGOs in Benin. Ould-Mey, Mohamedan, “Structural adjustment 
programs and democratization in Africa: The Case of Mauritania” in Multiparty 
Democracy and Political : Constraints of Democratization, p.44 Edited by John 
Mukum Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998) 30 The 
event was followed by the fall of dictatorships in Congo-Brazzaville, Niger and 
Mali and by the end of the apartheid system in South Africa. In other countries, 
such as Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Mali, the international community 
was able to put pressure on the same governments to enact democratic 
reform. According to Julius Ihonvbere, the struggle for democracy had positive 
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consequences on African states. It “encouraged challenges to authoritarian and 
military as well as repressive one-party regimes; (…) it has encouraged the rise 
of new political parties and movements on the political landscape; (…) ethnic, 
religious, community and human rights as well as environmental organizations 
in Africa have become part of the struggles for democracy.”49 In a few words, 
the democratization process, which has had a role in the crisis of the 
postcolonial state, has encouraged multipartyism and the creation of a civil 
society in Africa. 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, democratization, and the economic programs 
of the IMF and the World Bank translated, both domestically and 
internationally, in a total distrust of the state in the promotion of economic 
development. This, in turn, led African societies to “withdraw into ethnic and 
community institutions (…); to refuse to pay taxes, support government 
projects, and vote in elections; (…) and has also led them to withdraw into the 
so-called informal or underground or parallel economy.”50 Notwithstanding the 
advantages that the democratization process and the crisis of the state had for 
African societies, many scholars argue that the impact of the neoliberal era and 
its processes (such as SAPs) had a fundamental impact in the insurgence of 
conflict. Indeed, after a first wave of optimism, conflicts, especially the ethnic, 
tribal and religious ones, multiplied all over the continent. This does not mean 
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that ethnicity, tribalism and religion have become the primary factors for 
conflict. However, the absence of the ideological confrontation of the Cold War 
and the loss of trust in the state have led local leaders to exploit even more the 
ethnic, tribal and religious components in the mobilization and political 
adherence of local communities. As has been said, the economic factor plays 
an important role in African conflicts. This was true for the postcolonial period, 
and even more in the neoliberal one. Although proponents and critics of the 
impact of globalization on Africa have differing views, they both agree that 
globalization on Africa with its free trade, market liberalization and free flow of 
investment, has put Africa to a disadvantage in the global market because of its 
“inadequate capacity to manage the process, which makes it more vulnerable 
to inherent potential forces of political and economic destabilization.”51 In a 
paper produced by UNCTAD, the focus of the failure of Africa to enter 
globalization is on African states themselves.  
 
Accordingly, SAPs have resulted in better macroeconomic policies, with 
consequent higher levels of growth on the African continent. Anyhow, these 
policies are “clearly inadequate to effectively address the challenge of poverty 
reduction, which is embedded in the grossly uneven distribution of the benefits 
of economic growth between Africa’s sub-regions, economic sectors, and 
segments of the population.”5286 Proponents of SAPs and of globalization point 
out that globalization undoubtedly yields benefits, but that in Africa, structural 
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inefficiencies are the main cause for its unsuccessful results. African states’ 
main problems are those same problems that affected postcolonial states, that 
is, their dependence “on the production and on the export of a few primary 
commodities whose share of world trade is declining (…). Since the majority of 
people are employed in the commodity producing sectors, poverty is 
perpetuated by the secular decline in the demand for these commodities.”53 
Another major problem emphasized by UNCTAD is the lack of sufficient 
investment finance, which has contributed to the deterioration of 
infrastructure that has in turn led to higher costs of transport. This has made 
these goods, for which the world demand had already declined, even less 
competitive. Finally, an important shortcoming is the lack of domestic 
investment in human and physical capital, both of which are “prerequisites for 
competitiveness and sustained growth and development.”54 
 
Scholars, who are more critical of globalization, have argued that SAPs and 
globalization have not been beneficial at all for Africa; and on the contrary, 
they have triggered conflict. Indeed, the rise in poverty has increased the divide 
between rich and poor and also the share in the informal and illegal economy. 
In the words of Stefano Bellucci, “the liberalization of trade and of the money 
market has increased inflation and unemployment; in turn, the reduction of 
state intervention in the economy has reduced the investment in the education 
and health sectors. Thus, ‘the retreat of the state’ has corresponded to a 
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worsening of the living conditions of the masses and an intensification of the 
illegality, criminality and informality of economic exchanges. Social degradation 
has allowed the formation of new forms of violence, or ‘social chaos’, which 
characterize African conflicts in the global era.”55 Stefano Bellucci also affirms 
that democratization has not translated into democracy, in which minority 
rights are at the basis. Democratization has only led to multi-party competition 
in the elections and for access over resources, but has not yielded benefits to 
the whole population. “In Africa, the so-called neoliberal democratization has 
seemed to serve only the new system and the new dominant elite, rather than 
the whole population.”56 For those scholars, who criticize globalization and 
SAPs, such as Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, Maria Mies and Silvia Federici, the 
proliferation of war in Africa, as well as in Latin America and Asia, has been 
caused by the destruction of subsistence economies and especially of 
subsistence agriculture by globalization. For these scholars, globalization 
follows the same patterns of 19th-century colonialism, without necessarily 
conquering the territory. “SAPs, trade liberalization, privatization and 
intellectual property rights (…) are responsible for an immense transfer of 
wealth from the Third World to the metropolis, and (for) the expropriation of 
Third World assets and resources by multinational corporations, (…)” which 
have led to a “context of generalized economic bankruptcy, (in which) violent 
rivalries have exploded everywhere among different factions of the African 
ruling class, who, unable to enrich themselves through the exploitation of 
labour, are now fighting for access to state power, (which is) the key to the 
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appropriation and sale on the international market of either the national assets 
and resources or the assets possessed by rival or weaker groups.”57 In the 
essence, scholars have pointed out to a flurry of causes for the emergence of 
conflict in Africa in the neoliberal period. However, structural and economic 
factors remain the crucial ones. The crisis of the state and the following wave 
of democratization have substituted the old elites and introduced 
multipartytism in Africa, but economic and social underdevelopment has not 
decreased. Conflict over resources and power is still the key cause in the 
understanding of African conflicts, in both the postcolonial and the neoliberal 
periods. The end of the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the US 
has, however, unchained forces of identity creation and association, which 
were once subordinated to the ideologies of the Cold War. Sudan perfectly fits 
in the framework of African conflicts in both the postcolonial and the neoliberal 
periods. Sudan has inherited structural inefficiencies from its historical past 
that are still the main causes for conflict in the ongoing Darfur crisis. 
 
1.3.4  The Management of Identity Conflicts  
 
External intervention in the management of ethnic conflicts is a valuable and 
necessary component of ethnic conflict resolution and can prevent disastrous 
consequences commonly associated with such conflict. However, external 
intervention on its own is often an insufficient means of conflict management 
and can do more harm than good. External intervention can be paternalistic 
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and undemocratic and may fail because of a lack of understanding of the 
internal situation which has led to the conflict.58 Ethnic conflict is largely an 
intra-state phenomenon and therefore is at best internally managed. Some 
methods of internal conflict management are discussed below.  
 
1.3.4.1 Secession  
 
Secession is the most extreme method of conflict management and for this 
reason is often either not considered as an option for conflict management, or 
is considered a last resort. Nonetheless, some ethnic conflicts have been 
managed with varying degrees of success by allowing one of the ethnic groups 
involved to secede. Examples include the independence won by Lithuanians, 
Eritreans and Ukranians59. Secession may be considered a solution when the 
costs of secessionist civil war outweigh the benefits of maintaining the current 
state boundaries and when the separation of the multi-ethnic state will result 
in the creation of two homogenous regions, which are likely to be more 
governable than the original region.60 Secession also appears as an attractive 
option when it allows a group to escape oppression through receiving self-
government.61 While secession can be considered a viable option in the 
management of some ethnic conflicts, there are also some disadvantages 
related to it. Firstly, it is not always easy to determine exactly which group(s) 
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and which territory should form the new state.62 The seceding region is likely to 
contain its own minorities which means that secession could lead to new ethnic 
conflicts if these minorities do not support the secession of the region.63 
Secondly, secession often produces violence or occurs in a violent fashion, and 
may even exacerbate the original situation.64 Secession may transform the 
intra-state conflict into a conflict between two independent neighbouring 
states. A third problem is that secession may lead to the establishment of a 
state which is not economically viable, or may diminish or eliminate the 
economic viability of the existing state.65 Another problematic with secession is 
that certain international law principles can be appealed to both by the 
secessionists, and those wishing for the state to remain united thereby creating 
more friction than accord. These principles are that of self-determination and 
statehood, and the sovereignty of states respectively.66  
 
1.3.4.2 Nation-Building  
 
National identity or nationhood can be defined as a collective sense of 
belonging and can result from a number of factors.67 Nation-building involves 
reducing disparities between groups and promoting the idea of a common 
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shared nationhood.68 Some theorists have opined that if nation-building can 
promote an identity based on a common territory, or common history rather 
than one based on ethnicity, it can be considered an effective ethnic conflict 
management strategy.  
 
1.3.4.3 Power Sharing  
 
Power sharing practices have in such instances offered an alternative to the 
simple majoritarian practices of democratic governance. Two broad 
approaches to construction of democratic governance namely the 
consociational or group building block approach that relies on accommodation 
by ethnic group leaders at the centre and a high degree of autonomy and the 
integrative approach which seeks to create incentives for moderation by 
political leaders on divisive ethnic themes and to enhance minority influence in 
majority decision making have been adopted. Consociational approaches rely 
on elite accommodation and guarantees to groups to protect their interests 
such as a mutual or minority veto whereas the integrative approach relies on 
incentives for intergroup cooperation such as electoral systems that encourage 
the formation of pre-election pacts among candidates or political parties along 
ethnic lines.  
 
The consociational and integrative approaches can be fruitfully viewed as 
conceptual poles in a spectrum of specific conflict regulating institutions and 
practices that promote power sharing. Which approach and which practices are 
best in any given conflict situation is dependent on the patterns and dynamics 
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of the particular conflict. Indeed a given political system may fruitfully 
incorporate aspects of both approaches simultaneously. It is useful to consider 
the practices in terms of three sets of variables that apply to both approaches: 
territorial division of power, decision rules and public policies for example on 
language, education and resource distribution that define relations between 
the state and the ethnic groups. Five consociational conflict regulation 
practices are as follows:  
 
 Granting of territorial autonomy and creation of confederal arrangements;  
 Creation of polycommunal or ethnic federations;  
 Adoption of group proportional representation in administrative appointments 
including consensus decision rules in the executive.  
 Adopting a highly proportional electoral system in a parliamentary framework. 
Acknowledging group rights or corporate non territorial federalism.  
 
Five integrative conflict regulating practices are as follows:  
 
 Creating a mixed or non ethnic federal structure;  
 Establishing an inclusive centralised unitary state;  
 Adopting majoritarian but ethnically neutral or non-ethnic executive, legislative and 
administrative decision making bodies;  
 Adopting a semi-majoritarian or semi-proportional electoral system that encourages 
the formation of pre-election coalitions (vote pooling) across ethnic divides.  
 Devising ethnicity-blind public policies.  
 
Power sharing practices when they are adopted by parties in conflicts often 
evolve in direct response to a history of violent conflict. Pragmatic perceptions 
toward other groups can emerge from the belief that the failure to 
accommodate will precipitate wider strife. However, political leaders and 
publics must be motivated to avoid worsening or more violent conflict if power 
sharing is to be successfully adopted. Unfortunately such motivation does not 
always exist; high levels of violence do not inevitably mean that political 
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leaders will be more moderate and adopt power sharing. Transitional moments 
both in terms of changes in structure or peace processes in which parties adopt 
agreements or mutual security pacts that seek to limit the ability of groups to 
inflict mutual harm. The degree of unity and organisational coherence of the 
parties and the ability of political leaders to persuade their constituents to act 
peacefully are the most important variables in creating improved relations 
among ethnic groups. Conciliatory attitudes must both be broad including 
hard-liners and deep including key publics as well as leaders.  
 
International intervention in ethnic conflicts focuses both on the process by 
which groups rearrange their relations through violence or dialogue and on the 
terms and structures of the outcomes that are reached. Despite the inherent 
problem of partition, the international community should not assume that the 
borders of an existing state are sacrosanct. The principal decision the 
international community must face in any given violent ethnic conflict is 
whether separation or power sharing is the more achievable sustainable and 
just outcome. This is of special relevance when the parties themselves cannot 
reach an agreement on this fundamental question.  The international 
community often places too much emphasis on democratic elections without 
considering their potentially adverse impact in situations of severe ethnic 
conflict especially when such elections are held with simple majority rule 
electoral systems and without prior mutual security pacts. It is true that 
elections are critical moments in peace processes; they are turning points at 
which relations can polarise or new national unity can be forged through the 
creation of legitimate government. But much depends on both the electoral 
system chosen and the administration and monitoring of the election event. In 
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this way elections provide important opportunities for intervention to help 
ameliorate ethnic conflicts because they are especially amenable to monitoring 
and an ongoing international presence. 
 
1.3.4.4 Federalism 
 
Federalism can be considered a method of power sharing as it allows for power 
to be distributed among different groups. Federalism involves the devolution of 
power by the centre to regional units and a formal distinction between the 
powers of the central government and the powers of the federal units.69 A 
federal arrangement can increase the confidence of the conflicting ethnic 
groups and allow them to feel less threatened by other ethnic groups.70 It can 
also appease demands for secession. There are however, several problems with 
federalism. Firstly, federalism usually refers to the devolution of powers to a 
specific geographical region and is thus only a solution where the conflicting 
ethnic groups are territorially based.71 There are some forms of non-territorial 
partitions, such as the cultural councils of Belgium,72 but generally federalism is 
taken to involve devolution to a particular geographical area. Another problem 
with federalism is that there are definite costs to federalism and these costs 
may be seen as outweighing the benefits of federalism. The costs include the 
duplication of function, the expense of having state capitals and other 
                                            
69  John Coakley, “Introduction: The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict”, In The 
Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict, (Great Britain, Frank Cass, 1993), p.15. 
70  David Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing the Fear: The Origins and Management 
of Ethnic Conflict”, International Security, 21(2): 1996, 41-75. 
71  David Welsh, “Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict”, Survival, 35(1): 1993, 63-80. 
72  Francis Cohen, “Proportional Versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in 
Democracies”, Comparative Political Studies, 30(5): 1997, 607-630.  
 
59 
expenses related to the running of separate federal administrations.73 Nigeria 
serves as an example of an African state that has experimented extensively 
with federalism. At independence in 1960 Nigeria adopted a federal character. 
The three Regions established under British rule were maintained.74 Over the 
years a number of other Regions were established, many of them in response 
to the demands of ethnic groups. By 1996, Nigeria had 36 different federal 
regions.75 Some thinkers express strong support for the use of federalism in the 
resolution of ethnic conflict in Nigeria. Diamond describes the federal system 
as a 'crucial resource' for Nigeria and argues that decentralised power and local 
autonomy are essential in Nigeria.76 Akinrinade agrees, stating that the 
Nigerian experience illustrates the need for 'the development and practice of 
true federalism'.77 He sees the devolution of real power and responsibilities to 
federal units as vital and criticises the Nigerian federal system for having a 
central government with too much power. Rothchild sees federalism as a 
possible way to make politics in Nigeria less threatening and to encourage co-
operation between groups, but notes that federalism as a solution to ethnic 
conflict is undermined if ethnically exclusivist regional governments refuse to 
allocate resources equitably and act repressively.78 He notes that when 
                                            
73  Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985), p.621-622. 
74  Richard Synge, “Nigeria: Recent History”, in Africa South of the Sahara (London: 
Europa Publications, 2000), p.819.    
75  Osaghae Eghosa, Nigeria Since Independence: Crippled Giant, (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p.294. 
76   Larry Diamond, Class Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First 
Republic, (London: MacMillan Press, 1988), p.324-325. 
77   Akinrinade Sola, “Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Nigeria: What lessons for South 
Africa?” Lecture given at the University of Pretoria on 12 May 2000, organised by The 
South African Institute of International Affairs, Pretoria Branch.  
78   Donald Rothchild Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for 
Cooperation, p.56. 
 
60 
carefully crafted, federalism and other systems of decentralising authority, can 
place necessary limitations on central authority and promote confidence 
among regional leaders. However, federalism can increase conflict and worsen 
inter-ethnic relations if it is not introduced carefully.79 Osaghae does not 
believe that federalism, as implemented in Nigeria, was an adequate response 
as it favoured majorities and powerful minorities at the expense of smaller 
ethnic groups.80 While ethnic groups ought to be given increased autonomy, 
Osaghae does not believe that awarding particular regions increased 
autonomy, sufficiently addressed the needs of ethnic minorities. Thus, 
federalism has been both praised and criticised as a solution to ethnic conflict 
in Nigeria. According to McGarry and O'Leary, federalism has a poor track 
record with federations breaking down throughout Asia and Africa.81 For 
federalism to be successful, the division of powers needs to be continually 
renegotiated and supplementary consociational measures are often needed at 
sub-central levels of government to maintain the stability of the federation. 
Despite these difficulties, federalism is an attractive measure for the 
management of ethnic conflicts, and under certain conditions can be very 
effective.  
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1.3.4.5 Power Sharing 
 
Both historically and more recently, the international community has promoted 
power sharing by offering formulas institutional blueprints for post conflict 
political structures and has often sought to induce disputants to accept them 
through a combination of diplomatic carrots and sticks. Increasingly, the 
international community is using linkages to other issues such as membership 
in collective security, trade, and other international organisations to induce 
states to adopt practices that promote ethnic accommodation. The paradox of 
promoting power sharing early in the escalation of an ethnic conflict is that at a 
nascent stage of tensions, parties may be unwilling to embrace power sharing 
practices because they are not sufficiently desperate or feel insufficiently 
compelled. At a late stage of conflict, after significant violence, enmities may 
be too deep for parties to share power for mutual benefit. Determining when a 
conflict is ripe for a power sharing solution is at best a difficult judgement call 
requiring intimate knowledge of a situation, especially of the true disposition of 
the parties and their willingness to live together within a common or shared 
political framework.  
 
Thus a second paradox is the problem of judging intentions. Hasty adoption of 
a power sharing arrangement can set the stage for new grievances and strife. 
Moreover the international community is often asked to secure successful 
implementation of agreements or to guarantee then which in essence ties the 
international community to the substance of a settlement. The promotion of 
power sharing by the international community in situations of deep ethnic 
conflict is riddled with normative considerations such as potentially rewarding 
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aggression or appeasement of extremists. It also entails considerable risks such 
as inducing parties to share power when their underlying perceptions are still 
deeply suspicious and based on mutual harm. When an international mediator 
goes beyond facilitating negotiation and backs a power sharing solution in any 
given conflict at either an early or late stage of escalation, this policy involves 
choosing sides. This is true of choosing among parties to a conflict often in 
favour of minorities who seek to limit the power of majorities as well as 
bolstering more moderate factions within a given party or government against 
more hard-line elements.  
 
Power sharing involves a wide range of practices not a simple model or formula 
that can be universally applied. Thus in a given conflict there is no substitute 
for intimate scholarly and policymaker knowledge in reaching conclusions 
about whether any given power sharing practice will likely have an ameliorative 
or potentially adverse effect on a given ethnic conflict. For example in some 
situations consociational power sharing may be an appropriate interim 
measure but should not become a permanent feature of political life. Likewise 
parties in an ethnic conflict may be too insecure to accept the incentive 
mechanisms of the integrative approach preferring more firm guarantees of 
consociationalism. In many countries democracy may be a long way off but the 
international community can exert pressure for the adoption of conflict 
regulation practices by non democratic states such as fair treatment of ethnic 
minorities and ethnically diverse security forces. Conditional generalisations 
can be made that can serve to inform policy. Power sharing arrangements have 
been generally successful in managing ethnic conflict under the following 
conditions:  
 
63 
 They are embraced by a core group of moderate political leaders in ethnic conflicts 
and these leaders are genuinely representative of the groups they purport to lead;  
 The practices are flexible and allow foe equitable distribution of resources;  
 There are indigenously arrived at not agreed on as a result of too heavy external 
pressures or short term zero sum expectations of the parties;  
 Parties can gradually eschew the extraordinary measures that some power sharing 
practices entail and allow a more integrative and liberal form of democracy to evolve. 
 
1.4   Other Issues on the Management of Identity Conflicts 
  
When conflict management is attempted, it is possible to adopt one of the 
approaches discussed above without taking into account several issues which 
must be examined if the conflict management strategy is to have lasting 
success. A few of these issues are discussed below.  
 
1.4.1  Democracy and Ethnic Conflict  
 
Democratisation and ethnic conflict management are two processes identified 
as being of vital importance in Africa at the moment. Given that ethnic conflict 
management and democratisation are often cited as two of the most 
important goals towards which African states should be striving, it is useful to 
examine the relationship between the two. The coincidence of democratisation 
and violent ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world has 
led some to wonder whether ethnic conflict is not the inevitable result of the 
end of authoritarian rule, meaning that it can be expected that democratisation 
will in some way exacerbate ethnic tensions. Welsh argues that democracy 
widens the scope for ethnic politics - democratisation provides incentives for 
ethnic mobilisation which can threaten the cohesiveness of the state.82 The 
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arguments suggest that democratisation is likely to spark ethnic conflicts where 
ethnic tensions had previously been latent. Other writers acknowledge that this 
has sometimes been the case, but argue that democratisation and ethnic 
conflict need not go hand in hand. Glickman says that certain types of 
democratisation allow for the constructive expression and demonstration of 
ethnic differences, while Smith concludes after a long empirical study that 
democratisation does not raise or lower ethnic conflict scores.83 Following this 
line of thought, it can be argued that democratisation and effective ethnic 
conflict management are not incompatible, but that attention has to be given 
to the form of democratisation if the eruption of violent ethnic conflict is to be 
prevented. Cohen posits that democratisation should include proportionality if 
ethnic conflict is to be prevented, and Glickman proposes that democratisation 
in Africa should include some form of federalism if ethnic conflict is to be 
managed effectively.84  
 
If ethnic conflict management and democratisation are two of the most 
important challenges facing Africa at the moment, it makes sense that their 
impact on each other should be carefully considered. When democratisation is 
encouraged in Africa, there should be an awareness of the impact 
democratisation can have on ethnicity, and when ethnic conflict is managed in 
                                            
83   Glickman Harvey “Issues in the Analysis of Ethnic Conflict and Democratization 
Processes in Africa Today”, in Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa, Glickman 
Harvey (Ed.) (The African Studies Association Press, 1995); Smith Zeric “The Impact of 
Political Liberalisation and Democratisation on Ethnic Conflict in Africa: An Empirical 
Test of Common Assumptions” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 38(1): 200, 
p.34.  
84   Frank Cohen, “Proportional versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in 
Democracies” Comparative Political Studies, 30(5): 1997,607-630; Glickman Harvey 
Issues in the Analysis of Ethnic Conflict and Democratization Processes in Africa 
Today, p.407. 
 
65 
Africa, the impact of ethnic conflict on the democratic process should be given 
attention.  
 
1.4.2    Resources and Ethnic Conflict  
 
Ethnic conflicts often centre on competition for scarce resources.85 The 
existence of ethnic differences cannot be understood to be the only variable 
which explains the outbreak of incidences of ethnic conflict.86 When states 
experience periods of economic crisis and cannot provide their citizens with 
resources, the people may mobilise according to ethnicity in order to compete 
for the scarce resources which are available. Where certain ethnic groups are 
advantaged in the state's allocation of resources, tensions between ethnic 
groups are inevitable. The centrality of oil in many ethnic conflicts in Africa is 
an example of how competition for a resource can spark conflict between two 
ethnic groups. In Nigeria there have been several ethnic conflicts which are 
clearly related to competition over oil reserves. The Niger Delta region has 
been especially volatile in this respect. Although most of the crude oil in Nigeria 
comes from this area, the people of the Niger Delta are impoverished and 
politically marginalised.87 The process of oil extraction in their region has not 
brought them financial or political benefits and has led to the environmental 
degradation of the land upon which they live. The ethnic groups in the area feel 
that the major Nigerian ethnic groups have exploited them. This has resulted in 
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a situation where some interest groups in the Niger Delta which were fighting 
for their interests with regard to the oil-production have degenerated into 
violent ethnic militias which sabotage oil pipelines and abduct officials.88  
 
Oil is also a variable in the ethnic conflict in Sudan. While the south of Sudan 
has been comparatively disadvantaged in terms of political and economic 
development, it is in the South that Sudan's oil reserves are found.89 The only 
lasting peace accord in Sudan (the Addis Ababa agreement signed in 1972) 
allowed the South considerable autonomy which brought peace to Sudan for 
several years, but limited central government's access to and control over the 
south's oil reserves.90 When Sudan began to experience worsening economic 
crises during the late 70s, Nimeiri, the leader at the time, breached the Addis 
Ababa agreement in order to try to gain control of the oil fields in the south.91 
These actions contributed the end of the period of peace in civil war and the 
re-emergence of the violent ethnic conflict which has still plagues Sudan. In 
order to address ethnic conflict in Africa, the question of the distribution of 
resources needs to be examined. Ethnic conflict is inevitable where resources 
are scarce and unfairly distributed between ethnic groups.  
 
  
 
                                            
88  Agbu Osita, “Post-Transition Conflicts in Nigeria”, Conflict Trends, 3/2000: 2000, 24-
25.   
89  Peter Woodward “A New Map of Africa? Reflections on the Horn” Africa Insight, 
23(1): 1993, p.13.  
90  Taisier Ali and Roben Matthews, “Civil War and Failed Peace Efforts in Sudan” in Civil 
Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolutions, edited by Taisier Ali and Roben Matthews 
(Eds.), (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999) 
91   Taisier Ali and Roben Mathews Civil War and Failed Peace Efforts in Sudan, p.208-
209. 
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1.4.3   The Question of Religion  
 
Ethnic and religious conflicts frequently intersect. Many African countries are 
not only ethnically, but also religiously heterogeneous. When religious 
differences coincide with ethnic differences, religion can serve to exacerbate 
ethnic differences. In Africa the tension between Christianity and Islam is 
evident, with the populations of several states being divided between the two 
faiths. The role of religion in ethnic conflict is evident when examining the 
ongoing ethnic conflict in Sudan. Sudan is situated geographically across the 
cultural and religious divide of northern and sub-Saharan Africa, with its 
population divided between Islam, Christianity and traditional beliefs.92 The 
north of Sudan is predominantly Muslim while the people of the south practice 
Christianity and traditional religions. These religious differences coincide with 
ethnic and regional differences with the Islamic people living mainly in the 
north and being predominantly Arabic; and the people practising Christianity 
and traditional religions situated in south Sudan and belonging to various non-
Arabic ethnic groups.93  
 
Religion has played a significant role in the conflict in Sudan. Non-Islamic 
religions have come under attack by the northern-dominated state ever since 
independence.94 The various Islamist military governments which have been in 
power in Sudan have seen Islam as integral to the state of Sudan and threats to 
                                            
92  Glickman Harvey Issues in the Analysis of Ethnic Conflict and Democratization 
Processes in Africa Today, p.209. 
93  Glickman Harvey as above at p.51. 
94  Stavenhagen Rodolfo Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State, (Great Britain: MacMillan 
Press Ltd, 1996), p.107. 
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the state as being threats to Islam.95 This belief in the centrality of Islam and 
the importance of building an Islamic state leaves little room for compromise. 
The application of Muslim Shar'ia law has created much conflict in Sudan and 
has led to non-Muslims being treated as second-class citizens.96 Observers have 
warned that a lasting solution in Sudan is unlikely without some kind of 
compromise on behalf of the northern Arabic Muslims and that at this stage 
compromise seems unlikely.97 In situations where conflict is ethno-religious 
rather than simply ethnic, management of the conflict is more complicated. 
Groups with strong religious loyalties may be unwilling to compromise, making 
the management of ethnic conflict more difficult. Attention must be given to 
the coincidence of ethnic and religious differences so that ethnic conflict 
management takes into account the role that religion may be playing in the 
conflict.  
 
1.4.4   Arms and Ethnic Conflict  
 
A distinct difference between ethnic conflict of earlier times and ethnic conflict 
today, is the use of sophisticated weapons in contemporary ethnic conflict.98 
Management of ethnic conflicts has to take into account demilitarisation and 
also need to pay attention to the physical and psychological wounds caused by 
the use of destructive modern weapons in ethnic conflicts. During periods of 
ethnic conflicts mafia-like gangs come into existence and after the conflict 
                                            
95  Taisier Ali and Roben Mathews Civil War and Failed Peace Efforts in Sudan, p.196. 
96  Glickman Harvey Issues in the Analysis of Ethnic Conflict and Democratization 
Processes in Africa Today, p.277.  
97  Glickman Harvey as above.  
98  Hussein Adam, “Somali Civil Wars” in Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolutions, in 
Ali and Mathews (Eds.) (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999), 
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there are many who have learnt that it is easier and more profitable to live by 
the gun than by work.99 While weapons still form part of every day life, violent 
conflict can more easily erupt once again.  
 
 1.4.5   Traditional Ethnic Conflict Management Strategies  
 
Throughout the history of Africa, there have been conflicts between competing 
groups which necessitated the development of various techniques of conflict 
management. Pre-colonial methods of conflict management have often been 
disregarded in attempts to resolve contemporary ethnic conflicts in Africa. Yet 
the history of Africa tells us of many circumstances where people of different 
ethnic groups lived together in relative peace, meaning that there were 
successful ethnic conflict management processes in existence years ago.100 In 
managing ethnic conflicts today, it may be useful to reconsider these 
traditional techniques of conflict management which may prove far more 
useful in the current situations than Western models of conflict management.  
An example of the possibility of applying traditional mechanisms to manage 
contemporary conflict, can be seen in the management of conflict in Somalia. 
The lack of understanding regarding Somali traditions has been suggested as a 
reason for the poor progress of external mediators of Somali ethnic conflict, 
and an examination of traditional politics in Somalia has been put forward as 
                                            
99  Virginia Luling, “Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State” Third World 
Quarterly, 18(2): 1997, 287-302.  
100   Ihonvbere Julius, The Irrelevant State, Ethnicity, and the Quest for Nationhood in 
Africa, p.53. 
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being necessary for the permanent resolution of conflict in Somalia.101 In 
Somali history, clans competed and occasionally engaged in violent inter-clan 
conflicts, but there was no permanent domination of one clan over others.102 
Traditional processes of mediation between clans involved councils of elders 
(guurti) who arbitrated between clans.103 These traditional councils have been 
involved to some extent in resolution of conflict in Somalia, especially in 
Somaliland.104 Although traditional leaders have been instrumental in effective 
conflict management, it has also been argued that the use of traditional 
methods of conflict management is no longer appropriate in many African 
states because of the erosion of culture in Africa, and the manipulation of 
traditional systems by self-seeking dictators.105  
 
While this may be true to some extent, the erosion of culture and tradition in 
African states cannot be seen to completely invalidate the usefulness of 
traditional systems of ethnic conflict management. Traditional leaders using 
traditional methods of conflict management may prove to be successful where 
other ethnic conflict management techniques have failed and the co-operation 
of traditional leaders in all ethnic conflict management strategies should be 
encourages in order to give legitimacy to these strategies.  
                                            
101  Laitin David “Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention” in Civil Wars, 
Insecurity and Intervention, Walter and Snyder (Eds.) New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999), 167-168.  
102  Adam Hussein “Clan Conflicts and Democratization in Somalia” in Ethnic conflict and 
Democratization in Africa, Harvey Glickman (Ed.) (Atlanta: The African Studies 
Association Press), 1995.   
103  Woodward Peter, “Somalia” in Peacekeeping in Africa, Oliver Furley and Roy May 
(Eds.) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p.154. 
104  Adam, Hussein “Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?” in Collapsed States: The 
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, William Zartman (Ed.) 
(Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p.82-83.  
105  Laitin David, Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention, p.168-169. 
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1.4.6  The Role of External Intervention in Transforming Identity 
Conflicts  
 
Jenone Walker has noted that successful outside intervention in ethnic conflicts 
is scarce.106 Why is this so? This section will aim to provide some answers to 
this question and provide some concrete recommendations, which it is hoped, 
would contribute to the successful external intervention. As with the previous 
section, before proceeding with our examination of outside intervention, a few 
caveats need to be borne in mind. Following this four areas in urgent need of 
attention on the part of the international community will be discussed. These 
four areas are: international law, early warning, economic development and 
peacekeeping.  
 
1.5   Research Questions and Propositions Advanced in this Thesis 
 
The central concern of this thesis is the investigation of the constitutional 
mechanisms that have been employed in a selected number of cases to 
peaceably settle identity conflict. The cases in point are Kenya, Sudan and 
Somalia. In so doing it also poses the following questions;  
 
a) What political conditions drive people to violence?  
 
b) What circumstances allow people to settle differences peacefully?  
                                            
106  Jenone Walker, “International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts” in Michael Brown (Ed.) 
Ethnic Conflict and International Security, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press), p.165. 
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c) What is the role of the international community when relations between 
groups become violent?  
 
d) Why can violence be prevented and managed in some cases but not in 
others?  
 
e) What are the models of identity  conflict regulation and their specific 
efficacies?  
 
f) How is it possible to adopt one approach successfully in one case while 
the same approach failed in an apparently similar conflict elsewhere?  
 
g) Are there any transferable lessons about conflict management and 
settlement applicable to cycles of failure in one and the same conflict as 
well as to other conflicts?  
 
Ethnic conflict has been explained by scholars as either primordial and innate 
or instrumental and at least partially socially contrived. The extent to which 
analysts perceive ethnicity as immutable and innate versus socially constructed 
or manipulated by political leaders influences beliefs about the types of 
institutions and practices that can best ameliorate conflict along ethnic lines. A 
critical factor is whether ethnic groups perceive each other in essentialist, 
threatening terms or pragmatically. Pragmatic perceptions between groups in 
conflict create opportunities for peaceful management of intergroup relations. 
Ethnic conflicts can be more or less severe depending in large part on the 
structure of relationships for example whether identity and socioeconomic 
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differences overlap. An important predictor of the severity of conflict is the role 
of the state: Does it stand above conflicts and mediate them? Does a group 
own the state and use its powers to the detriment of other groups? A common 
thread that runs through all violent ethnic conflicts is the manipulative role of 
ethnic group leaders who foster discrimination and mobilise group members 
against their foes. Ethnic outbidding refers to extremist leaders  ethnic group 
leaders who decry moderation with rivals as a sell-out of group interests. Ethnic 
conflicts can escalate that is intensify or spread or they can de-escalate 
resulting in improved intergroup relations. Escalation occurs when background 
conditions of ethnic strife are combined with conflict triggers or precipitating 
events. A useful way to conceptualise moves toward more peaceful ethnic 
conflict management is through a phases or stages approach to de-escalation 
in which conflicts that can reach a stalemate are managed through protracted 
negotiations. Ethnic conflicts have usually been managed with non democratic 
authoritarian practices such as subjugation and control leading to massive 
human rights violations. Simple majoritarian democracy has presented special 
problems for ethnically divided societies. The principal problem has been that 
minority ethnic groups have been seemingly eternally excluded from power 
through the ballot box.  
 
1.6  Case Selection and Research Methodology 
 
This thesis is a qualitative research project that fuses the conceptual and 
empirical work on management and settlement of ethnic conflicts. At its core is 
a study of five cases: Nigeria Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa and Northern 
Ireland. The research methodology employed in the piece is a middle way 
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between the large-N statistical method and the smaller N=1 case-study 
method. The main pitfall of the large-N statistical method in social science 
research is that while it is useful for the observation of statistical trends, it does 
not lend itself to the in-depth qualitative analysis of smaller-N studies.107 While 
the large-N approach provides an important benefit in terms of “analytical 
clarity, parsimony and theoretical elegance,” this frequently comes at the 
expense of the “richness and depth derived from national or regional case-
studies”.108 Additionally, the higher the number of case studies, the harder it is 
to achieve conceptual equivalence across them. To properly engage the 
question of how to best manage and settle ethnic conflicts in pluralistic 
societies, it is necessary to deal with the details that inform specific cases. 
Institutional setups do not operate in a political vacuum; it is thus vital to have 
a proper understanding of the context in which they function. This in turn 
requires a level of description not found in statistical studies. As such, a large-N 
statistical research method on its own would be unsuitable for this thesis. 
 
The smaller-N=1 method, by contrast, has the advantage of in-depth analysis of 
a single case. Scholars such as Andreas Wimmer have applauded it calling it the 
“new realism” in the field of institutional design109. The “new realism” asserts 
that context must trump generality; scholars and practitioners must adopt a 
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“tailor approach” in which the idiosyncrasies of each case are given primacy.110 
On this account, the search for general lessons is hindered by the seemingly sui 
generis quality to each particular conflict and by the complexities involved 
therein. The main pitfall of the smaller-N=1 approach is that, while it is strong 
in descriptive content, it suffers lends itself to weak generalisation in the sense 
that the broader implications of such studies are often difficult to ascertain.111 
However there are exceptions to this assertion. One such case is Arend 
Lijphart’s path-breaking study of the Netherlands, The Politics of 
Accommodation, which provided an invaluable refinement to pluralist theory 
and served as the platform for the development of consociational theory.112  
Nonetheless, the general rule, is that single case-studies are in tension with a 
central goal of comparative politics: they are “unlikely to provide definitive 
answers.”113  
 
That which single cases gain in descriptive richness, they frequently lose in 
wider explanatory power. The use of a single case study approach would 
constitute a flawed basis for assessing the options and critical issues in the 
management and settlement of ethnic conflicts, even if the case employs 
various options and raises an array of critical issues. As Lijphart has noted “*a+ 
single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the 
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grounds for disproving an established generalisation.”114 It is submitted that 
this is necessarily the case because, challenging the case-by-case method, it is 
argued in this thesis that lessons of conflict management and institutional 
design can be readily identified and promoted across divided polities. While 
attention must be paid to the issue of context sensitivity, as each divided polity 
presents its own unique nexus of conflict-producing cleavages, certain patterns 
of divisions can nonetheless be discerned. More specifically, “there is no such 
thing as singularity until one compares one case with another. One will not 
recognize the specificity of an individual case unless one draws parallels with 
other instances.”115 Context specificity does not preclude general lessons and 
comparisons; it, in fact, mandates it. The management and settlement of 
ethnic conflicts and institutional design, then, must be a distinctly comparative 
enterprise. Herein lies the reason why this thesis treads a middle ground 
between the one-size-fits-all solution and the tailored approach. In this piece, 
the “structured, focused comparison” method of analysis is employed.  
 
As outlined by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, this method borrows 
from the statistical method the practice of asking a set of general questions for 
each case that are “carefully developed to reflect the research objective and 
theoretical focus of the inquiry”.116 From the single-case study method, is 
borrowed the process of fleshing out the historical details of the case under 
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consideration, but on a more limited basis. In essence, “the method is ‘focused’ 
in that it deals with only certain aspects of the historical cases examined,” 
specifically those aspects that have theoretical relevance.117 The selection of 
the following six cases permits me to retain some of the richness and thick 
description offered by the single case-study method while allowing for a degree 
of probabilistic generalisation. In picking a medium-N approach (six case-
studies), this thesis follows Arend Lijphart’s approach in his most important 
work on consociational theory, Democracy in Plural Societies, which looked at 
four cases in Western Europe (Belgium the Netherlands, Austria, and 
Switzerland). However, a plausible criticism of Lijphart’s case-selection is that it 
is focused on relatively peaceful, prosperous countries with long traditions of 
democracy, and therefore of little explanatory value for other parts of the 
world which do not share these features. This project’s case-selection does not 
suffer from these disadvantages. It is both global in scope and comprises of 
countries that have considerable duration of experience with conflict 
management strategies (South Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia, Puerto Rico, Northern 
Ireland and Nigeria). Unlike Lijphart’s work, it covers cases that are developing, 
developed as well as cases that are clearly deeply divided, with many of them 
violently divided. The cases are also temporally diverse. This geographic and 
temporal diversity in case selection provides an explicit methodological 
advantage permitting causal inferences about the relationship between specific 
power-sharing institutions and political stability that hold across time and 
space. 
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1.7  Definitions, Hypotheses and Assumptions 
 
This research thesis is underpinned by two main research assumptions all of 
which have likewise been assumed by other scholars like Horowitz and Lijphart. 
First, the political institutional design of a state represents a principal means by 
which to promote stability and cooperation in divided places. That is, the first 
theoretical assumption on which this thesis is based is that political institutions 
designs or a state’s political structures matter. The design  and structure of 
appropriate political institutions through which conflict can be peacefully 
channelled is of crucial importance to the politics of divided places. In this 
regard, places are often characterised by segregated civil societies, political 
institutions generally act as “the most prominent, and often the only, channel 
of communication between disparate groups.”118 As Ben Reilly and Andrew 
Reynolds have observed, institutions or state structures “must facilitate 
communication channels between groups who need to talk. If they exclude 
people from coming to the table, then their conflicts can only be solved 
through force, not through negotiation and mutual accommodation.”119 If 
institutions matter for political stability, what exactly does the notion of 
political stability entail? The concept remains an elusive one in comparative 
politics. It has been broadly defined as “the regularity of the flow of political 
exchanges” and has variously been characterised by the absence of violence, 
the longevity of government and cabinet duration, the legitimacy of the 
                                            
118  Benjamin Reilly and Andrew Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided 
Societies, Papers on International Conflict Resolution, No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press, 1999), p. 4. 
119  Reilly and Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Conflict, p. 4. 
 
79 
constitutional regime, and the absence of structural change.120 Alternatively, it 
is understood as a multidimensional concept inclusive of system maintenance, 
civil order, legitimacy and effectiveness. This is the approach followed by 
Lijphart, who argues that a stable regime is one in which there is a high 
likelihood of remaining democratic and where there exists a low incidence of, 
or threat of, political violence.121 Political instability refers to the failure to 
maintain the political system and civil order and may be said to result when: 
the state system collapses by way of coup d’état, there is an increase in 
political violence and/or the outbreak of civil war, and political extremism 
becomes more electorally rewarding. Also covered in this piece is what can be 
termed as imposed stability “imposed stability” which obtains where the 
conditions of political stability are present but where an exogenous force does 
the work of maintaining that stability, as through military involvement in the 
political sphere or through the active involvement of the international 
community. In such cases, should the exogenous force be removed, the area 
would likely revert to a situation of political instability. The argument 
underlining the importance of state structures necessarily implies the crucial 
value of elite level politics. As Ulrich Schneckener suggests, the consent of 
elites “is a conditio sine qua non for achieving an agreement in the first place” 
and the extent of their participation helps to determine the long-term stability 
of any agreement.122 Elite level politics represents a necessary piece of the 
conflict management puzzle. This position can be contrasted with “bottom-up” 
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approaches that emphasise the reconciliation potential of civil society in the 
form of networks of engagement and sites of deliberation that bridge the 
ethnic divide.123 This “social transformationist” perspective argues that elites in 
divided society are ethnocentric and that accommodating them through 
institutions exacerbates divisions. The proper way forward from this 
perspective is to focus on civil society organisations that seek to transcend 
division – to foster “those movements that crosscut social divisions, and 
challenge and erode the clash of ethno-nationalisms and create new 
relationships of mutuality through networking and debate.”124 The social 
transformationist perspective embraces such policies as integrated schooling 
and housing initiatives and the promotion of inter-group engagements, as in 
NGOs, sports clubs, trade unions and business associations. The rationale is 
that as members of the different groups come together in these associational 
forms of engagement and also in more “everyday forms of engagements” that 
cross the divide, they will begin to recognize their commonalities and to enjoy 
the benefits of cooperation. Nonetheless, this thesis argues that bottom-up 
approaches involving unelected, and often unrepresentative, moderates are no 
substitute for agreements between authentic, democratically elected leaders 
of the communities in conflict. Social transformationism is a useful ancillary to 
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elite-level accommodation, but it cannot replace it.125 The next theoretical 
assumption is that demography has an immense bearing on processes of 
institutional design. Political demography refers to the study of populations, 
with particular emphasis on the political effects of the size, composition and 
distribution of population groups.126 It is concerned with both demographic 
realities and perceptions of those realities. A polity’s demographic 
configuration can take multiple forms. The complexity of demography is 
captured in the following quotation from Benjamin Reilly:  
 
“Ethnically divided societies tend to be divided in different ways. For 
example, divided societies can be fragmented into many contending 
groups (e.g., Papua New Guinea and Tanzania) or balanced between a 
few similarly sized ones, which can then be broken down into bipolar 
(e.g., Fiji and Cyprus) or multipolar (e.g., Bosnia) configurations. They 
can feature dominant majorities (e.g., Sri Lanka) or dominant 
minorities (e.g., Rwanda). Minorities can be based on indigenous or 
other homeland societies or on settler diasporas (e.g., Russians in the 
Baltics). Ethnic groups can be divided by international boundaries 
between several states (e.g., Kurds) or entirely encapsulated by a single 
state. Groups can be territorially concentrated or widely dispersed”.127  
 
From the foregoing, three demographic issues in need of explication when 
approaching considerations of institutional design can be deduced. These are: 
the number of politically significant groups, their size vis-à-vis the other groups, 
and their territoriality, meaning their geographic concentration or dispersion. 
These indicators of demography are closely related. The number of groups can 
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range anywhere from two groups to hundreds of different groups; as Reilly 
illustrates, a polity may have a bipolar configuration, it may be characterized by 
extreme fractionalization or it may fall somewhere in between these two 
extremes. Similarly, the size of groups can show a dramatic range of difference. 
However, it is usually the case, , that to be politically significant, a group should 
represent a sizable portion of the polity’s overall population. “The group must,” 
in other words, “have the membership size and, thus, the mobilization 
potential to influence central state politics in a meaningful way.”128  
 
The extent to which a group represents a majority, a plurality, or a minority of 
the overall population will contribute both to the sort of claims it will make and 
to the prospects of reasonable response to such claims. Unquestionably, the 
larger the group size, the more likely it is to derive benefits from the system, 
including enhanced and effective representation in political bodies, the 
legitimacy to participate in the political arena, access to legal, bureaucratic, and 
military channels, and more generally, the right to make demands on the 
political system.129 This means that “the larger the ethnic group within a state, 
the less it can be ignored.”130 Horowitz discusses the implications of a 60:40 
split in which a majority group and its ethnic party would be able to retain 
power indefinitely.131 Where a country is divided between Group A with 60 per 
cent of the population and Group B with 40 per cent with ethnic party 
representation on both sides, Group B can become permanently excluded from 
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political power. Similarly, a group that constitutes, say, twenty per cent of the 
overall population would have more political leverage in a situation where it is 
one of many smaller sized groups than it would in situations where some 
variation of the majority-minority configuration obtains, as with an 80:20 split.  
 
From a strictly numerical perspective, the majority, in this sort of scenario, may 
have little incentive to compromise with the minority. This would be even more 
the case if that group of twenty per cent was spatially distributed throughout 
the territory. The geographic dispersion of groups makes political mobilization, 
in general, and secessionist bids, in particular, difficult. Conversely, if groups 
are territorially concentrated, secession may appear to be a feasible option. 
Similarly, when groups are territorially concentrated, it may be the case that 
demands for autonomy within the current system are given more serious 
consideration by both majority and minority groups. A group’s territoriality will 
also be informed by whether international state boundaries separate groups 
from their ethnic kin in other states, as is the case with the nationalist 
community in Northern Ireland and with the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Territoriality is also significant at a more symbolic 
level; as Wolff argues, “territory possesses certain values in and of itself.” 
Those values would entail ownership of natural resources, the extension of 
goods and services, and military and strategic advantages.132 Territory can give 
rise to irredentist, secessionist, and autonomist claims that would necessarily 
need to be addressed in the institutional design. 
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The primary aim of political institutional design in multiethnic polities is the 
quest to find constructive ways to reduce the political salience, social 
resonance and intensity of conflict and to thereby opening up the political 
space for intergroup cooperation and compromise. While many scholars are 
primarily concerned with the number of groups and other demographic data 
when proffering conflict-reducing strategies, these tell only a fraction of the 
story. The demographic configuration of a particular polity does not in itself 
lead to conflict. There is an important distinction between the diversity of a 
society and the depth of its divisions. The diversity or pluralism of a polity is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for conflict.133 Considerations of the 
political salience of ethnicity and how that salience is manifested in the political 
party system should take precedence because they go further in explaining the 
adoption and maintenance potential of particular institutional designs. There is 
a need to study the attitudes and interactions of the conflict groups in the 
polities under consideration, as the emphasis on political salience does, if 
institutional remedies are to be efficacious. Doing so provides both explanatory 
and prescriptive power to processes of institutional design in specific cases.  
 
1.8   Literature review 
 
This piece reviews the book “Ethnicity in Africa: Towards a Positive Approach” 
by Hameso Y Seyoum.  In his book, Seyoum analyses ethnicity in Africa from 
the pre-colonial period to date arguing that emerging nation states must 
directly confront the issue of ethnicity, irrespective of the negative 
connotations it has been accorded, in order to realise their development 
                                            
133  Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, p. 299. 
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agendas. He explicitly states that ethnicity can only be ignored at Africa’s own 
peril. The book consists of five chapters. Chapter one is like an overview of all 
the issues discussed in the book. In this chapter he argues that the immediate 
postcolonial state was governed in accordance with the modernisation theory 
already discussed above. According to Seyoum, in the postcolonial state, nation 
building was based on expunging ethnicity with the result that “real nations” 
were superseded by “non-nations” and their histories, cultures and languages 
were regarded as tribal, backward and irrelevant to development.134 He 
dismisses the modernisation and Marxian conceptions of ethnicity as 
inadequate and argues for the adoption of an African perspective that treats 
ethnicity as a form of African identity. To prove his case, Seyoum provides nine 
case studies namely Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, 
Rwanda and Burundi thereby demonstrating that these countries have suffered 
decades of misrule and conflicts due to an inadequate understanding of 
ethnicity and the management of ethnic relations. In chapter five, Seyoum 
examines the positive aspects of ethnicity. He submits that well guided, 
politicised ethnicity can serve various constructive objectives, such as 
mobilising resources to do away with oppressive rule and assisting in economic 
development. He gives the examples of countries like Ethiopia, Liberia and 
Somalia where ethnicity has proved a potent weapon for sorting out the 
vagaries of personal rule although not without lamentable repercussions.135 
According to the author postcolonial African states must cautiously respond to 
ethnic demands by equitably distributing national resources in order to ensure 
economic and social justice. He warns that states which ignore or fail to 
                                            
134
  Hameso Y Seyoum Ethnicity in Africa: Towards a Positive Approach, London: TSC Publications (1997). 
135
  Hameso Y Seyoum (1997) at 58. 
 
86 
accommodate ethnic claims are almost certainly doomed to political instability 
and total collapse.136  
 
“Ethnicity in Africa: Towards a Positive Approach” by Hameso Y Seyoum makes 
a substantial contribution to a positive appreciation of ethnicity. It is 
noteworthy that the case studies selected by Seyoum have also been selected 
as part of this research. In as much as the countries selected for analysis are 
similar, the content of analysis is radically different consequently rendering this 
piece substantially different from Seyoum’s work. Whereas Seyoum uses 
Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya as case studies to exemplify the fact that failure to 
recognise ethnicity has been the cause of civil strife in the aforementioned 
countries, this study takes cognisance of this fact and goes a step further by 
analysing the mechanisms that have been adopted to accommodate ethnicity 
following the outbreak of political instability and their viability. In this regard, 
this study seeks to be more exhaustive and precise than Seyoum’s work. 
 
1.9        Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter One is an introduction to the piece outlining the structure of the 
thesis. It is also in this chapter that the hypothesis and theoretical assumptions 
underlying management and settlement of ethnic conflict are discussed. 
Chapter Two delves into the conceptual framework surrounding the 
management and settlement of ethnic conflicts. Chapter Three analyses the 
case of Sudan and its experience with federalism, power sharing, autonomy 
and secession constitutional solutions to identity conflict. Chapter Four deals 
                                            
136
  Hameso Y Seyoum (1997) at 43. 
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with Kenya’s experience with power sharing and devolution as a constitutional 
models for identity conflict. Chapter Five deals with Somalia’s struggle for 
stable governance and international recognition as a successful state. This 
chapter advances the concept of autonomy as a tool for the resolution of the 
identity conflicts plaguing the country. Chapter Six concluded this piece by 
analysing the discussion of the three case studies, reasons for success in some 
cases and failure in others and advancing recommendations on the possible 
feasible solutions to other intractable identity conflicts with similar 
characteristics.  
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2. CONCEPTUALISING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT: 
CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT MANAGEMENT  
 
2.1   Introduction  
 
Models of ethnic conflict regulation are a distinct feature of managing and 
settling conflicts by macro political strategies that is via institutional 
arrangements, rules, mechanisms and procedures, sometimes including the use 
of force. However practice has shown that bottom approaches to conflict 
management are more effective in the long run. Any top down approach to 
conflict management has better chances of success if it is originally founded on 
a bottom up approach. This chapter will analyse various approaches to conflict 
management while emphasising the need for any approach adopted to be 
firmly grounded on societal circumstances rather than being reduced to an 
academic experimental exercise. The ensuing chapters examine both 
conceptually and by way of case study four conflict regulating practices or 
options namely; power sharing, autonomy, ethnic federalism and federations.  
 
2.1   The Role of the Constitution in Management of Cultural Diversity 
 
In this study, the Constitution is a contract between the citizens of a country in 
regard to the manner in which they will jointly shape their collective destiny, 
manage their affairs and make their rules.137 Being the supreme law of the 
land, a constitution is vital in employing the federal principle in a bid to 
politically integrate a pluralistic society. A constitution ought to be construed as 
                                            
137  Heywood, as note 37 above. 
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more than just rules of government. It ought to assemble the nation’s 
aspirations and codify its common values. Constitutions in multi-cultural 
countries are invited to deal with this feature. A constitution can put minority 
guarantees and protections beyond the reach of parliamentary majorities.138  
 
Where it is firmly founded, a constitution is capable of generating a sense of 
security amongst the minorities. Constitutional approaches to multiculturalism 
have ideally fallen between two opposing paradigms. The first of these is 
drawn from the classical liberal democratic model.139 It places emphasis on the 
existence of enforceable human rights in the constitution including the rights 
to individually practice one’s religious, cultural or linguistic preference. The 
second paradigm employs the federal principle and constitutionally recognises 
cultural or community difference thereby allocating a measure of self-
government, group autonomy or group protection. Since this thesis will be 
concerned with the latter, it is worth briefly discussing first constitutional 
approach to dealing with multiculturalism. 
 
2.2    Power Sharing Arrangements 
 
The case for power sharing in ethnically divided societies dates back to the 
1970s by Eric Nordlinger and Arend Lijphart.140 In the following, decade Donald 
                                            
138   See Gaili, as note 15 above (2004) Harvard International Law Journal 517. 
139  Haysom, as note 1 above at 222. 
140  Arend Lijphart Thinking About Democracy: Powersharing and Majority Rule in Theory 
and Practice, Routledge 2008.  
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Horowitz offered important new insights on this regime type.141 In invoking the 
term power sharing or its related formulations such as consociationalism 
advocates have used the term variously to refer to institutions, an elite culture 
and informal decision making practices or policies. More recently it is also in 
use by scholars of international relations to include informal provisions found 
in peace settlements and ceasefires. Power sharing arrangements in ethnically 
pluralistic societies consist of rules that seek to guarantee inclusive decision 
making, partitioned decision making and predetermined decisions or a 
combination of these. These rules can provide mandates or relatively hard 
guarantees and opportunities or relatively soft guarantees. 
 
2.1.1  Inclusive Decision Making  
 
In realms where decisions are binding on all  members of a society regardless 
of their ethnic identity, power sharing institutions seek to reassure minorities 
that their interests will be taken into account by guaranteeing participation of 
representatives of all the main ethnic groups in the making of governmental 
decisions.142 In practice, power sharing arrangements are seldom fully inclusive 
because the dominant political elite typically leaves the leaders of small groups 
who lack bargaining leverage out of the decision making process. Nevertheless 
the objective is to include all groups “that can threaten political stability” if 
kept outside the arrangements. The ideal of inclusive decision making sets twin 
objectives: First is the representation of all major ethnic groups in the central 
                                            
141  Donald L Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes, in The 
Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and 
Democracy 15, 20-22 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002) 
142  Id. 
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decision making organs of the state that is the organs that have jurisdiction 
over members of all ethnic groups. Second, is decision making procedures 
within these organs that give a voice in policy outcomes to representatives of 
ethnic minorities as well as majorities. Inclusion of minority groups in a grand 
coalition is not a sufficient condition; tokenism is not enough. It is critical that 
power sharing assigns group representatives in the elite cartel  to positions of 
power such as influential ministries that these are authentic representatives of 
their communities and that they have real voice in public policy. In practice 
mandates or relatively hard guarantees of representation in decision making 
stipulate that specific ethnic groups must occupy designated posts of the 
central government. For example in Cyprus 1960-1968 the constitution 
assigned the presidency to the Greek community and the vice presidency to 
the Turkish community each community held a separate election to fill its 
assigned post. The president and vice president in turn each appointed the 
seven Greek ministers and three Turkish ministers from their respective 
communities in order to constitute the Council of Ministers. Similarly under the 
Global Ceasefire Accord and the Pretoria Protocol on Political Defence and 
Security Power Sharing in Burundi signed in 2003, seats in the national 
assembly and transitional cabinet must be allocated according to a formula of 
60 percent to Hutus and 40 percent to Tutsis; positions in the senate and the 
regular troops of the security forces must be divided evenly between Hutus 
and Tutsis.  
 
More commonly inclusive decision making is guaranteed by setting aside seats 
within the national legislature or within a separate upper chamber for 
representatives designated ethnic groups. Cyprus’s constitution for example 
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guaranteed that 70 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives would 
be elected by the Greek community and 30 percent by the Turkish community. 
Under the 2004 Naivasha Protocol on Power Sharing in the Sudan, the northern 
based National Congress Party is allocated 52 percent of all seats in the 
transitional National Assembly while the remaining seats are distributed as 
follows: 28 percent to the southern based SPLA/M, 14 percent to other 
northern political forces and 6 percent to other southern political forces. 
Mauritius expands minority representation in its National Assembly by 
allocating 8 of its 70 seats among the Hindu, Muslim, Chinese and general 
population to ensure representation of major communities. These are but a 
few illustrations. Federal states with regions drawn to correspond to ethnic 
homelands such as India often maintain an upper legislative chamber that 
guarantees equal representation to each homeland. 
 
Alternatively opportunities for representation in central decision making that is 
relatively soft guarantees do not assign government posts to probability that all 
major ethnic groups will in fact be represented. Lijphart has argued for a 
parliamentary rather than a presidential form of government because it lowers 
the barriers to entry into the government than single member districts because 
they lower the barriers to entry into the legislature. Thus constitutional 
designers can increase the likelihood of coalition governments that over time 
include most of the major ethnic groups by adopting a combination of 
parliamentary government with elections by list proportional representation in 
large magnitude districts with low electoral thresholds. Horowitz advocates 
voting schemes in presidential elections that require a victor to win support in 
more than one region of the country. He also for legislative elections that 
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permit voters to register their first second and lower preferences among 
candidates and require a victor to command an absolute majority made of first 
and lower ranked votes. In both of these types of elections candidates must 
broaden their appeals beyond the demands of a single ethnic group in order to 
win; as a consequence, victors are likely to represent coalitions of ethnic 
groups. Whatever type of guarantee is used to expand ethnic representation in 
government, inclusive decision making also depends on decision rules within 
the government and legislature to ensure that the voices of minority 
representatives are in fact registered in policy making. Relatively hard 
guarantees of inclusion in decisions typically require concurrent support from 
representatives of different ethnic groups that is ethnic representatives 
exercise a veto over sensitive issues. For example Cyprus president and vice 
president each had an independent final veto over decisions of the Council of 
Ministers and over laws or decisions of the House of Representatives 
concerning foreign affairs, defence and security. Relatively soft guarantees may 
require supermajorities in a common legislature so that depending on the 
actual proportions of seats held by the different ethnic groups, sensitive 
legislation must garner at least some support from the minority communities in 
order to pass. 
 
2.1.2   Partitioned Decision Making  
 
Some issues divide ethic groups deeply from one another but policy to address 
these issues need not be standardised for the country as a whole. Such issues 
as traditional or religious practices are especially important to ethnic group 
members. For these policy realms power sharing typically prescribes 
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partitioning decision making so that separate agencies of the ethnic groups 
such as communal legislative chambers or homeland administrations make 
policies for their on members. Rather than bringing ethnic representatives into 
the political centre to reach a common policy, partitioned decision making 
divides the government’s decision making powers in these policy realms and 
allocates these powers among independent governmental decision making 
agencies in which specific ethnic groups have greater voice  sometimes what 
amounts to an exclusive voice. The most important institutional distinction in 
granting this type of autonomy to ethnic groups concerns whether power 
sharing assigns jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of territoriality or 
personality. The former creates ethnofederalism while the latter creates 
ethnocorporatism. Ethnofederalism is adopted more frequently because of the 
case of creating and administering autonomous regions within territorially 
based state but territory is only a proxy for ethnicity. Thus the Soviet Union’s 
ethnofederalism assigned most responsibility to territorial units that acted in 
the name of the ethnic group but many administrations included substantial 
minorities and sometimes even majorities composed of other nationalities. 
Ethnocorporatism creates jurisdictions that extend only to members of the 
community and mot to all residents within the territory. This includes such 
institutions as communal legislative chambers which adopt separate policies 
for their respective ethnic communities and bureaucratic administrations such 
as separate school systems for different ethnic communities residing side by 
side in the same region.  
 
Forms of ethnocorporation were practiced in the Millet system of the Ottoman 
Empire that granted autonomy to non Muslim confessional communities and 
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under the Estonian Cultural Autonomy Law of 1925; it was also associated with 
the proposals for the Austro-Hungarian Empire offered by Karl Renner, Otto 
Bauer and the Austrian Social Democrats after 1899. Cyprus’s 1960 constitution 
created two Communal Chambers elected separately from the Greek and 
Turkish communities that had exclusive legislative jurisdiction in matters of 
religion education, culture and personal status for members of their respective 
communities. The Communal Chambers were also empowered to create courts 
to adjudicate civil disputes concerning religious matters and personal status 
and to impose taxes on members of the separate communities to finance these 
policies. It is important to note that in power sharing these agencies of ethnic 
groups are typically not voluntary associations but governmental or state 
institutions. Individuals under their jurisdiction do not freely choose to join 
except by escaping to another jurisdiction rather compliance is mandatory for 
everyone within their jurisdiction and enforcement is backed by the coercive  
powers of the state exercised by these agencies. Mandated autonomy that is 
relatively hard guarantees of ethnic autonomy assign agencies to specific 
ethnic groups.  
 
Opportunities for autonomy that is softer guarantees of ethnic autonomy 
create agencies that increase likelihood of ethnic capture but do not this. Thus 
federalism or cantonal autonomy with boundaries drawn without regard to 
ethnic composition may be a relatively soft guarantee of ethnic autonomy but 
they afford geographically concentrated ethnic minorities greater voice in local 
administration and therefore expanded opportunities for self governance. 
Harder guarantees of ethnic autonomy give these agencies exclusive 
jurisdiction in specific policy realms. Relatively soft guarantees of ethnic 
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autonomy give the central government and ethnic agencies concurrent 
jurisdiction. The latter is softer because it carries significant risk of poaching on 
the prerogatives of ethnic agencies by a fiscally and politically dominant central 
government or even outright pre-emption by the central government. 
 
2.1.3   Predetermined Decisions 
 
Formal power sharing rules often set some issues such as the allocation of 
valuable governmental resources outside the decision making powers of all 
levels of government. In power sharing these predetermined decisions typically 
include formulas for proportional allocation of such government resources as 
educational funds or positions within the bureaucracy and the military. These 
are issues that the drafters of power sharing institutions do not feel they can 
entrust to subsequent generations of politicians and the uncertainties of 
democracy. Thus various Nigerian constitutions since 1979 have made 
balanced recruitment and balanced allocation of fundamental principles in 
federal decision making. The 1999 constitution specifies for example that not 
only “the composition of any of its appointed agencies and the conduct of its 
affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character 
of Nigeria. Cyprus 1960 constitution mandated that the republic’s army would 
consist of 2000 men 60 percent were to be Greeks and 40 percent Turks. The 
police and the gendarmerie were to consist of another 2000 men of these 70 
percent were to be Greeks and 30 percent Turks.  
 
Harder guarantees that these 70 percent were to be Greeks and 30 percent 
Turks. Harder guarantees that these decisions will remain outside the 
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jurisdiction of all levels government prohibit amendments to the formulas or at 
least mandate extraordinary procedures such as a constituent assembly to 
enact a change of rules. Softer guarantees can be amended by some simpler 
procedure such as legislative majority.  
 
Of course there are subtle differences among the proposals for power sharing 
institutions. Perhaps the best known is the difference between what is 
sometimes called the consociational approach of Lijphart and the integrative 
approach of Donald Horowitz. Consociationalism is characterised by such 
protections for segmental interests as the grand coalition, mutual veto, 
proportional allocations and autonomy. The integrative approach seeks to 
manage conflict through the use of incentives to promote interethnic 
cooperation in parties and electoral campaigns. Despite such differences the 
power sharing approach is defined by at least three common characteristics. 
These approaches share a commitment to what Timothy Sisk calls a coalescent 
democracy as opposed to competitive democracy; thus governments and 
legislatures represent inclusive coalitions of ethnic groups. They privilege one 
dimension of social cleavage-ethnicity-in designing institutions and defining 
policy equity rather than seeking to identify dimensions of social cleavage in 
which ethnicity is not the primary dimension that separates majority from 
minority. And they tend to concentrate powers particularly through federalism 
or autonomy in a few critical decision making areas in which ethnic interests 
must be reconciled either at the electoral stage of in the decision making stage.  
 
The case for power sharing is not simply a scholarly discourse; it is intended as 
practical policy advice as well. Indeed many authors have advised 
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constitutional commissions in a number of new democracies in ethnically plural 
societies on the design of their constitutions. The themes of these authors have 
been adopted as an agenda for action by a number of governmental, 
international and non governmental organisations advising new states on 
institutional design. For example scholars associated with the United States 
Institute for Peace have issued that examine a variety of alternative power 
sharing arrangements to solve ethnic conflicts. The International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance has issued a handbook that outlines 
options for negotiators in developing democracies with deeply rooted conflicts. 
The East Europe Constitutional Design Forum in London has published a 
handbook on electoral and constitutional models for ethnically divided 
countries. All advocate some form of power sharing institutions.  
 
2.1.4   The Perils of Power Sharing 
 
The sad irony of power sharing arrangements is that when they are extended 
to ethnically divided societies they have created both motives and means for 
the ethnic elites empowered by power sharing to escalate ethnic conflicts. No 
matter whether the ethnic elites intended it or not this escalation has tended 
to threaten the consolidation of peace and democracy. Specifically in ethnically 
divided societies power sharing institutions have given rise to at least seven key 
problems that have thwarted the consolidation of peace and democracy. These 
are problems that emerge in ethnically divided societies even when there has 
not been a recent conflict. 
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2.1.5   Limits to Democracy  
 
Power sharing limits democracy. Power sharing institutions typically seek to 
create a stable cartel among the elites of ethnic groups and often other 
interest groups. As Nils Butenschon notes these elites in plural societies must 
deviate from competitive practices of political decision making on the national 
level as is the accepted norm in Western democracies and avoid public appeals 
to their respective constituencies over the issues that are most divisive among 
groups. These elites can compromise with another because they can enjoy the 
discretionary freedom that comes from their predominance over a politically 
deferential and organizationally encapsulated following. Nordlinger contends 
that a necessary condition for conflict regulation is a form of structured 
relations between leaders and non elites in which the leaders are clearly 
predominant and their demands regularly fulfilled. Yet carried too far powers 
sharing institutions limit precisely those essential elements that define 
democracy. Democracy requires competition among elites over the important 
policy concerns of the public and accountability of the elites to the citizenry on 
these most important policy issues through regular elections. Such elections 
permit the citizens to select among competing party elites.  
 
2.1.6  Institutional Weapons  
 
Powers sharing institutions frequently empower the leaders of ethnic groups 
with the means to challenge the power sharing agreement. Many institutions 
of inclusive decision-making such as mutual vetoes can be used to begin a 
game of brinkmanship in which each side threatens to force a deadlock in a 
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governmental decision-making until the other side grants further concessions. 
Many institutions of partitioned decision-making such as the power of 
autonomous homelands in ethno federal states can be abused by regional 
leaders including ethno military warlords to press central government for 
further devolution and to extract income that can be invested in future fighting 
capacity.  
 
This predation in turn can feed the fears and suspicions that give ethnic elites 
the motive to challenge the power sharing agreement in anticipation of 
defection by the other side. Power sharing in the highly charged environment 
at the end of a conflict is complicated by fear and suspicion among ethnic 
communities and frequently by the reality that each power of government 
allocated to an ethnic group is an opportunity for it to exploit. Ethnic elites may 
fear frequently with justification that the vetoes or autonomy granted other 
groups can be used as weapons to extort concessions. Thus in Cyprus President 
Makarios complained bitterly of the vice presidents use of veto to wring further 
concessions for the Turkish minority. Meanwhile Greeks complaints fuelled 
fears in the Turkish community that the decision rights of the minority were 
being threatened. 
 
2.1.7   Focus on Inter-Ethnic Allocation   
 
Power sharing institutions shape the agenda of politics and privilege issues of 
interethnic allocation of power and resources. Consequently the issues that 
divide ethnic groups from one another come to occupy a central place in 
politics under power sharing sustain interethnic conflict at high levels and keep 
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alive fundamental issues of renegotiating  the rules of power sharing. For 
example ethnic elites under power sharing often debate whether the rules of 
proportionality disadvantage one or another unfairly. This challenge to the 
predetermined decision is particularly common among elites who believe that 
the members of their own communities exhibit special skills and achievements 
and that proportionality discriminates against their more qualified candidates 
for positions in favour of less qualified members of other ethnic groups. 
Proportionality may leave ethnic groups residing in wealthier regions 
particularly aggrieved. In Nigeria for example minority peoples such as those of 
the oil producing areas in the Niger Delta felt marginalised because the greater 
part of the benefits were allocated to other states on the basis of need. 
Similarly as the Soviet Union began to democratise, the wealthier Baltic regions 
were the first to complain that the redistributive policies imposed by Moscow 
were unfair. In each of these cases issues of allocation were not only points of 
interethnic distribution but also fundamental questions concerning revision of 
the power sharing institutions themselves.  
 
2.1.8  The Second Generation Problem  
 
Even where ethnic elites are initially sincere in their commitments to power 
sharing, elite incentives particularly but not exclusively in the majority group 
change once a power sharing arrangement is in place a moral hazard or time 
inconsistency problem that can be called the second generation problem in 
power sharing institutions. Although a majority group may perceive that it has 
an incentive to make concessions on power sharing at the time a peace accord 
is negotiated, these incentives tend to shift as the contract becomes a reality. 
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As the need to reassure weaker parties becomes less immediate, the majority 
party is inclined to focus on the problems of governance and maintaining 
political power. Its need to act in a conciliatory manner toward ethnic 
minorities diminishes and the requirements of decisive governance increase 
raising questions as to the majority groups continuing commitment to the 
principle of proportionality in civil service recruitment regional allocations or 
representation in the decision making process. Compromises among elites who 
negotiated the original power sharing agreement may become particularly 
difficult to maintain and as a consequence, the power sharing institutions may 
be threatened when ambitious up and coming politicians engage in outbidding 
behaviour to outflank the moderate elites within their own community. Under 
pressure from their constituents to pursue the community’s narrow self 
interest, the political leaders of the majority community in particular will find it 
harder to compromise in order to realise the common interest of all ethnic 
groups and to uphold a long term commitment to what at times seems to their 
constituents to be a disadvantageous arrangement. When ambitious up and 
coming leaders with more radical demands actually succeed in replacing 
moderates, the upshot is to complicate still further the maintenance of the 
ruling elite cartel and therefore the ethnic balance of power. For example 
Serbian leaders who succeed Josip Broz Tito as part of the collective leadership 
of Yugoslavia found they were outflanked within Serbia by more radical leaders 
made holding the federation together more difficult. Subsequently, the 
outflanking of Milosevic by still more radical nationalists such as Vojislav Seselj 
and the addition of these radicals to form a parliamentary majority in Serbia 
led to a further radicalisation of politics in the last year of the Yugoslav 
Federation. 
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2.1.9   Governmental Inefficiency 
 
Power sharing arrangements are designed to expand the representativeness of 
the state but this representativeness often comes at the cost of greater 
governmental inefficiency. Inclusive decision making particularly by 
guaranteeing ethnic representation and granting vetoes to ethnic spokesmen 
and women makes policymaking slower and more likely to end in deadlock, 
Partitioned decision making agencies and bureaucracies. For example parallel 
educational systems and parallel courts in the same regions multiply 
administrative costs. For countries emerging from civil conflict these costs may 
overtax a very weak revenue base. With additional costs the government may 
simply have to deliver less in the way of education and other services. For 
example Edmond Keller and Lahra Smith document that Ethiopia has found 
that it is an enormous financial burden to develop course texts and train 
teachers to conduct classes simultaneously in the various languages of the 
regions. Ethnic leaders and their constituents may quickly grow disillusioned 
with a government that cannot help them reconstruct their lives after civil war 
nor provide them with hope for significant improvement in the future.  
 
2.1.10 Governmental Rigidity 
 
Power sharing arrangements tend to be inflexible and unable to adapt to 
rapidly changing social conditions during a transition from intense conflict. In 
reassuring all major groups about their autonomy or representation at the 
political centre, power sharing institutions freeze a status quo that makes 
political change difficult. Yet a post conflict environment may demand dynamic 
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arrangements that can shift over time as socioeconomic interests change and 
new actors enter the political process. In general, however institutions 
particularly strong institutions that represent credible commitments to power 
sharing among ethnic groups in divided societies are likely to be sticky. 
Lebanon’s inability to adapt its institutions to a changing social environment 
except in the face of political crisis and finally civil war attests to this stickiness. 
Balancing the competing needs for strong institutions and flexible institutions 
through power sharing may be well beyond the abilities of constitutional 
designers. This is particularly problematic for completing the transition to 
democracy. In exceptional cases such as South Africa during its transition from 
apartheid to non racial democracy, power sharing institutions have facilitated 
the evolution of stable intergroup relations leading to full democracy. What 
begins as a pact among ethnic elites must be transformed into dense webs of 
interdependent relations among an expanding set of political participants. 
Once in place, power sharing institutions must evolve with the steady adoption 
of more democratic rules. Yet power sharing institutions is typically create the 
conditions for the dominant political class to resist change. This resistance may 
lead to escalating political conflict and repression. Excluded politicians may be 
too impatient to remain differential as behind the scenes negotiations and 
compromises slow or even block the transition to democracy.  
 
In the face of opposition from the elite cartel, often the only way for new 
politicians to break into politics is through the transformation of the power 
sharing arrangement itself. In reaction the dominant elites may respond indeed 
they are expected to respond in order to maintain their structured 
predominance with repression of the leaders questioning the system in the 
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name of democratisation. For example Lebanese power sharing broke down as 
newcomers challenged the pre-eminence of traditional elites, these elites 
attempted to reassert their authority with repression and the elites found it 
imprudent to continue honouring many of their commitments to one another 
under the old power sharing rules. Since power sharing is often an elitist 
approach it tends to resist not only political adaptation to social change as well. 
 
2.1.11 Inadequate Enforcement  
 
It may be difficult to enforce the rules of a power sharing arrangement against 
opportunistic behaviour by the leaders of ethnic groups that are the major 
parties to the agreement. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish sanctions from 
predation. Attempts by group leaders and even attempts by a central 
government that is supposed to be above all ethnic groups to sanction 
violations of the rules frequently escalate conflict among ethnic groups and 
threaten agreement. Without an external guarantor to ensure stability, 
especially in the early phases of implementation, aggrieved interests can 
always find reasons to renege on their commitments. Domestic enforcement 
agencies can be captured by ethnic interests and even when they are not 
captured, the leaders of some ethnic groups may believe these agencies are 
partisans of one side. Thus in the last years of the Soviet Union when Mikhail 
Gorbachev attempted to enforce rules against Estonia and Georgia that 
prohibited union republics from discriminating against their own minorities this 
action was taken as escalation of a conflict between the union republic 
governments and Moscow and it provoked counter escalation by union 
republic leaders. Gorbachev was seen as a partisan of an empire that kept 
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Russians in a dominant position in a dominant position over Estonians and 
Georgians.  
 
Domestic enforcement agencies run jointly can become paralyzed by the same 
opportunistic behaviour that they are supposed to monitor and sanction. 
Designers may try to decentralise monitoring and enforcement among the 
parties to the agreement by permitting ethnic elites to sanction one another 
for failure to fulfil commitments, but this leads to a proliferation of institutional 
weapons that makes power sharing even more fragile. Perhaps the best 
indication of all these intrinsic difficulties in implementing power sharing is the 
high mortality rates for power sharing arrangements. Many of the cases cited 
by power sharing advocates as successes have in fact ended in failure. Such 
failures result in the collapse of democracy renewed ethnic conflict and 
violence and the abandonment of the power sharing arrangement. For 
example among the 16 experiments with power sharing institutions cited by 
Horowitz, 12 were subsequently discarded.  
 
2.1.12 The Conditions Necessary for the Success of a Power Sharing 
Arrangement 
 
Under proper conditions the experience with power sharing may be more 
positive. According to proponents of the power sharing strategy seven 
conditions can favour the success of power sharing institutions even in 
ethnically divided societies. Yet in ethnically divided societies few if any of 
these conditions are typically present at the end of the conflicts particularly 
after conflicts as intense as civil wars. 
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2.1.13 Elite Dominance 
 
In a power sharing agreement the parties must be able to fulfil their 
commitments in the contract. This means the ethnic elites must continue to 
assure one another that they can enforce this agreement within their 
respective ethnic groups an enforce subsequent decisions reached through its 
inclusive decision making procedures. These commitments may be more 
credible as Nordlinger suggests when elites have demonstrated predominance 
within their group. Yet even in normal times, this type of ethnic solidarity is 
uncommon. Internal diversity of ethnic groups because of divisions among 
regions, clans, classes or personalities complicates the processes of negotiating 
and maintaining durable power sharing arrangements. Ethnic leaders must 
actively develop a common position within the ethnic community before 
entering into political exchanges with other spokespersons at the political 
centre.  
 
This two step process complicates the operation of a power sharing 
arrangement and increases the likelihood of governmental immobilisme. In the 
rapidly changing conditions that prevail at the end of a conflict, it is unlikely 
that elite dominance will remain secure. Even if the conflict itself strengthened 
the unity of the ethnic group, the rapid transition from conflict to peace is likely 
to encourage both splits among elites within individual ethnic groups and the 
rise of challengers from the stratum of young up and coming leaders. For 
example in Northern Ireland a roadblock in the path to implementing the Good 
Friday Agreements arose quickly when it became apparent in the November 
2003 elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly that the moderate leaders of 
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both protestant Ulstermen and Catholic Irish did not command unified support 
within their respective communities and could not deliver votes. The two 
parties that emerged as the largest in the Assembly the Democratic Unionists 
and the Sinn Fein could not work together to sustain the power sharing 
agreement. Alternatively where some possess hierarchical organisation, this 
disparity mat pose a threat to other groups that are not organised and may 
feed fears among the weak about long term commitment of the strong to 
power sharing. Weakness or erosion of elite dominance within the respective 
communities can also increase the incentive of members of the power sharing 
elite to resist compromises or break commitments among themselves. 
Problems of credible commitments among the elites of different ethnic groups 
may become particularly acute when the balance of factional power shifts 
within their respective groups. As extremists within a group gain a substantial 
following and effectively challenge their representatives in the elite cartel, the 
existing elites may find it very difficult to continue support for power sharing. It 
is true as John McGarry and Brendan O Leary assert that the leaders of the rival 
ethnic communities must fear the consequences of ethnic war and desire to 
preserve the economic and political stability of the regions. Yet in many 
circumstances they fear the relatively remote probability of ethnic war less 
than they fear the immediate threat to their political position from radicals 
within their respective communities.  
 
2.1.14     A Culture of Accommodation 
 
Where a trans-societal bargaining culture is present as in Belgium Switzerland 
and India, it facilitates the negotiation of intergroup issues. Where this culture 
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exists only as an elite culture limited to the power sharing leaders, there may 
still be a basis for sustained compromises although a much more fragile basis. 
Major group actors come to anticipate that their rivals will reciprocate their 
positive moves and when this occurs they are able to interact according to the 
rules of the political game. Such a bargaining culture, parties to an agreement 
are more likely to accept costs in the short term or in individual decisions 
because they expect greater gains in the longer term or in subsequent 
decisions.  
 
2.2   Autonomy 
 
Autonomy has been defined as a means for the diffusion of powers in order to 
preserve the unity of a state while respecting the diversity of its population. 
Etymologically, the term autonomy derives from two Greek words: auto 
meaning self and nomos meaning law or rule. Thus the original meaning of the 
word was the right to make one’s own laws. Today the concept is used in three 
different branches of science: philosophy and its derivatives; the natural 
sciences and law, political science and international relations. For philosophers 
autonomy is a person’s power to determine by oneself through one’s own 
rational will positive liberty or self mastery; in the natural sciences, the concept 
means organic independence or the condition of a phenomenon conforming 
only to its own laws and not being subject to higher rules, that is not a mere 
form or state of some other organism.  
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2.2.1  Autonomy as Described by Various Scholars 
  
Georg Jellinek has describes an autonomous entity as one based solely on its 
own laws and with all the material and functional attributes of statehood: the 
authority to govern, to administer and to judge. Practically this seems to be a 
synonym of sovereignty. According to Paul Laband, autonomy always includes 
the power of legislation but differs from sovereignty in that it can be exercised 
only within the limits established by the sovereign. A somewhat similar notion 
of autonomy is found in the writings of Carre de Malberg. An entity may be 
regarded as autonomous only when it has its own non-derivative original 
powers of legislation, administration and adjudication. It should be 
distinguished from self-government… a notion implying that the self-
administering entity is subordinated to a superior entity that could have 
administered it by itself. It is interesting that Carre de Malberg speaks of self-
government and administrative decentralisation as if the two terms were 
interchangeable. For Leon Duguit autonomy implies an area protected from the 
legislative power of the state. Henry Berthelemy uses the term as a synonym 
for decentralisation while Maurice Hauriou uses it to describe the discretion 
that the laws sometimes give to the administration .  
 
Heinrich Dorge defined autonomy by referring to the regimes of autonomy 
established in the wake of World War I mainly in the Aaland Islands and the 
Memmel Territory, In his opinion, those regimes have two characteristics: First 
the authority of the autonomous entity includes all the significant attributes of 
state power (legislation, adjudication and administration) and secondly those 
matters that are under the authority of the autonomous body are once and for 
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all removed from the state’s legislative power unless the autonomous entity 
expressly agrees to a different arrangement. Dorge was aware that some 
entities designated as autonomous  did not in fact meet his definition for 
example the autonomous republics regions and areas in the Soviet Union; he 
denied however that these entities enjoyed genuine autonomy. Jacob 
Robinson examined the nature of autonomy in the context of his seminal study 
on Memmel by comparing it with sovereignty. In his opinion, internal 
sovereignty assumes the supreme and unrestricted authority of the state 
subject only to restrictions that are expressly specified. Autonomy on the other 
hand exists only in respect to those powers that have expressly been granted. 
Within the context of UN decolonisation efforts Louis Sohn sums up his 
conception of autonomy as follows: The concept of an autonomous area is in 
between the concepts of a non self governing territory and an independent 
state. The autonomous territory is authorised to deal with economic, social and 
cultural matters, free from interference by another government. The central 
government retains powers in the fields of foreign relations and international 
security are interlinked, the central government may also have some control 
over security. Rudolf Bernhardt distinguishes between a broad and narrow 
concept of autonomy.  
 
In its broad sense autonomy denotes the limits of State interference on the one 
hand and the autonomous determination and regulation of certain affairs by 
specific institutions on the other hand whereas the narrower sense it denotes 
protection and self determination of minorities. In his opinion it is in the 
narrower sense that the notion of autonomy denotes protection and self-
determination of minorities. In his opinion, it is in the narrower sense that the 
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term is employed in modern international law. James Crawford has suggested a 
shorter definition. For him autonomous areas are regions of a State usually 
possessing some ethnic or cultural distinctiveness which have been granted 
separate powers of internal administration to whatever degree without being 
detached from the State of which they are part. In their 1980 study on The 
Concept of Autonomy in International Law Hurst Hannum and Richard Lillich 
express the opinion that autonomy and self government are determined 
primarily by the degree of actual as well as formal independence enjoyed by 
the autonomous entity in its political decision making process. Generally 
autonomy is understood to refer to independence of action on the internal 
hands of the central or national government but occasionally power to 
conclude international agreements concerning cultural or economic matters 
also may reside with the autonomous entity in its political decision making 
process. Generally autonomy is understood to refer to independence of action 
on the internal or domestic level as foreign affairs and defence normally are in 
the hands of the central or national government but occasionally power to 
conclude international agreements concerning cultural or economic matters 
may also reside with the autonomous entity.  
 
Writing in 1990 Hannum gives a more object oriented definition emphasising 
the purpose of autonomy: Personal and political autonomy is in some real 
sense the right to be different and to be left alone; to preserve, protect and 
promote values which are beyond the legitimate reach of society. The shortest 
description of autonomy known to this author is that of Heinrich Oberreuter 
referring to Pohlmann; the opportunity for free self determination within the 
framework of a legally pre-existing order. A practical definition has been 
 
114 
adopted by Henry Steiner: Autonomy regimes for ethnic minorities… amount to 
governmental systems or subsystems administered or staffed by a minority or 
its members. In summary the approaches to autonomy discussed above can be 
classified into four main categories: One group includes those theories that 
compare autonomy to a right to act upon one’s own discretion in certain 
matters, whether the right is possessed by an individual or by an official body; 
others use autonomy more or less as a synonym for independence according to 
a third notion, autonomy is synonymous with decentralisation; and under a 
fourth notion, an autonomous entity is one that has exclusive powers of 
legislation administration and adjudication in specific areas. The latter is called 
political autonomy as opposed to administrative autonomy which is limited to 
powers in the sphere of administration. In the literature on minorities’ rights 
autonomy has been used to denote limited self rule. In private law it expresses 
the power of persons to conclude contracts and perform legally relevant 
transactions.  
 
2.2.2   An Eclectic Description of Autonomy 
 
Having examined the various theories on the concept of autonomy this thesis 
advances an eclectic description of autonomy. Due to the fact that there are 
numerous differences between the definitions already discussed the following 
description does not accurately reflect or accommodate these differences. A 
territorial political autonomy is an arrangement aimed at granting to a group 
that differs from the majority of the population in the state but that constitutes 
the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the majority in 
a specific region, a means by which it can express its distinct identity. A main 
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issue involved in the establishment of a regime of autonomy is the division of 
powers between the central authorities and the autonomous entity. The 
powers of the autonomy are usually related to matters of culture, economics 
and social affairs. There are however different degrees of autonomy and the 
extent of the powers transferred to the autonomous authorities varies 
accordingly ranging from a very limited to a larger and up to a high 
concentration of major powers in the above areas. Usually foreign relations 
and external security are reserved for the central government; however in a 
few cases the autonomous body has limited powers with the consent of the 
central government to enter into international agreements and to become a 
member of a particular organisation. For example Aland is a member of the 
Nordic Council and with the approval of Finland is permitted to conclude 
agreements with the Nordic countries. 
 
In order to avoid disputes and misunderstandings it is important that the 
powers of a regime of autonomy be defined as clearly as possible when it is 
established. There are usually four different areas of powers to be considered: 
powers reserved for the central authorities, those fully transferred to the 
autonomous entity, parallel powers and powers that can only be exercised 
jointly. In certain cases the central authorities determine a general policy in a 
number of areas in which the autonomous entity may act and the local 
authorities are authorised to operate within the limits of this general policy. 
There is usually a need for cooperation, coordination and consultation between 
central authorities and the autonomous entity. This is crucial because there is 
likely to be a close link between their respective powers. In addition certain 
powers are likely to require joint action. Even if the transferred powers are 
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carefully and meticulously described when the autonomy is established future 
difficulties cannot always be prevented. For example there may be differences 
of opinion regarding to which category of powers a certain practical matter 
belongs. Similarly a question may arise in an area of powers that had not been 
considered beforehand or a question may arise that encompasses different 
areas one of which is within the jurisdiction of the centre and the other within 
that of the autonomy.  
 
In many cases in order to ensure cooperation the parties establish a joint organ 
in which both the central government and the autonomous entity are 
represented such as is the case with the Aland Delegation. In addition the 
parties may agree upon a special procedure for settling disputes between the 
centre and autonomous body for example the documents that established the 
autonomy of the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Memmel. As already noted 
above, the powers of the autonomous entity usually include legislation, 
adjudication and administration in those spheres of responsibility that have 
been transferred to the autonomous entity. In some cases however 
adjudication remains fully within the authority of the central government. The 
legislative acts of the autonomous area usually requires confirmation by the 
central authorities but this confirmation by the central authorities must be 
given except in severe cases defined in advance for example when those 
legislative acts amount to an excess of power or undermine the security of the 
state. The assumption is that the representatives of the population in the 
autonomous area exercise the relevant powers. Nevertheless coordination is 
often needed between the centre and the autonomous authorities regarding 
the appointment of one or more high ranking officials like the representatives 
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of central government in the autonomous region or the head of local 
administration. In most cases the official is either appointed jointly or by the 
local authorities with the consent of the centre or vice versa. The acts of the 
autonomous entity in the areas for which it has jurisdiction are normally not 
subject to any control by the central authorities except as mentioned in such 
cases as excess of jurisdiction. In certain cases the inhabitants of the 
autonomous region participate fully in the public life both in their region and in 
the framework of the central government for example in Aland, South Tyrol 
and in the past in Southern Sudan. A regime of autonomy can be established by 
an international treaty, by a constitution by a statute or by a combination of 
instruments of these categories; probably it may even be established by a 
custom. 
 
2.2.3    Personal or Cultural Autonomy 
 
Up until now this thesis has been concerned with territorial autonomy that is 
powers granted to the population of a specified geographical area. However 
this discussion on autonomy would be incomplete without addressing another 
type of autonomy namely personal or cultural autonomy. Redslob has 
described personal autonomy as the attribute of a community whose members 
are connected by individual characteristics such as ethnic consciousness or 
language and irrespective of their location or abode. In other words this type of 
autonomy applies to all members of a certain group within the state regardless 
of the place of their residence. Personal autonomy is usually granted to ethnic, 
cultural, religious or linguistic minorities. In the case of personal autonomy, the 
state grants minorities the right to take the necessary steps through their own 
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institutions in order to protect and implement their own rights. They may act 
upon their own discretion but within the limits of the laws of the state. In 
principle each individual should be able to decide whether or not to belong to 
the minority group; however certain groups in particular religious ones and 
indigenous populations tend to establish conditions for membership. In certain 
situations, it may also be difficult to leave a particular group. Personal 
autonomy has a great advantage over territorial autonomy: As mentioned it 
usually applies only to people who opt to be members of the group for which it 
is established. Territorial autonomy on the other hand may apply to all 
inhabitants of a certain region thus including those who are not members of 
the group for whose benefit the regime is established and who may even 
resent it. Territorial has another disadvantage: Since people tend to move from 
one place to another, the composition of the population of a given region may 
change; the former majority in the region might become a minority and 
consequently the regime of autonomy may lose its raison d’être. This may be 
problematic is the relocation that changes the composition of the population is 
encouraged by the central government. On the hand territorial autonomy has 
the advantage that in addition to cultural matters, it can also apply to a wide 
range of social and economic affairs whereas personal autonomy has usually 
been limited to matters of culture, language, charity, religion and education. 
Personal autonomy has the advantage of applying to all members of an ethnic 
group in a country regardless of their location.  
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2.3      Federalism as a Conflict Management Tool 
 
Any scholar of federalism would acknowledge the complexity in defining 
federalism in view of the various ways in which it has been employed.143 
Indeed, one researcher has identified 267 different conceptions of the term.144 
Nevertheless, federalism or the federal principle in this thesis refers to the 
philosophical or ideological idea that a political organisation should seek to 
achieve both political integration and political freedom by combining shared 
rule on some matters and self-rule in various forms on others.145 Federalism is 
a normative and philosophical concept based on the notion that the greatest 
human fulfilment is to be found through participation in a wider community 
that at the same time favours diversity and protects individuality.146  The 
practice of federalism links individuals or groups within various political 
entities, forming part of a broader single entity, in a lasting but limited union in 
such a way as to provide for the pursuit of common ends, while maintaining 
their respective integrities usually through permitting some level of discretion 
in policy making on their part. This thesis discusses the application of the 
federal principle in Sudan. 
 
 
 
                                            
143  J Anton American federalism and public policy (1989) 3. 
144  See W Stewart Concepts of federalism (1984). 
145   J Madison, A Hamilton, and J Jay The federalist (1987) 515 opine that as a normative 
concept federalism entails both elements of self-rule and shared rule. See also D 
Elazar Exploring federalism (1987). 
146  On this definition of federalism see B De Villiers “Federalism in South Africa: 
Implications for individual and minority protection” (1993) South African Journal of 
Human Rights 375. For the same definition see P King Federalism and federation 
(1982) 159. 
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2.3.1   Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation 
 
A federation is a distinct political system which typically comprises of a 
sovereign state in which at least two governmental units, the federal and the 
regional enjoy constitutionally separate competencies – although they may 
also have concurrent powers. Both the federal and regional governments are 
empowered to deal directly with their citizens and the relevant citizens directly 
elect at least some components of the federal and regional governments. In a 
federation, the federal government usually cannot unilaterally alter the 
horizontal division of powers: constitutional change affecting competencies 
requires the consent of both levels of government. Therefore, a federation 
automatically implies a codified and written constitution and is normally 
accompanied at the federal level by a supreme court charged with umpiring 
differences between the governmental tiers and by a bicameral legislature in 
which the federal as opposed to the popular chamber may disproportionately 
represent the smaller regions. Elazar has emphasised the covenantal character 
of federations, that is, the authority of each government is derived from a 
constitution and convention rather than from any other government as is the 
case with autonomy.  
 
Federations vary in the extent to which they are majoritarian in character but 
most constrain the power of federation wide majorities in particular they 
constrain the federal demos though there is extensive variation in this respect. 
The United States, Brazil and Australia allow equal representation to each of 
their regions in the federal chamber meaning massive over representation for 
the smaller units. Other federations also over represent less populous units but 
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not to this extent. Federations differ additionally in the competencies granted 
to the upper house or federal chamber. Some chambers such as the United 
States Senate are extremely powerful and arguably more powerful than the 
House of Representatives because of its special powers over nominations to 
public office and in treaty making. Others including those in Canada, India and 
Belgium are weak. In some instances a single state, province or region can 
block a constitutional change but normally a veto requires a coalition of two or 
more such entities. Negatively defined a federation is majoritarian to the 
extent that it lacks consociational practices of executive power sharing, 
proportionality principles of representation and allocation, cultural autonomy 
and veto rights. Further it is majoritarian to the extent that it lacks consensual 
institutions or practices such as separation of powers, bills of rights and courts 
and monetary institutions insulated from immediate governing majorities. A 
majoritarian federation concentrates power and resources at the federal level 
and facilitates executive and legislative dominance either by a popularly 
endorsed executive president or by a single party premier and cabinet. 
 
Federations can be multinational/multi-ethnic or mono-national in character. 
In the former, boundaries of the internal units are usually drawn in such a way 
that national or ethnic minorities control at least some of them. In addition 
more than one nationality may be explicitly recognised as co-founders and co-
owners of the federation. On the other hand national federations may be 
nationally or ethnically homogeneous (or predominantly so) or the may be 
organised often consciously so as not to recognise more than one official 
nationality. This often happens in such a way that the state’s national and 
ethnic minorities are also minorities in each of the constituent units. The 
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intention behind national federalism is nation building and elimination of 
internal national differences. The founding and paradigmatic example of a 
national federation is the United States. The Latin American federations of 
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, African federations of Ethiopia and 
Nigeria adopted its model. American educated intellectuals have often 
proposed national federations as a way to deal with ethnic heterogeneity in 
post colonial and post communist societies.  
 
2.3.2   Ethnic Federalism as a Solution to Ethnic Conflict 
 
Ethnic federalism is an attempt to create a territorial solution to ethnic conflict 
by acknowledging the need to grant some degree of autonomy to ethnic 
groups within a state but attempts to do so without complete secession. As 
Professor Tully explains: 
 
The most familiar form of the politics of cultural recognition is the 
claims of nationalist movements to be constitutionally recognised as 
either independent nation states or as autonomous political 
associations within various forms of multinational federations and 
confederations.  
 
Federalism based on  ethnic  divisions provides a solution to demands for 
recognition without dissolving the unity of the nation-state.  Ethnic-  based 
federalism is an institutional arrangement that acknowledges and uses  ethnic  
units "as a basis for local governments," in the hopes that doing so will 
harmonize inter-group conflicts.147 From another perspective,  ethnic  
federalism is the attempt to align affective communities with political 
                                            
147  James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity pages 5-6 
(1995). 
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communities.148 Affective communities are groups held together by a "personal 
or emotional connection,"149 such as religion or  ethnicity.150 Political 
communities are bound by common decision-making processes, not social or 
emotional ties. A federal structure based on  ethnicity  is only appropriate 
when  ethnic  groups generally associate with a particular territory, and the 
territorial sub-parts of a nation are, therefore, able to generally align with 
regions inhabited by distinct  ethnic  groups.151 The challenge of  ethnic  
federalism is to create a state whose citizens perceive themselves as having a 
dual identity, both as members of a particular group and as citizens of the 
nation-state.152 Those who criticize the system of  ethnic  federalism claim that 
rather than facilitate this dual identity, it reinforces the divisions in the society 
or encourages the creation of new divisions, making tensions higher and 
fragmentation of the state more likely.153 Proponents of the theory argue that 
political actors will act in accordance with the underlying  ethnic  power 
structure, whether it is recognized or unrecognized.154 Where  ethnicity  is a 
powerful force, political actors are not likely to act without reference to  
ethnicity  simply because political structures do not openly reflect or 
acknowledge  ethnicity.155  Ethnically based federal systems tend to be 
established where there has been a history of strong centralized government 
                                            
148  Id. 
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and dominant national power.156  In response to their past lack of power in the 
centralized state, minorities within the state may seek some degree of 
autonomy, the freedom to rule themselves in accordance with their own ways 
and customs.157 
 
Critics of ethnic federalism have raised several challenges to this system of 
government. First, unless a state is divided into irrationally small sections, some 
number of minority groups will remain in the various sub-parts. These 
minorities may be excluded from participation in the ethnically-based sub-
government or in the local economy. However, ethnic federalism also provides 
a unique opportunity for developing minority rights. Second, ethnic federal 
structures are usually asymmetrical in nature, affording each group different 
rights and privileges.158 This asymmetry may simply be a product of geography, 
with some groups historically living on fertile land containing great natural 
resources and others living on arid land with no natural resources. While 
federalism may produce a temporary consensus between the different groups 
in the formation process, asymmetrical systems are inherently difficult to 
operate, requiring great administrative capacity and political skills already 
lacking in many developing nations.159 Asymmetry also results in inequalities 
that amplify inter-group animosity, threatening the very core of the federal 
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system.160 Administrative difficulties are most problematic in the area of fiscal 
federalism, an area in which asymmetries may be most strongly felt.  Lastly, 
some argue that since  ethnicity  holds people together not by a reasonable 
policy choice, but by emotion,  ethnic  identity will be manipulated as a political 
resource and used to create blind support and loyalty.161 Others counter that  
ethnic  federalism does not create a vehicle of manipulation, but merely 
institutionalizes  ethnic  politics, and that it is impossible to eliminate, 
overcome or transcend the cultural dimension of politics.162 
 
Proponents of  ethnic  federalism believe that despite these concerns, the 
system can still meaningfully negotiate  ethnic  tensions.163 Making the  ethnic  
divisions part of the structure of the state may relieve fears of abuse based on  
ethnic  identity, thus reducing the ability of leaders to manipulate using  ethnic  
identity. Some  ethnic  theorists maintain that rather than further increase the 
problems of a nation by increasing friction between  ethnic  groups and 
allowing despotic rulers the freedom to use  ethnicity  to gain the 
unquestioned support of the people,  ethnic  federalism may instead actually 
reduce inter-group tensions.  
 
Such official recognition of  ethnic  and national differences could help mitigate 
age-old tensions. After all it is not the diversity that exist between or among 
peoples and cultures of a given country that causes conflicts, it is instead the 
way one manages or mis-manages difference. There will always be conflict, and 
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conflict itself is not unhealthy. Only conflict expressed through violent means is 
devastating to both nations and peoples. Thus the goal of ethnic federalism is 
to create a political structure through which ethnic groups may express 
conflicts peacefully without resort to civil ear or violent secession. 
 
2.4     The Potential of Federalism as a Conflict Management Tool 
 
There are at least eight ways in which federal institutions that is, the existence 
of substate territorial units holding some governmental power that the central 
government does not hold, can have benign effects on ethnic conflict. Some of 
these effects involve providing satisfactions at one level of government that are 
unavailable at others. Others entail restructuring of cleavages, interests, 
relations and alliances. Firstly, units placed below the central government, 
whether those are called provinces, regions, or states, can allow a group that is 
a minority in the country as a whole but a majority in a substate unit to 
exercise governmental power in ways that would be foreclosed if the whole 
country were one undifferentiated territory. For example, in Malaysia, where 
Chinese are about one-quarter of the total population and no longer exercise 
great power at the centre, they nevertheless are a majority in the state of 
Penang.164 The Chief Minister of that state has always been Chinese, and 
despite the rough edges of ethnic relations there, there is some sense of a 
government responsive to Chinese interests in Penang.165 Where groups are 
territorially differentiated, this is a very common function of federalism, and it 
can certainly mitigate, but not vitiate, a sense of minority exclusion at the 
central government level. The important point is that such provincial power, 
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while not completely satisfying, may be sufficient to avert attempts to secede, 
particularly because most such attempts fail anyway. 
 
Second, the existence of substate units can quarantine conflict within those 
unit boundaries. Ethnic violence in Malaysia has tended not to spread from one 
state to another. In the Nigerian First Republic (1960-1966), with three major 
territorial units (and one much smaller one), every ethnic issue threatened to 
engulf the whole country and ultimately did in the Biafra War.166 In the 
restructured Second and Third Republics, with larger numbers of states, many 
ethnic issues have become sub national issues limited to one state at a time. 
The issue of Sharia, or Islamic law--always a delicate problem in a country so 
evenly divided between Muslims and Christians--has become a state matter, 
with various solutions in the several northern states.167 These solutions have 
not always been reached peacefully, but at least the considerable disorder 
attending them has tended to be quarantined. Issues of this kind in Nigeria are 
highly contentious, but the contention is focused on the governmental level at 
which the power is lodged, and political losses do not necessarily create 
grievances that spill across boundaries into other units. 
 
Third, federalism can make it possible to mitigate discontent by making special, 
asymmetric arrangements for regions with special problems or distinctive 
identities. Indonesia is not formally a federal state but has a heavy measure of 
devolution to regions. In the case of Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, it 
has been possible to devolve power to impose Islamic law without devolving 
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that power to other sub national units.168 Quebec's special identity has been 
recognized in Canada, albeit with difficulty.169 Asymmetrical federalism in 
general makes special dispensations possible, but more possible at the 
periphery than near the centre of power. 
 
Fourth, in ethnically heterogeneous states, regional government provides a site 
at which politicians of various groups can encounter each other, become 
familiar with each other, engage in bargaining, and learn about the needs and 
aspirations of groups other than their own before they rise to the national 
level, where more complex and delicate issues of national policy may need to 
be resolved. Training in compromise is important in divided societies. This 
political socialization function of federalism in multiethnic countries is 
underappreciated. This may be one reason federalism is more often 
recommended when groups are territorially separate than when they are 
intermixed. Yet benign effects are possible in both. 
 
Fifth, division of a country into subunits can create incentives for political 
actors to see at least some issues in terms of competition among those 
subunits, rather than among ethnic groups. Consider a country with resource-
rich and resource-poor regions. Resource-rich regions are likely to argue for 
policies that apportion revenue from resources according to the principle of 
derivation (crudely, revenue should be returned to the place in which it 
originated), while resource-poor regions are likely to argue for policies 
apportioning revenue proportionately by population. If resource-rich units and 
resource-poor units do not coincide with particular ethnic groups, then this 
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argument over revenue will cross-cut ethnic divisions and create allies out of 
members of groups that may otherwise be antagonistic. One of the oldest 
hypotheses in ethnic conflict studies suggests that cross-cutting cleavages 
mitigate ethnic conflict. A major problem in severely divided societies is that it 
is very difficult to deliberately arrange for cross-cutting cleavages to present 
themselves. Federalism, however, may inadvertently do what ethnic conflict 
engineers cannot otherwise do. 
 
Sixth, federalism may activate sub-ethnic cleavages that drop conflict down to 
the sub national level from the national level or, to put it differently, from the 
intergroup to the intragroup level. Before India's reorganization of states along 
linguistic (ethnic) lines in the 1950s, the undivided state of Madras had a high 
level of conflict between Tamil speakers and Telugu speakers.170 The 
reorganization partitioned these two groups, placing Telugus in Andhra 
Pradesh and Tamils in Tamilnadu, and the structure of cleavages changed 
dramatically.171 In Andhra, for example, with Tamils absent, conflict took place 
among three intra-Andhra territorial groups, Telenganas, Coastals, and 
Ryalaseemas, and among several powerful landowning castes, especially 
Kammas and Reddis.172 Politically relevant group identities are malleable. One 
stimulus to which they respond is the territorial context. All else equal, the 
smaller the territorial context, the lower the level of politically salient identity. 
To put the matter crudely, if there are multiple territorial compartments, there 
are likely to be multiple sub-ethnic conflicts. Inevitably, the more of these there 
are, the more difficult it is for the country as a whole to be divided along a 
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single overarching cleavage line. One function of federalism, therefore, may be 
to create such ethnic and sub-ethnic complexity as to reduce the level of 
conflict the whole country experiences. This function is a corollary, in a sense, 
of the quarantine function. Countries, such as Tanzania, that have a large 
number of dispersed groups are generally not as conflict-prone at the national 
level as those, such as Sri Lanka, with a few large groups that meet at the 
centre of politics.173 
 
Seventh, federalism can serve as a de facto electoral reform. Territorial 
boundaries serve to partition electorates, sometimes in ways that exacerbate 
ethnic conflict, sometimes in ways that reduce it. The best example of this in 
both directions comes from Nigeria. As mentioned, the First Republic had three 
large regions. One of these, the Northern Region, contained about half the 
total Nigerian population.174 The Hausa-Fulani, about thirty percent of the 
Nigerian population but perhaps twice that percentage in the North, was able 
to gain control of the Northern Regional Government by securing a large 
majority for its party, the Northern People's Congress in the Northern 
legislature and squelching most opposition activity from minority ethnic groups 
in the North by a combination of patronage and denial of services to dissident 
areas.175 Using this strong position in the Northern Region as a base, the NPC 
was able to win a plurality of seats in the national legislature and, with a junior 
coalition partner from the south, to control the country as a whole.176 
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Essentially, the large size of the Northern Region allowed its largest group, with 
only thirty percent of the total population, a springboard to national power. 
During and after the Biafra War, Nigeria was redivided, first into twelve and 
then into nineteen states. During the Second Republic (1979-1983), the North 
was divided into ten states (out of nineteen), but the Hausa-Fulani were able to 
control only six of these; the remainder were controlled by non-Muslim and 
Muslim (but not Hausa-Fulani) political parties, as well as a dissident Hausa 
party.  
 
The difference was that with new state boundaries, the incentives and 
disincentives available to the former NPC over the whole Northern Region were 
limited to those states populated by genuine supporters of the successor to the 
NPC. In this way, the proliferation of states changed the arenas that groups and 
parties could dominate. After the reconfiguration of federal units, the Hausa-
Fulani were confined to something approximating a proportional share of 
electoral power, rather than the greater-than-proportional share they had 
enjoyed previously.177 No longer could they dominate Nigerian politics from 
their disproportionately large Northern base. In this sense, federalism 
amounted to an electoral reform. Eighth, federalism can provide a stimulus for 
interethnic alignments and coalitions. Once the Hausa-Fulani could no longer 
govern essentially alone, their political party was driven to seek genuine 
coalitions with other groups.178 If, then, federalism helps to proliferate groups 
and subgroups, or if it helps to confine the power of groups to a more or less 
proportional share, it will, all else equal, make it impossible for one group to 
aspire to control the whole government through the democratic process. If that 
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is so, and if parties remain ethnically based, as they are likely to be, then it 
follows that incentives to form interethnic coalitions will be enhanced. 
Interethnic coalitions are much more likely to attend to the interests of 
multiple groups, thereby reducing conflict, especially if the coalitions are 
formed before elections. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: POWER SHARING, AUTONOMY AND SECESSION  AS 
AN ANTIDOTES FOR IDENTITY CONFLICT IN SUDAN 
 
Preface  
 
This chapter examines Sudan’s experience in grappling with the ethnic 
question, in particular its resort to federalism and autonomy. On the whole, 
this chapter will trace the debate on federalism, which has featured all through 
Sudan’s quest for peace and unity. Apart form investigating the manner and 
content of federalism as has been employed, in particular, the 1972 Addis 
Ababa Peace Agreement179 (the Addis Agreement) and the Constitution of 1998 
(the 1998 Constitution), the political, sociological, anthropological and 
psychological issues revolving around these endeavours will be considered. This 
chapter lays the foundation for a discussion of the present Sudanese political 
and constitutional order, which is re-introduced the notion of autonomy in 
Sudanese politics. In the essence, this chapter will serve to bring the recent 
political and constitutional developments in Sudan into perspective. In doing 
this, it will also provide historical insight into the character of the conflict, 
highlighting the key issues that have been at the heart of the civil war. This 
chapter will equip the reader with a factual background that will enable the 
ensuing analysis of feasibility the Interim National Constitution. Sudan’s 
constitutional past and devotion to the rule of law is bleak. Sudan has had 
three transitional constitutions, two permanent constitutions and a series of 
constitutional decrees regarding constitutional issues in its 48-year history as 
                                            
179  The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan, Appendix B in M Beshir 
The Southern Sudan: From conflict to peace (1975) 158.  
 
135 
an independent state.180 This chapter also provides insight into the content and 
significance of the federal principle as employed in the Interim Constitution 
that was drafted on the basis of the CPA. The conceptual framework of analysis 
under chapter two and the federal history of Sudan under chapter three will 
inspire this analysis. It is hoped that this endeavour will expose the potential 
perils and possibilities for success of the present constitutional order in Sudan. 
 
 3.1       Background 
 
Many scholars have often referred to Sudan as the microcosm of Africa in the 
sense that it is at one and the same time both Arab and African.181 Whereas the 
internal cultural composition of Sudan may render it the microcosm of Africa 
physically, culturally and ethnically, this uniqueness confronts it with multiple 
political marginalisations rendering it neither distinctly African nor Arab, 
Muslim nor Christian. Internally, this puts it in an awkward position where the 
dominant elite mostly from the North desire the country to be Arab and 
Muslim and its Southern elite desire it to be African and “de-Arabised”.182 
These two contradictory and exclusivist desires have been at the heart of the 
Sudanese conflict. Since it erupted in 1983, the internal conflict between the 
North and the South has been reproducing itself time and again in 
unprecedented patterns of violence. There has been an array of efforts both at 
the domestic and international stage aimed at resolving this conflict. Of 
                                            
180  See M Hoebink Constitutional perspectives on Sudan (1999) 6-7. 
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Sudan in Africa 1985 228.  
182  A Mazrui “The multiple marginality of the Sudan” in Y Hassan Sudan in Africa (1985) 
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significance to this study, is the use of the federal principle in the quest for 
political integration and democratisation in Sudan.  
 
3.2   The Question of Autonomy in Pre-Independent Sudan 
 
Indeed if one wishes to come to terms with a political concept, one must first 
come to terms with its history in a given context albeit the risk of 
reconstructing it imperfectly. Rufus Davis has said of this task: 
 
“Those who travel the precarious journey into the past must not expect 
to find a beginning, nor one simple coherent thing, nor a single path, 
human institutions are not like that… Neither must they expect to find 
all the scattered shreds that need only the potter’s skill to bring them 
back to their original form... And worse for the explorer, there is no 
register of birth for political ideas, no birth names, no book of dates.” 
183 
 
Perilous as the journey into the past in the quest for the evolution of a concept 
may be, this study will proceed as best as can to trace the federal idea in 
Sudan’s political history. Sudan has a long history of state formation but only a 
targeted, skeletal history of the same is in order for purposes of this study. 
Historically, there existed five kingdoms in the area presently known as Sudan 
namely the Nubia, Maqarra, Alawa, Funj kingdoms and the Fur Sultanate.184 
The Nubia, Maqarra and Alawa kingdoms were Christian kingdoms situate in 
the South while the Fur Sultanate and Funj kingdom were Islamic and situate in 
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the North.185 The precursor of contemporary Sudan is said to date back at the 
establishment of a semi-centralised Islamic kingdom by the Funj kingdom 
following its defeat of the Nubia and Alawa kingdoms in 1754.186 By this 
conquest, the latter were brought under the central administration of the 
former. During this period, the cultural process of Islamism/Arabism was a 
mark of cultural superiority hence it would bestow upon an individual an 
esteemed status in society.187 For example, in the Fur Sultanate cultural and 
racial supremacy was asserted through proof of Arabic descent.188   
 
3.2.1   The Turko-Egyptian Rule (1821-1885) 
 
The Turko-Egyptian conquest of the Funj and Fur Sultanate in 1821 and 1873 
respectively, can be considered the earliest event that brought about a 
comprehensive centralised system of governance for the area presently known 
as Sudan. Naturally, as a colonial power extending its domains through military 
conquest, the Turko-Egyptian rule obliterated the boundaries between 
indigenous kingdoms and imposed central or unitary rule from Khartoum.189 
Some scholars have opined that this is the period that created the base for the 
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strong centralisation tendencies that have been the hallmark of the Sudanese 
state up until 1998 when federalism was first constitutionally entrenched.190  
The Turko-Egyptian rule has been described as the most brutal and exacting 
period of colonial rule that has dominated Sudan.191 Reforms introduced during 
this period included the centralisation of government, imposition of forced 
labour and service to the army, imposed taxation and monopolisation of the 
exiting trade in ivory.192 There was a policy of forced conversion to Islam and 
compulsory change of language from indigenous dialects to Arabic.193 The two 
most significant developments contributing to the North-South divide then, 
were the impoverishment of certain areas of the North through the forms of 
taxation already mentioned and land ownership, an act which contributed to 
the dramatic expansion of slave-raiding and slave-owning.194 Slave raiding was 
chiefly carried out from the South and while not all Southerners were 
negatively affected by it, some benefited from collaboration with the merchant 
companies or the government.195 Owing to the fact that the slave population in 
the North during this period was largely drawn from the South, in the popular 
mind, slaves and blacks were synonymous.196 The effect of this was that even 
the Southern Sudanese who converted to Islam or exercised some power in the 
colonial society, as those in the army did, were stigmatised by their slave status 
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or their slave origins.197 Therefore, the incorporation of the whole of the South 
as the Sudan’s exploitable hinterland, the intensification of racial stratification 
and the widespread identification of people from the South with low status can 
rightly be viewed as consequences of the economic and political system of 
Turko-Egyptian colonialism.198 Around 1881 an Islamic religious movement 
which came to be known as the Mahdist movement led by Mohammed Ahmed 
al-Mahdi, emerged in the North bringing to an end the Turko-Egyptian regime. 
Although some non-Muslims supported this movement, the revolt is widely 
thought to have been the brainchild of the Islamic community.199 
 
3.2.2        Anglo-Egyptian rule  
 
In 1898, the British colonialists joined forces with Egypt to conquer Sudan 
thereby overthrowing the Mahdist state. During the Anglo-Egyptian rule, the 
North and South were administered as two separate entities.200 In response to 
frequent rebellions from the South mostly over unequal treatment, the British 
prohibited most contact between the two regions. For example, from 1922, 
Southerners could not travel to the North without a special permit and vice-
versa.201 In addition, Islam and the use of the Arabic language were banned in 
the South while the activities of Christian missionaries were encouraged 
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there.202 Little was done during Anglo-Egyptian rule to develop the South hence 
the existence of great economic disparity between the two regions at 
independence. Indeed, owing to multi-cultural and economic disparity factors, 
on the road to independence, the British considered the option of granting 
independence separately to the South or attaching it to either Kenya or 
Uganda.203 However Egyptian and Northern Sudanese pressures succeeded in 
keeping the two regions together as a united country204 
 
3.3  The Federal Question in the Run Up to Sudan’s Independence 
 
Southern demand for a federation dates back to the run-up to independence in 
1950 when Southern politicians raised the issue of structuring future relations 
between the North and South on a federal basis.205 In November 1955, a month 
before independence, they declared that they were going to endorse the 
proclamation of independence for Sudan, only if the South were going to be 
granted considerable autonomy within a federal state.206 The calls for 
federalism were principally driven by the Southerners’ fear of Northern 
domination that had already begun manifesting itself in the numerical disparity 
between the South and the North in the legislative assembly.207 In the run up to 
the grant of independence, a twelve man commission was appointed to inter 
                                            
202  A Alier “The Southern Sudan question” in M Wai (Ed) The Southern Sudan (1973) 3.  
203  M Bona People and power in Sudan: The struggle for national stability (1981) 24-28. 
204  Bona, as above. 
205  See M Khalid The government they deserve: The role of the elite in Sudan’s political 
evolution (1990) 98; M Wai, as note 84 above at 69. 
206  Alier, as note 76 above at 19; See also Sudan Weekly Digest of Proceedings of the 
Senate 22 December 1955 304. 
207  There were only 13 Southern members in the legislative assembly as against 75 from 
the North; see Niblock T Class and power in Sudan: The dynamics of Sudanese politics 
(1898-1985) 65. 
 
141 
alia recommend the way to advance towards self government in Sudan. The 
Commission produced a draft Constitution which provided for certain 
safeguards for the South including the appointment of a minister for Southern 
affairs who was to be responsible for promoting in the Council and introducing 
in Parliament, measures for the economic and social betterment of the peoples 
of Sudan208 But these recommendations were rejected by the majority 
Northern representatives during the ensuing debate in the legislative assembly 
in January 1952. Later in the same year, Southerners were excluded from 
crucial constitutional talks that took place in Cairo between the Northern 
political parties and the Condominium powers.209 
 
These events increased Southern apprehension about the Northerners’ 
intentions towards the South. To most Southern Sudanese, this was clear proof 
that the Northerners wanted to include the Southerners in the new 
constitution and the new Sudan on their own terms and not on the terms that 
the Southern Sudanese wanted.210 This increasingly tense situation was further 
aggravated by the policy of “Sudanisation” through which the working force in 
the country was to be transformed to a Sudanese one as opposed to a foreign 
one.211 Of the 1222 jobs, which were to be Sudanised, 1069 of which were held 
by Britons and 153 by Egyptians, only 4 were given to Southerners.212 This more 
than anything else at the time, demonstrated to the Southerners that the 
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Northerners were just but new colonisers.213 In the heat of the moment, 
though federalism continued to be their main demand, some of the more 
radical Southerners of the time began to call for the complete separation of the 
South from the North. Others called for a referendum under the auspices of 
the United Nations (UN) to determine the future of the South.214 It was against 
this backdrop of political disenchantment that a revolt broke out in the 
Southern region of Torit on 18 August 1955. In the aftermath of the mutiny, 
Southern politicians raised the federal question once again in December 1955 
during a debate on the motion for self-determination for Southern Sudan. After 
a passionate appeal by the Southerners in both houses, the Northern members 
eventually agreed reluctantly to the insertion of a provision into the bill which 
stipulated that the Southern demand for a federal system of government 
would be considered after independence.215 In response, Southern politicians 
deferred the question to after independence in exchange for posts in the 
government to be formed.216  
 
3.4      The Federal Question After Sudan’s Independence 
 
No sooner had independence been declared, than the term federalism became 
a taboo, tantamount to subversion, in the political language of the Northern 
elite who on the eve of independence were assuring their Southern brothers 
that they sympathised with their cause.217 In 1957, a parliamentary committee 
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set up to look into the federal question rejected the idea on the ground that it 
was unsuitable for the Sudan. It then came to the fore that the clause had been 
inserted as a political manoeuvre rather than as a genuine promise on the part 
of the North. The then leader of the opposition Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub 
explained this as follows: 
 
“We canvassed all the parties to secure unanimity. We encountered 
some difficulty in convincing the Southerners so we inserted a special 
resolution to please them pledging that the constituent Assembly 
would give full consideration to the claims of Southern Members of 
Parliament for a federal Government for the three Southern 
provinces.”218 
 
In November 1958, the Sudanese government was overthrown in a military 
coup led by General Ibrahim Abboud and the new military regime set on to 
deal forcefully with dissent in the South. It became official government policy 
that the South introduces Islam and Arabic throughout the country with all 
speed in order to unite the Southern people and Sudan in general with the 
hope that this would discard calls for federalism. African traditional religions 
practiced mainly in the South were discouraged and in February 1962, all 
foreign Christian missionaries in the South were expelled.219 As unrest in the 
South mounted, Northern forces attacked Southern villages with as many as 
half a million Southerners fleeing into exile.220 The government of Abboud 
declared a state of emergency and warned that any talks of federalism would 
be considered as treason. 
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By this time a Southern rebel guerrilla force known as Anya-Nya had been 
established to resist Northern dominance. The political wing of the Anya-Nya, 
Sudan African National Union (SANU) repeated the pre-independence calls for 
federalism through the grant of autonomy to the South. In October 1964, 
massive general strikes broke out in the North, leading to the fall of the military 
government. A transitional government replaced the military government and 
arranged what came to be known as the roundtable conference in March 1965 
to discuss the Southern question with a view to reaching an agreement that 
was to satisfy the regional interests as well as the national interests of 
Sudan.221 
 
3.5   The 1965 Round Table Conference 
 
Among the significant aspects of this conference were the divisions amongst 
Southerners as to whether the South should remain a single political unit and if 
so whether its independence was viable option. Three factions namely SANU 
(I), SANU (O) and Southern Front (SF) represented the South. The Northern 
parties consisted of the Umma Party, the National Union Party (NUP), the 
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) and the 
Communist Party. The Northern politicians were prepared to concede only a 
limited regional autonomy to the South in areas such as primary education, 
health and roads, leaving control over economic planning, financial policy, state 
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security, armed forces, foreign affairs and other areas of national policy to the 
central government.222 
 
The Southerners on the other hand, insisted that a federation was necessary to 
ensure that they would exert control over their own affairs and resources. 
However whereas there was general agreement amongst the Southerners on 
their right to self-determination, there was a divergence of views amongst 
them on how it was to be asserted. SANU (I) insisted that federation was 
necessary to ensure that the South would exert control over their affairs and 
resources.223   The SF for their part wanted the Southern people to express 
their opinion by way of referendum. It was their position that in all previous 
attempts to solve the Southern problem, the wishes and aspirations of the 
people of Southern Sudan were not ascertained. To find out what they wanted, 
the SF adopted the position that the Southerners should be allowed to exercise 
their right to self-determination in an internationally supervised referendum at 
which they would chose between separation, confederation, federation, local 
autonomy or the existing unitary system.224 SANU (O) called for outright 
secession and the formation of an independent state in the South.225 With such 
divergent views it came as no surprise that the conference ended in a deadlock. 
Ultimately, the conference appointed a twelve-person committee to draw up a 
working paper on the North-South relations. The Committee, made up of an 
equal number of Southern and Northern members, deliberated for a year 
before submitting a report. Although the Committee finally agreed that the 
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South should be separate from the North, it was still unable to agree on several 
key issues particularly the most vital question on whether the South should be 
one region as most Northerners wanted or three regions as advocated by the 
Southerners.226 There were also fundamental differences over what 
relationship would exist between Southern and Northern troops and on the 
fiscal aspects of the proposed federal arrangement. By the time the 
Committee’s report was submitted, the civil war in the South had degenerated. 
The then President Ibrahim Abboud resigned as head of state and a transitional 
Government was appointed to serve under a provisional Constitution of 1956. 
The Coalition government that came to power after April 1965 reneged on the 
question of reconvening the conference to discuss the federal question. The 
coalition was in turn ousted out of power by the military on 25 May 1969 led 
by Colonel Jaáfar Nimeiri. 
 
  3.6     The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement  
 
Nimeiri immediately embarked on the federal question and took steps towards 
recognising the rights of the Southern people to regional autonomy within a 
united Sudan. Over the next two years he made a positive step in appointing 
Southerners to administrative positions in the South.227 During a visit to 
Ethiopia in 1971, his government made arrangements for a peace conference 
to be held in Addis Ababa. The conference called for the grant of autonomy to 
Southern Sudan and resulted in the Addis Agreement. The Addis Agreement 
created a federal structure in Sudan and was later incorporated into Southern 
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Provinces Regional Self-Government Act of 1972 (SPRSA) and the permanent 
Constitution of 1973. For the first time, the South had its own Regional 
Assembly, High Executive Council (HEC), Regional Civil Service, Regional 
Development Corporation, a regional principal language (English) in addition to 
the national official language (Arabic).228 At the centre, the South was 
represented by Southern quotas in the government, national assembly and the 
army. The country’s Second Vice-President was a Southerner and headed the 
HEC. The Addis Agreement stipulated that the SPRSA could only be altered 
upon a vote of three quarters of the National Assembly and approval by a 
referendum in the South.229 Despite the fact there appeared to be legal 
safeguards in to the regional autonomy that the South was granted, within the 
space of little more than a decade the agreement collapsed and brought down 
with it the “federal experiment” in Sudan. The following section will investigate 
the content of federalism as employed in the Addis Agreement in a bid to 
evaluate its strengths and weaknesses in consolidating peace and democracy. 
 
3.7      The Content of Autonomy Under the Addis Ababa Peace 
Agreement 
 
As alluded to earlier, the 1972 Addis Agreement was given legal status through 
enactment of the SPRSA of 1972 as an organic law of the Sudan. It was later 
incorporated into the 1973 Constitution.  
 
 
 
                                            
228  Hannum, as note 66 above. 
229  Article 2 of the Addis Agreement. 
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3.7.1   Legislative Power under the Addis Agreement 
 
Chapter V of the Addis Agreement vested regional legislative authority in a 
People’s Regional Assembly elected by Southern Sudanese citizens resident in 
the Southern region.230 The Assembly could legislate over the preservation of 
public order, internal security efficient administration and the development of 
the Southern region in the cultural, economic and social fields.231 This 
legislative competence was subject to the reserved powers of the central 
government which included national defence, external affairs, currency and 
coinage, air and inter-regional river transportation, communications and 
telecommunications, customs and foreign trade (over certain commodities 
which the regional government could identify with the approval of the central 
government), nationality and immigration, planning and public audit.232  
 
The People’s Regional Assembly was expected on request to provide the 
Peoples National Assembly with facts and information concerning the 
administration of the South.233 Further, the People’s Regional Assembly could 
by a two-thirds majority request that a national law it deemed detrimental to 
Southern welfare be postponed from entering into force. However, the 
National President had the discretion to grant or deny such request.234 To 
safeguard the interests of the Southern region, the People’s Regional Assembly 
could by a majority of its members, request the withdrawal of any Bill 
presented to the National People’s Assembly, which in its view would adversely 
                                            
230  Article 8 of the Addis Agreement. 
231  Article 11 of the Addis Agreement.  
232  Article 7 of the Addis Agreement.  
233  Article 12 of the Addis Agreement. 
234  Article 14 of the Addis Agreement. 
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affect the welfare rights of the citizens in the Southern region.235 Again in this 
instance, withdrawal of such Bill was a matter within the president’s 
discretion.236 The President could veto any Bill of the People’s Regional 
Assembly that he deemed contrary to the National Constitution. Nevertheless, 
the National People’s Assembly could reintroduce such a Bill and according to 
article 107 of the 1973 Constitution, a two-thirds majority of the National 
Assembly could override a presidential veto.237 
 
3.7.2   Executive Power Under the Agreement 
 
The regional executive authority was vested in a HEC headed by a President 
with a mandate to act in the South on behalf of the National President. 
According to article 18, the HEC was charged with specifying the duties of the 
various government departments in the Southern region. The National 
President appointed the President of the HEC on the recommendation of the 
Peoples’ Regional Assembly.238 The HEC President in turn proposed its 
members to the National President for appointment the process being the 
same for removing appointees from office. As a Chief Executive, the President 
of the HEC had the constitutional mandate to promulgate administrative 
regulations enforcement of which was the responsibility of Council 
Members.239 The Addis Agreement remained vague on the question of the 
relationship between the Council and the various ministries of the central 
government.  
                                            
235  Article 15 (i) of the Addis Agreement. 
236  Article 15 as above. 
237  Article 107 of the Constitution of Sudan 1973. 
238  Article 19 of the Addis Agreement. 
239   Article 24 of the Addis Agreement. 
 
150 
All the same the ultimate authority for defining the relationship rested in the 
hands of the National President.240 Provisions dealing with the relationship 
between the HEC President and the National President were unclear. For 
example, article 16 stipulated that the Council acted on behalf of the national 
administration but article 20 made the Council responsible to the People’s 
Regional Assembly and the President. The National President’s constitutional 
power to regulate the relationship between the Southern administration and 
the central ministries also was problematic. The Addis Agreement was not clear 
on how the regional departments should relate to the central ministries and 
the role of Provincial Commissioners exacerbated this confusion. Provincial 
Commissioners were nominated by the HEC President and appointed by the 
National President. Although their work directly concerned matters assigned by 
the Act to the regional government, these Commissioners reported the central 
government authorities in Khartoum.  
 
3.8       The Fall of the Addis Ababa Agreement 
 
The Addis Agreement of 1972 forever remains a landmark in the political 
history of Sudan for having brought about and maintained peace for 11 years. 
It collapsed when President Nimeiri failed to abide by its commitments. Owing 
to the fact that the Southern government was entitled to revenues received 
from natural resources in the South under the Addis Agreement, they were 
enthusiastic in wooing oil companies to explore the region. United States oil 
company Chevron Incorporated agreed to explore Southern Sudan in 1974 and 
in 1978 discovered significant oil reserves. In 1983, Nimeiri’s government 
                                            
240  Article 22 of the Addis Agreement. 
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through the National Assembly attempted to redraw the boundary between 
the North and South in such a way as to shift Bentiu and other areas of the 
South, rich in agriculture and minerals to the North. In addition, in September 
1983, under the influence of Hassan Al Turabi the then leader of the National 
Islamic Front241, Nimeiri cancelled the grant of autonomy to the South and 
introduced Sharia rule throughout the country. All these steps led to strong 
reactions in the South and eventually to the outbreak of another civil war in the 
same year.  
 
3.9    Political Developments in Sudan From 1985 to Date 
 
In April 1985 after 16 years in power, the military Government of Colonel 
Nimeiri was overthrown in a military coup organised by army officers and 
Transitional Military Council was put in place under the leadership of General 
Abed Rahman Siwar Al-Dahab. Elections were organized in 1986 that saw the 
Sadiq Al-Mahdi become Prime Minister. Al-Mahdi’s Government lasted less 
than four years. However, during this period it had started taking some 
important measures but was faced serious challenges including the continuing 
war in the South as well as drought and desertification. In June 1989 the 
current president of Sudan General Omar Hassan Al Bashir assumed power 
following a military coup d’état.242  
 
 
 
                                            
241  The National Islamic Front is an offshoot of another movement based in Egypt called 
the Muslim Brotherhood who advocated for a theocratic state. 
242  A Lesch Sudan: Contested national identities (1998) 113. 
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3.10    Federal Structure Under the 1998 Constitution of Sudan 
 
The 1998 Constitution is the first one to have formally introduced the federal 
principle in Sudan’s political administration.  It came into force on 1 July 1998 
and elections of which were boycotted by all major political parties in the 
country were held. Incumbent President El-Bashir was elected for a further 
five-year term with his National Congress Party (NCP) assuming 340 of the 360 
parliamentary seats. Al Turabi was appointed the Speaker of Parliament. The 
NCP party members were awarded key positions and possessed strong control 
influence over the Government, army, security forces, judiciary, academic 
institutions and the media.243 Although it created a federal structure in Sudan 
and provided for certain fundamental rights and freedoms, the 1998 
Constitution reflected a strict Islamic ideology. The relationship between the 
federal government and the states was such that the former had more 
authority over the latter.244  
 
In 1999, an internal power struggle within the NCP resulted in President El-
Bashir declaring a state of emergency, dissolving the Parliament, and 
suspending important provisions of the Constitution including those related to 
the structures of the local government in the various states.245 In May 2000 Al 
Turabi led a split from the ruling NCP thereby establishing a new party called 
the Popular Congress Party (PCP). Many officials linked to Al Turabi were 
dismissed from Government and in May 2001 Al Turabi himself was placed 
                                            
243  Lesch, as above at 114. 
244  K Adar, J Yoh and E Maloka, as note 20 above at 104. 
245  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary  General  19 available at  
www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. 
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under house arrest and was later accused of organizing a coup d’état. At least 
70 key members of the PCP were detained without charge or trial, and a 
number fled in to exile.246  
 
3.11  Federalism In Contemporary Sudan: The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement and the  Transitional Interim National Constitution 
 
It is important to clarify the legal status of the CPA in the Sudanese 
constitutional order. Article 225 of the Interim Constitution provides that the 
CPA is deemed to have been duly incorporated into the Constitution and that 
any of its provisions which are not expressly incorporated are considered to 
part of the Constitution.247 The legal effect of this provision is to render it an 
integral part of the Interim Constitution and therefore part of the supreme law 
of the country. Therefore, in this study where reference is made to the CPA and 
the various agreements comprising it, cognisance should be taken of the fact 
that such references bear constitutional fortitude. 
 
3.12  The Interim National Constitution of Sudan 
 
The Interim Constitution is comprised of 151 articles, 17 parts and 7 schedules. 
Whereas it is clear that the Interim Constitution does create a federation as 
qualified by Elazar248 earlier in the study, another clearly evident element of 
the federal principle employed in the Constitution is autonomy.249. The federal 
                                            
246  Report of the International Commission as above. 
247  Article 225 of the Interim National Constitution. 
248  Elazar, as note 28 above. 
249  Lapidoth, as note 14 above. 
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structure is created under Part I, Chapter IV, article 177 (1) which stipulates 
that the Republic of Sudan shall be decentralised with four levels of 
Government: 
 
a) The national level of government exercising authority with a view to protecting the 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the  Sudan 
b) Southern Sudan level of government exercising authority in respect of the people and 
states in Southern Sudan 
c) The state level of government exercising authority at the state level throughout the  
country 
d) The local level of government existing throughout the Sudan.250 
 
As for the grant of autonomy section 25 of the Interim Constitution recognises 
the autonomy of the Government of Southern Sudan and the states of 
Southern Sudan. This chapter will discuss the significance of federalism in the 
Interim Constitution under the following headings: 
 
 The content of Southern Sudanese autonomy.  
 The impact of federalism on the relationship between the state and religion. 
 Fiscal federalism in the Interim Constitution. 
 The right to self-determination of the South. 
 
3.13  The Content of Autonomy Under the Interim National 
Constitution 
 
In response to the cultural diversity and the attendant North South civil war 
that lasted over 40 years between the North and the South, the Interim 
Constitution employs the federal principle and creates an autonomous 
arrangement in Sudan.251 Article 159 of the Interim Constitution provides for 
                                            
250  Article 24 of the Interim National Constitution. 
251  See Lapidoth, as note 14 above. 
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the establishment in Southern Sudan of a government known as the 
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) with legislative, executive and judicial 
organs.252 Article 25 recognises the autonomy of the GOSS. It is noteworthy 
that inasmuch as other states are created by this constitutional dispensation, 
Southern Sudan is accorded a special status in the political administration of 
the country.253 Lapidoth254 refers to such an arrangement as a territorial 
political autonomy because it is primarily aimed at granting the Southern 
Sudanese who differ from the majority of the population, a means through 
which they can express their distinct identity. The GOSS operates in accordance 
with an Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan and has the following primary 
responsibilities; promotion of good governance, development and justice, 
exercise of authority in respect of Southern Sudan and the states of Southern 
Sudan, acting as a link between the National Government and the states of 
Southern Sudan and to ensure the protection of rights and interests of the 
people of Southern Sudan.255  
 
3.14  Executive Power of the Government of Southern Sudan 
 
Executive power in the GOSS is vested in President of Southern Sudan directly 
elected by the people of Southern Sudan according to the Interim Constitution 
of Southern Sudan, a Vice President and the Southern Sudan Council of 
                                            
252  Article 152 of the Interim National Constitution. 
253  The federal principle as employed by the Interim Constitution is therefore an 
asymmetrical federal arrangement with the Southern Sudan enjoying a special status 
as compared to other states. 
254  Lapidoth, as note 14 above.  
255  Article 162 of the Interim National Constitution. 
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Ministers appointed by the President of the GOSS.256 The tenure of the 
President of the GOSS is five years and commences from the date of his 
assumption of office and he/she is subject to re-election for one term only.257 
In the event of the post of the President of GOSS falling vacant, pending 
elections within sixty days and the swearing in of the President elect, his 
functions are assumed by Vice President of the GOSS.258 This arrangement 
positively differs from that of 1972 discussed in chapter three whereby in place 
of the GOSS was a High Executive Council (HEC) and in place of a President of 
the GOSS was a President. In the previous arrangement, whereas the National 
President appointed the President of the HEC, the present arrangement under 
the Interim Constitution is more steadfast and democratic and requires the 
President of the GOSS to be elected by the people of Southern Sudan.259 In 
addition the contemporary arrangement is more elaborate on the relationship 
between the President of the GOSS and the National president than existed 
between the National President and the President of the HEC under the SPRSA.  
 
Under the SPRSA the HEC acted on behalf of the National President whereas 
another provision made the HEC responsible to the Regional Assembly. This 
ambiguity made it unclear whether the President was more responsible to the 
National President or the Peoples’ Regional Assembly. The Interim Constitution 
is for its part very clear and stipulates that the President of the GOSS is to be 
the First Vice President of the country. In this regard he is a direct assistant to 
the National President in the running of the country as a whole and is also 
                                            
256  Article 163 (1) of the Interim National Constitution.  
257  Article 163 (2) of the Interim National Constitution. 
258  Article 163 (3) of the Interim National Constitution. 
259  See Article 163 (1) of the Interim National Constitution as compared to Article 19 of 
the Addis Agreement. 
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directly in charge of running Southern Sudan.260 Unlike the SPRSA where the 
National President’s power to regulate the relationship between the Southern 
administration and the central ministries was problematic261 the Interim 
Constitution makes the National President and Southern President partners. In 
this regard, the most crucial decisions affecting the country require the consent 
of the President of the GOSS. No provision in the Interim Constitution directly 
mandates the National President to act unilaterally over affairs falling within 
the mandate of the GOSS. All actions affecting the country including a 
declaration of war and states of emergency which may entail suspension of 
parts of the Bill of Rights262, and dissolution of or suspension of any of the state 
organs263 with attendant consequences on the South, are to be taken with the 
consent of the First Vice President who is also the President of the GOSS. 
Drawing from the above the Interim Constitution ought to be viewed as having 
stronger legal safeguards than the 1972 federal arrangement that fell apart 
after bringing 10 years of peace to Sudan.  
 
3.15  Legislative Power of the Government of Southern Sudan 
 
Article 169 of the Interim Constitution provides for the establishment of the 
Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. The Protocol on Power Sharing264 and the 
                                            
260  See Articles 65 (b) and Article 163 (1). 
261  N Kasfir “Southern Sudanese politics since the Addis Ababa Agreement” 76 (1977) 
African Affairs 143. 
262  Article 211 of the Interim National Constitution. 
263  Article 211 of the Interim National Constitution. 
264  Protocol on Power Sharing articles 2.2.14, 2.2.6 1.5.5.4 (c) and (d) and 2.11.4.6 (i) in 
Part II of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
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Protocol on Wealth Sharing265 that form part of the CPA envisage some of the 
functions of the Southern Sudan Legislature. Its powers shall include inter alia 
competence to approve plans, programmes and policies relating to state and 
society and approve the Annual Southern Sudan Budget of revenues and 
expenditures. The Constitution of Southern Sudan has not at the time of this 
study been enacted. However, there is in place a Draft Constitution of Southern 
Sudan ( Draft Constitution) premised on the CPA awaiting adoption. Notable in 
the draft is the independence granted to the Southern Sudanese Assembly. 
Unlike the Regional Assembly under the Addis Agreement, the National 
President cannot veto a Bill of the Southern Sudanese Parliament. In addition, 
unlike the Addis Agreement whereby the Regional Assembly was subject to 
scrutiny by the National Assembly,266 the Draft Constitution provides for the 
complete independence of the Southern Sudanese Assembly. In this manner 
there are stronger safeguards in the present arrangement to guard against 
abuse of the CPA.267 
 
3.16  Federalism and the Relationship Between State and Religion 
 
The relationship between state and religion has featured as the most divisive 
issue in the history of Sudan.268 This relationship was very instrumental when 
                                            
265  Protocol on Wealth Sharing article 15.4 in Part II of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. 
266  Article 12 of the Addis Agreement. 
267  Article 99 of the Draft Constitution of Southern Sudan 
268  K Adar, J Yoh and E Maloka, as note 20 above at 104. See also A Sidahmed and A 
Sidahmed Sudan: The contemporary middle-east (2005) 116; N Wakoson “The 
dilemmas of South-North conflict” in F Deng and P Gifford The search for peace and 
unity in the Sudan 90; A El-Affendi Turabi’s revolution: Islam and power in Sudan 23. 
See in particular Lesch, as note 125 above at 1 who emphasises that the identity 
crisis in Sudan has centred on state and religion more than on any other factor.  
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drafting the Interim Constitution. Indeed Article 1 of the Constitution provides 
that: 
The Republic of Sudan is an independent, sovereign state. It is 
democratic, decentralised, multicultural, multi-lingual, multi-racial, 
multi-ethnic, multi-religious country where such diversities exist.269 The 
Interim Constitution in recognising this diversity provides for a secular 
and democratic Sudanese state whereby freedom of religion and belief 
is guaranteed equally to all.270 Different from previous constitutions 
with the exception of the 1973 Constitution that was premised on the 
Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972, the Interim Constitution 
recognises the diversity of the Sudanese state and thereby provides for 
a secular and democratic state.271  
 
In a positive budge, Article 5 of the Interim Constitution permits the 
applicability of other sources of law in Sudan other than Sharia thereby 
accommodating other traditions and beliefs. Nationally enacted legislation is 
divided into two categories namely that applicable to Northern Sudan and the 
other applicable to Southern Sudan. Nationally enacted legislation having 
effect only in Northern Sudan has as its source of legislation Islamic Sharia and 
the consensus of the people272 while that applicable to Southern Sudan has as 
its sources popular consensus, the values and customs of the people of the 
Sudan including their traditions and religious beliefs having regard to Sudan’s 
diversity.273  
 
                                            
269  Article 1 of the Interim National Constitution. 
270  See Article 38 of the Interim National Constitution on the freedom of creed and 
worship. 
271  The 1998 Constitution of Sudan provided for a federal structure but based on Islam. 
Inasmuch as article 1 of the constitution provided the Sudan was a country of 
religious tolerance, Article 7 provided declared that jihad, an Islamic notion was duty 
of every Sudanese. This constitutional quagmire served as the foundation for the 
manipulation of the Southern Sudanese.  
272  Article 5 (1) of the Interim National Constitution. 
273  Article 5 (2) of the Interim National Constitution. 
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This provision largely addresses the state religion question that has for long 
hampered peace efforts between the North and South. Also creditable is article 
5 (3) (a) which stipulates that where national legislation is currently in 
operation or is to be enacted and the source of such legislation is religion or 
custom, residents of Southern Sudan who do not practice such religion or 
custom may either introduce legislation to allow practices or establish 
institutions in the state consistent with their own religion or customs.274 In the 
same vein, Southern Sudanese residents may also refer the law to the Council 
of States275 to be approved by a two-thirds majority of all the representatives 
or they may initiate national legislation which will provide for necessary 
alternative institutions as may be appropriate.276 Moreover, article 6 mandates 
the state to respect religious rights to worship or assemble, establish and 
maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions, acquire and 
possess movable and immovable property, write, issue and disseminate 
religious publications, teach religion or belief in places suitable for these 
purposes, solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from 
individuals, private and public institutions, train appoint, elect or designate by 
succession appropriate religious leaders called for by the requirements and 
standards of any religion or belief, observe days of rest, celebrate holidays and 
ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of religious beliefs and 
communicate with individuals and communities in matters of religion and 
belief at national and international levels.277  
                                            
274  Article 5 (3) (a) of the Interim National Constitution. 
275  Article 85 of the Interim National Constitution provides that the Council of States is 
composed of two representatives from each state each elected by the state 
legislature. 
276  Article 5 (3) (b) of the Interim National Constitution. 
277  Article 6 of the Interim National Constitution. 
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The downside of Article 5 is that it fails to address the sources of legislation for 
states that do not fall in the North or South. During negotiation of the CPA, this 
was very prominent issue. In effect the Machakos Protocol of July 20 2002 had 
included a provision to the effect that nationally enacted legislation having 
effect only in respect of states outside Southern Sudan was to have as its 
source of legislation Sharia and consensus of the people. The contentious issue 
was that as crafted, this provision was a recipe or chaos. Some of the plausible 
arguments raised were that Northerners and Southerners were not neatly 
divided societies who lived in their respective regions. Presumably it was 
thought wise in the Interim Constitution not to prescribe Sharia as a source of 
law for any of the non-Southern states but to leave it ambiguous as it currently 
is. This article as presently crafted still poses the potential to destabilise the 
relative peace in the country and create further discontent in the regions in the 
West Darfur and the East.278 There seems to be a conception that Sudan is 
neatly divided into two, the South and the North. The reality on the ground is 
far more complex than this. The same constitution provides for freedom of 
movement and permits all Sudanese to live wherever they wish in the country. 
Article 42 (1) provides as follows:  
 
“Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of movement and the 
liberty to choose his/her residence except for reasons of public health 
and safety as shall be regulated by law.” 
 
In this regard, many Southern Sudanese have permanently settled in the North 
and vice versa. Khartoum is the capital city where most jobs and opportunities 
                                            
278  Not often highlighted in the new is the existence of a rebel group in the eastern part 
of Sudan Beja area. Earlier this year a rebel group abducted military offices and 
demanded to be recognised in the political dispensation that was being arranged 
then between the Northern government and the South. 
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are situated and is also in the North. It is imperative that many Southern 
Sudanese would be subject to Sharia law while in the North. Therefore, this 
constitutional arrangement in the Interim Constitution raises the question of 
whether the autonomy granted to Southern Sudan includes personal 
autonomy279 for the Southerners. Lapidoth when discussing the role of 
autonomy in consolidating a multicultural society, opines that personal 
autonomy is an integral part of territorial autonomy because it serves to it 
serves to preserve and promote the religious linguistic and cultural character of 
a minority.280 A provision guaranteeing other ethnic groupings personal 
autonomy within their respective regions to be free from the application Sharia 
laws is required so as to avoid any injustice that may be occasioned to them. 
However, Lapidoth’s concept of personal autonomy does not seem to have 
been entirely overlooked. Part X of the Interim Constitution does provide for a 
special kind of administration in the capital city Khartoum that is in the North 
but forms the main centre of activity. This effectively means that Southerners 
and other Sudanese from the various regions are bound to conduct their every 
day activities there. Article 154 emphasises that human rights and fundamental 
freedoms specified in the Constitution including respect for all religions, beliefs 
and customs should be guaranteed and enforced in the National capital. Article 
156 sets forth five principles that are to guide judges and law enforcement 
agencies in dispensing justice and enforcing law in the national capital.  
These are: 
 
                                            
279   See Lapidoth, as note 14 above at 37-38. Lapidoth defines personal autonomy as the 
right of members of a certain group within the state normally ethnic, cultural, 
religious or linguistic, within a state regardless of their residence to preserve and 
promote their identity through institutions established by the minorities themselves 
280  Lapidoth, as note 14 above at 38. 
 
163 
a) Tolerance shall be the on the basis of peaceful coexistence 
between the Sudanese people of different cultures, religions and 
traditions; 
b) Behaviour based on cultural practices and traditions which does 
not disturb public order is not disdainful of other traditions and not in 
violation of law shall be deemed in the eyes of the law as an exercise of 
personal freedoms;  
c) Personal privacy is inviolable and evidence obtained in violation of 
such privacy shall not be admissible in a court of law; 
d) The judicial discretion of courts to impose penalties on non-
Muslims shall observe the long established Sharia principle that non-
Muslims are not subject to prescribed penalties and therefore remitted 
penalties apply according to law;  
e) Leniency and granting the accused the benefit of the doubt are 
legal principles of universal application and required by the 
circumstances of the Sudan.281 
 
Consideration is made of the fact that Khartoum being the capital city is likely 
to be cosmopolitan and by virtue of this fact southerners and persons from 
other regions other than the North ought not to be subjected to Sharia law. 
Whereas as this provision does not completely exempt non-Northerners from 
the application of Sharia law it in the very least provides for a mechanism 
through which some leniency may be exercised in dealing with them. 
 
3.17   Fiscal Power Under the Interim Constitution 
 
Fiscal federalism refers to federalism as an allocative device. This would entail 
the sharing of wealth and distribution of resources in a federal arrangement.282 
With regard to Sudan this refers to constitutional provisions on control over oil 
income and related resources, which have played a major role in the Sudan 
conflict since the discovery of oil in 1982. The Interim Constitution provides for 
                                            
281  Article 156 of the Interim National Constitution. 
282  See Haysom, as note 1 above. 
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distribution of resources for the development of the country without 
discrimination, stating the principle that the sharing and allocation of wealth 
emanating from the resources of the Sudan shall ensure that the quality of life, 
dignity and living conditions of all the citizens are promoted without 
discrimination on grounds of gender, race, religion, political affiliation, 
ethnicity, language or region.283 The sharing and allocation of this wealth shall 
be based on the premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled to 
development.284The Interim Constitution also obligates the parties to consult 
and share the benefits of oil development with individuals who enjoy rights in 
land.  
 
During negotiation of the Interim Constitution, experts recommended the 
creation of a trust fund of oil wealth, which could be used to fund 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of the South to compensate residents of the 
oil fields for the massive destruction and loss of life that occurred during the 
war and to help redevelopment of oil-producing areas. The Interim 
Constitution in this regard provides for the establishment of a “Future 
Generation Fund” once national oil production reaches two million barrels per 
day.285 Although the Interim Constitution commits the parties to ensure that all 
funds and accounts created by that agreement are “on-budget” and that all 
revenues and expenditures are made public,286 there are no effective oversight 
mechanisms contained in the CPA to ensure that this takes place. It creates two 
institutions with control over parts of the oil sector but neither of them 
                                            
283  Article 185 (1) of the Interim National Constitution. 
284  Article 185 (2) of the Interim National Constitution. 
285  See Article 192 (7). 
286  See Article 192 (8). 
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possesses the capacity to independently ensure that oil revenues are managed 
correctly. The function of the National Petroleum Commission (NPC)287 is to 
assist the government in formulating policies and guidelines with respect to the 
petroleum sector and to monitor and assess the impact of those policies, as 
well as to negotiate and ensure all oil contracts are consistent with these 
policies.288 Its purpose is to ensure that oil-producing communities and the 
Southern government have a voice in the decision-making process. While the 
goals of the NPC may be laudable, its powers do not allow it to independently 
monitor the way oil revenues are dispersed or ensure that money is actually 
spent in accordance with the law.  
 
The Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) is 
created to ensure transparency and fairness regard to the allocation of 
nationally collected funds.289 Composed of three representatives of the 
National Government, three representatives of the GOSS, and the Ministers of 
Finance of each state in Sudan, it is empowered to “monitor and ensure that 
equalisation grants from the National Revenue Fund are promptly transferred 
to respective levels of government ensure appropriate utilisation and sharing 
of financial resources; to ensure that resources allocated to war affected areas 
are transferred in accordance with agreed upon formulae and to ensure 
transparency and fairness in the allocation of funds to the Government of 
South Sudan and states/regions according to established ratio and 
percentages.290  
                                            
287  Established under Article 191 of the Interim National Constitution. 
288  See Article 191(3) of the Interim National Constitution. 
289  See Article 198 of the Interim National Constitution. 
290  Article 198 (2) of the Interim National Constitution. 
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Neither the FFAMC nor the NPC are functionally independent of the 
government, in fact both are composed almost entirely of high-level 
government officials. Unlike most oversight commissions in other jurisdictions, 
neither body is empowered to investigate complaints of mismanagement, 
much less take action to remedy those actions. Finally, there are no guarantees 
of access to information possessed by either government or private entities 
that either body requires to perform even its listed functions. The CPA 
emphasises that revenue sharing should reflect a commitment to devolution of 
power and decentralisation of decision-making in regard to development, 
service delivery and governance.291 It further provides that at least 2% of oil 
revenue shall be allocated to the oil producing states/regions in proportion to 
output produced in such states/regions.292 Of the remaining oil revenues from 
the South, a portion will be allocated to an Oil Revenue Stabilisation Account293 
and the remainder to be divided evenly between the government of Southern 
Sudan and the national government. 50% of any non-oil revenues collected in 
Southern Sudan is also to be allocated to the Government of Southern 
Sudan.294  
 
This arrangement may pose problems given the fact that the bulk of oil 
reserves are in the South (though there is still some disagreement over where 
the border is and on which side some oil fields are located295) and the great 
population disparity between North and South. This means that even above 
                                            
291  See the Wealth Sharing Agreement, at Article 1.8. in Part II of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement 
292  Article 192 (5) of the Interim National Constitution. 
293  To be established according article 192 (4) of the Interim National Constitution. 
294  See Article 192 (6) of the interim National Constitution of Sudan. 
295  See the International Crisis Group Report, “New Sudan Action Plan,” 4. 
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and beyond the 2% automatically returned to the South, Southerners will 
probably receive a much higher portion of revenue per capita than 
Northerners.  
 
The South has significantly greater development needs than the North.296 The 
Wealth Sharing Agreement is vague about the specifics about the flow of oil 
revenue. It is also unclear whether the 50% of revenues from Southern oil will 
first flow through the central government or not. Though this would seem 
logical, the CPA specifies only that “All revenues collected nationally for or by 
the National Government shall be pooled in a National Revenue Fund (NRF) 
administered by the National Treasury,” without specifying what those 
revenues will be.297 Thus it is possible for oil and other revenues to accrue 
directly to the Southern government or state governments without having to 
flow through the nominally transparent National Revenue Fund. The system of 
decentralisation may also complicate the process of accounting for revenue 
distributions and spending within regions. Though the Agreement requires that 
“all levels of government comply with generally accepted accounting standards 
and procedures and that there shall be institutions at the state/regions, GOSS 
and national levels to ensure that funds are distributed according to the agreed 
government budget, neither of the institutions it creates has authority to 
supervise government entities other than the National Government.  
 
                                            
296  IRIN News, “Sudan: School attendance low in south, mainly among girls,” April 19, 
2005; IRIN News, “Sudan: Inadequate food, health and education for returnees to the 
south,” April 18, 2005; International Crisis Group. 
297  Wealth Sharing Agreement Article 7.1. 
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If states are to receive oil revenues directly, there are no requirements of 
transparency or accountability in the Wealth Sharing Agreement that covers 
those funds. This is especially problematic given the Southern government’s 
wide independent powers to tax revenues, borrow money, and receive foreign 
aid directly. Though certain Southern government funds, such as the Southern 
Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF), must be transparently 
administered and are subject to an oversight committee, the income garnered 
from oil revenues, taxes, loans, or aid is not subject to this oversight unless it is 
channelled into the SSRDF. Thus an independent body is needed to oversee oil 
revenues flowing both to the central government as well as state or regional 
governments with the power to investigate violations and enforce the 
Agreement. Such a body need not focus exclusively on oil revenue monitoring, 
but may be empowered to monitor and enforce other aspects of the peace 
agreement as well. Many countries in Eastern Europe, for example, created 
Ombudsman’s offices to monitor the transition from communism to democracy 
in the early 1990s.298  
 
The peace agreement creates a host of nominally independent institutions to 
oversee various aspects of the agreement, including National and Southern 
Sudan Land Commissions to arbitrate land claims and recommend land policies 
to the various levels of government, an Electoral Commission to oversee 
legislative elections, and a Human Rights Commission, whose functions are not 
                                            
298  “The Bill of Rights and the Emerging Democracies” in (2002) 65 Law and 
Contemporary Social Problems 272; R Williams “Earned sovereignty: Bridging the gap 
between sovereignty and self-determination” (2004) 40 Stanford Journal of 
International Law 118. The Rambouillet Accords, which ended the conflict in Kosovo, 
provided for the creation of an Ombudsman office, both to prevent further violence 
against Kosovars and to discourage individual retribution against Serbs. 
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spelled out. It is crucial that these institutions be given the independent 
oversight authority and the power to enforce the constitution and law in the 
areas of their purview. At the same time, the growth of civil society and the 
development of better education, health, and economic systems in all parts of 
Sudan will enable citizens to play a more active role in monitoring the activities 
of the national and regional governments. 
 
3.18  The Right of Self-Determination Under the Interim Constitution 
 
As illustrated in chapter three, the most prolific element of the Sudanese 
conflict has been the debate on the right to self-determination of the South. 
Article 219 provides that the people of Southern Sudan have the right to self-
determination. Accordingly this right is to be enumerated under a Southern 
Sudan Referendum Act to be promulgated by the National Legislature at the 
beginning of the third year of the interim period.299 As soon as the Southern 
Sudan Referendum Act is established a Southern Sudan Referendum 
Commission is also to be established. Another Commission titled the 
Assessment and Evaluation Commission is also to be set up by the President 
under Article 221 to monitor the implementation of the CPA. The Commission 
is to conduct a mid-term evaluation of the unity arrangements established 
under the CPA and in so doing recommend ways of improving institutions and 
arrangements created there under. Six months before the end of the six-year 
interim period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum 
organised the Referendum Commission already mentioned above in 
cooperation with the National Government and Government of Southern 
                                            
299  Article 220 (1) of the Interim National Constitution. 
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Sudan. The people of Southern Sudan shall here after have the right to confirm 
unity off the Sudan by voting to sustain the system of government established 
under the Interim constitution and the CPA or vote for secession.300 In the 
essence the Interim Constitution creates an option of secession for the 
Southern Sudanese in accordance with their right to self-determination. The 
right to self-determination of peoples has long been recognised and accepted 
as legal principle under international law.301 The riddle remains as to how 
effective the right to self-determination is in managing the civil conflict in a 
multicultural society such as Sudan. The following section will be dedicated to 
examining the merits or demerits of secession as tool for realising peace and 
democracy. Borrowing from Russell and McCall302, the following considerations 
come into play when making an examination on whether secession is justified 
in a given instance: (i) questions of democracy and democratic rights (ii) racial 
and ethnic quality (iii) viability of the post-secessionist states. This study will 
take up each of this at a time applying them to Sudan with a view of reaching 
an informed opinion on the viability of the impending secession of Southern 
Sudan. 
 
3.19  Democracy 
 
Whereas the concept of democracy is considered today to be too vague to 
establish a blue print for government, it may at the least serve to establish a 
                                            
300  Article 221(2) (a) of the Interim National Constitution. 
301  I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 1998, 595. Article 19 0f the African 
Charter unequivocally declares that nothing shall justify the domination of a people 
by another. Further,  article 20 mandates a right to self-determination. 
302  P Russell and S McCall “Can secession be justified? The case of southern Sudan” in D 
Wai The Southern Sudan: The problem of national integration (1973) 95. 
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rough measure of illegitimate government. The premise from which this study 
proceeds is that if a large proportion of a population of a state is denied the 
opportunity both to participate in the decision to form the state and to 
establish its mode of government, as well as the opportunity to participate 
effectively in that government after state formation, then this would constitute 
a very strong argument for secession.303 But it is noteworthy that the 
democracy test is a double-edged sword. It should be applied not only to the 
state as a whole but also to the secessionist movement itself. For if within the 
population which secessionists claim to represent there are significant 
segments which have not manifested a will to attach themselves to the 
movement and are deliberately excluded from its leadership, this would 
seriously undermine the justice of the secessionist cause.304  
 
Relevant questions that ought to be posed to assist this quest concern the 
circumstances that surrounded state formation of the Sudanese nation-state as 
discussed under chapter three. From pre-independent Sudan through the 
Turko-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian rule to the present day Sudan, has anything 
approximating a social contract taken place? Have the Southerners participated 
fully in the process of state formation and where the state was formed in the 
running of the same? Can one objectively say that the birth of the Republic of 
Sudan had the Southerners’ consent and support? The answers to these 
questions are of paramount importance in assessing the potential perils or 
success of a decision of Southern Sudan to secede at the end of the interim 
period. 
 
                                            
303  Russell and McCall, as above. 
304  Russell and McCall as note 38 above at 95. 
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Without regurgitating the federal history of Sudan in chapter three, right from 
pre-independent Sudan, the predominantly Christian/animist Southern 
kingdoms of Nubia, Maqarra and Alawa were conquered and subjugated to the 
Islamic and Northern Funj kingdom. The Maqarra and Alawa were brought 
under the central administration of the Funj.305  The Turko-Egyptian rule that 
followed was no different and has been famed for being brutal and 
characterised by inter alia forced conversion to Islam and a compulsory change 
of language from indigenous dialects to Arabic. These policies were mostly 
aimed at Southerners who were mostly animist or Christian. The Anglo-
Egyptian and Condominium rule was no better with the first attempt to consult 
the South about its future coming in with the convening of the Juba 
conference. The next pertinent steps on the path to creation of a Republic of 
Sudan were the visits to Cairo Egypt by representatives of Northern political 
parties resulting in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953. The South was 
excluded from these crucial talks that were to lead up to the creation of a 
Constitution for the new state. By the time independence came forth, Southern 
Members of Parliament had been bought into accepting to put the federal 
question to rest. This effectively meant shelving the future and participation of 
the South.  
 
All in all, through the critical moments of state formation the South were 
constantly isolated. The effect of this is such that by the time of creation of a 
Republic of Sudan, the North and South and are still so far apart that a single 
democratic system of majority decision making is unworkable. However, this 
point by itself would not necessarily justify the break up of state. Opinion in 
                                            
305  See chapter three page 16. 
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America on the eve of the civil war was probably divided in this way yet one 
would scarcely regard this as justifying the secession of Southern Sudan. 
 
3.20      Racial and Ethnic Equality 
 
The argument here is to the effect that is some racially or ethnically distinct 
section of a state’s population were given reasonable legal rights to participate 
in its government, if the members of this group were consistently regarded as 
inferior and are treated as inferiors in the day to day social intercourse of the 
nation, the value of any democratic right they may enjoy would be gravely 
diminished. If they were regarded as inferior and denied any democratic rights 
this would constitute an even stronger argument against submitting to the 
government of those who claimed to be their natural superiors. The question 
that would be poised here with Sudan is what the situation is as far as racial 
equality goes.306 The danger with this test is that racial attitudes are 
notoriously difficult to assess and one would have to look elsewhere for more 
concrete means of determining the relationship between the two groups. 
 
3.21  Viability of the Post-Secession State 
 
Indeed the justification of important political acts like secession cannot be 
entirely confined to deontological considerations of justice. Certainly one of 
the strongest arguments used against secessionist movements in the past has 
been that they would divide the state into two fragments one or both of which 
would be severely crippled economically and scarcely able to survive as a viable 
                                            
306  Russell and McCall, as note 38 above. 
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nation.307In addressing the question what the odds and evens are for secession 
in Sudan the economic effect of such secessionist movement is of critical 
importance.308 Given the fact that Southern Sudan recently overwhelmingly 
voted for an independent state of Southern Sudan, one of the major challenges 
still o be faced and overcome remains the fact that most of the economic 
activity and infrastructural institutions to manage any wealth exists in the 
North. Without proper support from Kenya and other African and international 
friends, the looming secession of Southern Sudan would effectively be like 
farmer with a grade cow who is no longer able to feed it and puts it up for sale. 
It would be extremely difficult for Southern Sudan to sustain itself.  
 
3.22  Is Southern Sudanese Secession Therefore Justifiable? 
 
Given the difficult and tumultuous journey from independence to date that 
Sudan has experienced, the question as to whether the looming secession in 
Sudan is justifiable or not has been answered by the voting patterns of 
Southern Sudanese in the January 2011 referendum. Other constitutional 
mechanism such as federalism which was a long time employed proved 
ineffective in the long run and thereby justifying the secession of Southern 
Sudan.  
 
3.23   Conclusion 
 
This chapter has illustrated that the historical process that has separated the 
Arab/Islamic North and the African/South has its roots in the attempts at 
                                            
307  Russell and McCall, as above. 
308  See in this regard P Collier and A Hoefflier The political economy of secession (2002). 
 
175 
Arabisation and Islamisation by the North of the South and in the resistance to 
these forces in the South. Undeniably, every Sudanese government since 
independence has been dominated by Northern Arab Muslims. This chapter 
underscores the significance of ethnic diversity in the Sudanese society. The 
federal principle has been very instrumental in Sudan’s quest for peace and 
democracy but for has long remained an elusive concept and can even be said 
to have failed. The Addis Agreement facilitated a period of peace for eleven 
years but collapsed when it was repudiated by then President Al-Nimeiri. The 
federal experiment in Sudan in 1972 provides useful indicators on the style of a 
workable federal arrangement for the country. Also pertinent to the conflict 
has been the allocation of natural resources in particular oil. This has 
emphasised the need to provide for a concise fiscal plan in a prospective 
federal arrangement for Sudan. Lastly, the inability of the North and South to 
reach a consensus on the style of political administration from the pre-
independence era raises the debate on a right to self- determination with a 
possibility of secession.  
 
Against the backdrop of Sudan’s practice of the federal principle discussed in 
chapter three one can deduce that the Interim Constitution has been a 
carefully thought out and well drafted document. It takes into account most of 
the inadequacies of the Addis Agreement and provides legal safeguards to 
watch against it abuse. Further, it provides for a more steadfast relationship 
between the National President and the Southern President unlike the Addis 
Agreement. The Interim Constitution does not contain a claw-back clause 
permitting the National President to withdraw Southern autonomy or meddle 
in the affairs of the Southern Government. Instead, it adopts a “cooperation 
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approach” requiring National President to consult the President of the GOSS in 
all decisions affecting the country.  
 
The Interim Constitution makes Sudan a secular state and allows for other 
sources of law other than Sharia in the South. Whereas it fails to do the same 
for other states not in the North and not forming part of the South, it does 
establish a mechanism to protect non-Northerners from application of Sharia 
law while in the Northern capital city of Khartoum. The most attractive feature 
of the Interim Constitution is its inclusion of a right to self-determination of the 
South with an option of secession. The viability of secession of Southern Sudan 
is debatable and will depend on the advancements made by the region during 
the interim period. Sudan has been afflicted by a civil war mainly between the 
Arab-North and the African–Animist Christian South for nearly four decades 
punctuated by an 11-year pause that brought some relief and left useful 
lessons and indicators of what is required to bring about peace and democracy 
in the troubled country. One off the options that has been resorted to in the 
quest for peace and democracy has been political integration along lines of 
assimilation and coexistence within a framework that accommodates diversity 
within unity. In essence this has meant resort to the federal principle.  
 
Contrary to the customary conception of federalism in the conventional sense 
of a federation, federalism in this study has been used to refer to a normative 
concept capable of varied application. This renders federal political systems 
such as federations, autonomous arrangements and decentralised or devolved 
arrangements just but varied applications of the federal principle. Indeed, the 
federal principle has proved critical as tool of political integration in pluralistic 
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societies. It has served as a tool of democratisation. In discharging this function 
of integration, the constitution has proved to be a vital avenue through which it 
has found expression. The incorporation of the federal principle in the 
constitutional framework has created federal arrangements that have 
managed to deal with the challenges of multiculturalism. However this has not 
been the case in all societies.  
 
The success or failure of the federal principle in addressing the challenges of 
multiculturalism has been dependent on the nature of the society where it is 
employed. In Sudan, the historical process that separated the Arab/Islamic 
North and the African/South had its roots in attempts at Arabisation and 
Islamisation of the South and in the resistance to these forces in the South. In 
effect, every Sudanese government since independence has been dominated 
by Northern Arab Muslims. Critical to the Sudanese conflict has been ethnic 
diversity. Despite calls for a federation in Sudan, actual resort to the federal 
principle to meet the challenges of diversity was only achieved in 1972 with the 
promulgation of the Addis Agreement. The grant of autonomy to the South 
while successful to the extent of having provided 11 years of peace collapsed 
when it was repudiated by the then President Al Nimeiri. The 11-year period 
thus left a lot of lessons to learn about the federal experiment in Sudan. Of 
these is the importance of taking into account ethnic diversity in any 
arrangement meant to politically integrate the Sudanese society. Secondly the 
Addis Agreement underscored the need to establish a well-crafted model of a 
federal arrangement in terms of content. The design of autonomy as embodied 
in the Addis Agreement had with it its own flaws, which can be said to have 
contributed to its eventual collapse. This lesson is a pointer as to the precise 
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manner and content of federalism required to sustain peace and advance the 
democratisation process in Sudan.  
 
Thirdly, the demise Addis Agreement and the period 1972-1983 emphasises 
the need for a concise fiscal plan in any prospective federal arrangement. The 
distribution of oil is central to any scheme aimed at integrating the Sudanese 
society. The demise of the Addis Agreement ought to inform the contemporary 
constitutional order in Sudan that reintroduces the issue of Southern 
autonomy.  
 
This study unconventionally steers away from the afro-pessimism that 
characterises most literature on governance in Africa. Viewed from the lens of 
the historical application of the federal principle in Sudan, the Interim 
Constitution is a well though out and well drafted. The inadequacies of the 
Addis Agreement in failing to provide an unequivocal provision preventing the 
National President from meddling in the affairs of the South have been 
addressed. On the relationship between the National President and the 
president of the HEC or Southern President, is the shift from a “control” 
approach under the Addis Agreement to “cooperation” under the Interim 
Constitution. Unlike the President of the HEC under the Addis Agreement who 
was but a stooge answerable to the National President, the President of the 
GOSS is to be consulted by the National President on virtually every decision 
affecting the country as a whole. As regards Southern Sudan he is the Chief 
Executive. The fiscal plan under the Interim Constitution is flawed and will need 
to be amended as and when becomes necessary to enhance its functionality. 
On the controversial issue of state and religion the Interim Constitution makes 
 
179 
commendable strides in making Sudan a secular state. Even more unequivocal 
than the Addis Agreement, it provides for different sources of law to apply in 
the South. While it fails to clearly stipulate that eastern and western states may 
have as sources of law traditions and customs, it goes a long way to provide for 
freedom of creed and worship. The most appealing feature of the Interim 
Constitution is its inclusion of a right to self-determination of the South with an 
option of secession. By so doing it joins the Ethiopian Constitution as being the 
only two Constitutions with a right to secession. Whether this provision is a 
good or bad thing is open to debate as has been alluded to in chapter four and 
will be dependent on whether ones allegiance is with justice or economic 
realities. 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: POWER SHARING, DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF ETHNIC ACCOMMODATION IN KENYA 
 
Preface 
 
This chapter assesses the nature and impact of institutions of power-sharing 
and devolved government in Kenya. The focus of the discussion is on the 2008 
agreement signed between the country’s two main political parties, PNU (Party 
of National Unity) and ODM (Orange Democratic Movement) and the 
enactment of a new constitution that has seen the creation of comprehensive 
devolved system of government. The agreement was agreed upon after a 
disputed election that sparked a wave of ethnic clashes in which more than 
1,000 people were killed and another 300,000 were internally displaced. Signed 
in March 2008, it has been largely successful in its primary goal: ending the 
violence and restoring peace in Kenya. Since the implementation of the 
agreement there has been little inter-communal violence and some of the 
people displaced by the post-election clashes have been able to return home. 
Moreover, the agreement has enjoyed wide-spread support from across 
partisan and ethnic lines. The agreement similar to that of South Africa during 
its transition from apartheid to a democratic system, is temporary in nature 
and does not guarantee permanent positions of power to any groups or 
parties. While the parties to the accord are collaborators in its implementation, 
they are also foes in the electoral arena that expect to compete vigorously in 
the next election cycle. The power-sharing agreement, therefore, does not 
undermine the electoral incentives that the parties would otherwise face in its 
absence. The main accomplishment of the power-sharing agreement has been 
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the creation of a Grand Coalition government in which executive functions and 
cabinet positions are shared between the two main parties. Long-term 
grievances and underlying issues have not been addressed and remain latent 
sources of conflict.  So far the parties have shown a willingness to work 
together and compromise. But the Grand Coalition government is facing many 
serious challenges. Currently, the issue of whether to prosecute perpetrators of 
the violence domestically or internationally following the International Criminal 
Courts (ICC) involvement in the PEV is a potentially explosive issue that 
threatens to destabilise the agreement. The structure of this chapter is as 
follows. The first section describes the 2008 power-sharing agreement, placing 
it in the context of long running debates about constitutional reform in Kenya. 
The next section takes an in depth look at the devolved system of government 
under Kenya’s new constitutional dispensation.  
 
4.1   The Challenges to Political Stability in Kenya: Ethnic Politics 
 
The principal challenge to stability in Kenya comes from the centrality of 
ethnicity in politics. Kenya, like other African countries, is a highly diverse 
society. There are approximately 44 ethnic groups in Kenya. While ethnic 
differences are not automatically salient in multi-ethnic societies, in Kenya such 
divisions became politicized early, prior to the transition to independence, and 
have remained central to Kenyan politics since. This section first provides a 
brief review of the factors that have contributed to the politicization of ethnic 
differences. It then examines the 2007 election and the post-election violence 
that led to power-sharing negotiations.  
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4.2   Brief Historical Review 
 
The divisiveness of ethnic cleavages in Kenyan is in large part the result of a 
history of ethnic favouritism by Kenyan leaders. The first President, Jomo 
Kenyatta, relied heavily on trusted members of his own Kikuyu ethnic group, 
particularly those from his home area of Kiambu in Central Province.309 The 
Kenyatta government’s policies were also seen as favouring his own group. 
Above all, the land redistribution scheme, undertaken shortly after 
independence, was seen as disproportionately benefiting the Kikuyu.310 
Because the Kikuyu were perceived to be relatively better off than other tribes 
at independence, they were able to take advantage of the sale of highly 
productive land that was purchased from departing white settlers by the 
government in the 1960s and 1970s and then resold on a “willing-buyer, 
willing-seller” basis. Rightly or wrongly, the fact that the Kikuyu benefited from 
the government’s land redistribution scheme fed the belief that the Kenyatta 
government favoured the Kikuyu at the expense of other tribes. After 
Kenyatta’s death in 1978, the Vice President, Daniel Arap Moi, a Kalenjin from 
the Rift Valley, ascended to the presidency. Like Kenyatta, Moi also relied on an 
inner circle drawn largely from his own ethnic group, the Kalenjin.311 Moreover, 
Moi aggressively promoted his co-ethnics within the government 
administration, parastatals, the military, and the police, perpetuating the sense 
that state largesse was distributed along ethnic lines. The advance of Kalenjins 
                                            
309  Anderson, David 2005 “’Yours in Struggle for Majimbo’. Nationalism and the Party 
Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 1955-64,” Journal of Contemporary History 40 (3) 
pp. 547-564. 
310  Id 
311  Id 
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within the government structures came largely at the expense of the Kikuyu.312 
In 2002, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu from Central Province, became Kenya’s third 
president. Kibaki came to power at the head of a diverse coalition party, the 
National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC).313 While the party held the 
promise of creating a broadly inclusive government, in practice, Kibaki, like 
those before him, was seen as favouring his own group, particularly in 
promotions to top cabinet and administration positions.314  
 
A second factor behind the divisiveness of ethnicity in politics is the party 
system, which has historically reflected and reinforced ethnic cleavages. Prior 
to independence, competing parties emerged as champions for different ethnic 
blocs, turning early electoral contests into an us-against-them battle for control 
of the state and the resources that come with it. The first party to form in the 
early 1960s was the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which initially 
brought together leaders from across the ethnic spectrum, united in their goal 
of gaining independence from Britain. But within a few years leaders from 
several smaller tribes split from KANU after becoming convinced that they 
would never play a major role within the party, which was controlled by Kikuyu 
and Luo politicians. The break-away faction, headed by leaders from the 
Kalenjin, Maasai, and coastal groups, formed the Kenya African Democratic 
Union (KADU). Central to KADU’s platform was a demand for a federal 
constitution that would give ethnic groups greater control over their own 
affairs and limit domination by larger tribes. This position resonated with 
Kenyans in the Rift Valley and on the coast who were worried about Kikuyu and 
                                            
312  Anderson as note 309 above. 
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Luo “migrants” snatching up prime land in these areas.315  In the two national 
elections that preceded independence held in 1960 and 1963 ethnic identities 
largely determined voting behaviour, with voters by and large lining up behind 
their ethnic leaders.316 After independence, Kenya became a de-facto single 
party state under the KANU government, which had emerged victorious in the 
1963 election. For the subsequent two decades opposition parties did not exist 
in Kenya. When multi-party competition was again legalized in 1991, parties 
once again formed around ethnic blocs.317 In the 1992 and 1997 elections, the 
opposition parties garnered support from Kikuyu and Luo areas, while the 
incumbent party, headed by Moi, maintained its strongest support among 
Moi’s own Kalenjin group and among pastoralists from the Rift Valley.318 In 
2002 the opposition parties finally united behind Mwai Kibaki, brining together 
most tribes, other than the Kalenjin who remained loyal to KANU.319  
 
A third factor, which is both a reflection of inter-communal tensions and which 
has sharpened such divisions, is a history of episodic violence associated with 
elections. In the multi-party era since 1991, violence between ethnic groups 
has taken place in three of the four election rounds namely 1992, 1997, 2007. 
Much of the responsibility for this violence rests with politicians who have 
exploited latent tensions for electoral gains, fuelling divisions between groups. 
For example, prior to the 1992 election, Kalenjin politicians in the Rift Valley 
used fear tactics to mobilize support within their communities, spreading the 
                                            
315  Bienen, Henry 1974 Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
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idea that the Kikuyu would seek retribution against the Kalenjin if they came to 
power. Leaders called on the Kalenjin to defend their ethnic homelands, 
reclaim land that rightfully belonged to them, and chase the Kikuyu out of the 
area. Reports estimated that 1,500 people died in these clashes and another 
300,000 were chased away from their homes, mostly in the Rift Valley, during 
the months before and after the 1992 election.320 A similar dynamic was seen 
in lead-up to the 1997 election, with violence this time occurring both in the 
Rift Valley and also in some ethnically-mixed regions along Kenya’s coast.321  
 
4.3   The 2007 Election 
 
Despite a history of contentions elections, the 2007 campaign has often been 
described as being like no other. The presidential election featured three main 
candidates, each from different ethnic groups. The incumbent president Mwai 
Kibaki, a Kikuyu from Central Province, headed the Party of National Unity 
(PNU). His main challenge came from Raila Odinga, a Luo from Nyanza Province 
who led the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The election also included 
Kalonzo Musyoka, a Kamba from Eastern Province, who headed the Orange 
Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K). The race, which was closely fought by 
Kibaki and Odinga, was the first election in Kenya’s history to pit a Kikuyu 
against a Luo. Leaders from the two groups have at times worked together, as 
in the early days of KANU or more recently when Odinga and Kibaki joined 
forces in 2002 to defeat Moi. However, there is a long history of bad blood 
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between the two groups that dates back to the independence era.322 By the 
time the 2007 election campaigns got under way, Kenyans were already 
severely polarized. Despite real achievements made by the Kibaki government 
in terms of infrastructure, economic growth, education, and expanded political 
freedoms, many Kenyans felt Kibaki had failed to live up to the promises he 
offered in 2002. Kibaki had come to power on a promise to end tribalism in 
Kenya. Yet, after taking office he reneged on a pre-election commitment to 
create a Prime Minister position that would be filled by Odinga. To many Luos, 
this was seen as a betrayal. Moreover, during Kibaki’s first two years, a divisive 
constitutional review process occurred, culminating in an acrimonious 
referendum that pit ethnic groups against each other.323 Kibaki’s government 
also became embroiled in a number of conspicuous corruption scandals, 
betraying his promise to bring an end to the pervasive corruption of the Moi 
era.  But the Achilles heel for Kibaki was the perception that he had favoured 
his own Kikuyu ethnic group at the expense of others.324 A survey conducted in 
mid-October 2007, about two months before the 2007 election, found that the 
majority (approximately 57%) of Kenyans thought that Kibaki’s government 
served the interests of certain ethnic groups at the expense of others.325 
Moreover, views on this question were highly polarized by ethnic group.  
 
In the election campaign, the opposition ODM and ODM-Kenya played on the 
perception that Kibaki favoured his own group, using highly emotional appeals 
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that tapped into a sense of injustice and resentment. As evidence, the 
opposition claimed that Kibaki had disproportionately appointed the Kikuyu to 
top positions in the cabinet and the government administration. Moreover, the 
opposition charged that Kibaki unfairly favoured the Kikuyu region Central 
Province in the distribution of funds for social services and infrastructure, while 
neglecting other parts of the country. At the same time, the opposition claimed 
that Kibaki had callously persecuted certain groups, for example by evicting 
Kalenjin squatters from the Mau forest and deporting Muslims from Coastal 
regions. Opposition appeals tapped into long-standing grievances against the 
Kikuyu, who have historically dominated Kenya’s economy. And campaign 
rhetoric played on grievances over access to land, arguing that the Kikuyu had 
unfairly benefited from land redistribution schemes following independence, 
taking land that rightfully belonged to other communities. Kibaki’s party, the 
PNU, also employed divisive ethnic rhetoric during the campaign. PNU 
candidates portrayed Odinga as a dangerous man, playing on the fear of the 
unknown and highlighting negative cultural stereotypes. The PNU argued that 
Odinga had been involved in a failed coup in 1982 and alleged that he had 
communist leaning because he had studied in Eastern Europe. In addition, the 
PNU drew on the stereotype that Luos are irrational and impulsive. They also 
claimed that Odinga would take revenge on certain ethnic groups if elected. 
These appeals were designed to generate fear among Kenyans. 
 
As expected, voting closely followed ethnic lines. A survey conducted two 
weeks before the election found that almost all Kikuyu (94%) intended to vote 
for Kibaki; almost all Luos (97%) intended to vote for Odinga; and most Kambas 
(77%) planned to support Musyoka. The vote was less polarized among those 
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groups that did not have a candidate in the race, though evidence of bloc 
voting was seen among other groups as well. For example, the vast majority of 
Kalenjins (91%) and Luhyas (70%) supported Odinga, while most Merus (86%) 
supported Kibaki. 
 
4.3.1   A “Stolen Election” as Trigger for Post-Election Violence 
 
The national election took place on December 27, 2007. Over the next few 
days, it became apparent that the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) did not 
have the capacity to adjudicate between conflicting claims of fraud in the vote 
counting process.326 The official figures showed Kibaki ahead of Odinga by a 
sizable margin, but ODM leaders argued that the vote counts from Kibaki’s 
strongholds had been inflated after the polls closed. Kenyans watched this 
drama unfold on TV, as the national media relayed images from the ECK 
counting centre in real time. Despite lingering concerns about the integrity of 
the vote tally, the ECK Chairman, Samuel Kivuitu, announced Kibaki as the 
official winner in the early afternoon of December 30. Less than two hours 
later, Kibaki was sworn in at a rapidly assembled inauguration ceremony, which 
was broadcast live on national television. Minutes later, the violence began. 
 
Over the next two months, at least 1,000 people were killed and another 
300,000 were chased from their homes.327 The violence was concentrated in 
three main areas: the slums of Nairobi, the nation’s capital, Kisumu, the largest 
town in the Luo area, and in Rift Valley, an ethnically mixed region in which 
Kalenjins and the Kikuyu live in close proximity. In Nairobi and Rift Valley 
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violence took two forms. First, there was a considerable amount of 
spontaneous rioting. Second, the Kikuyu were targeted. Many Kikuyu had their 
houses burned down and their businesses destroyed. Many were told to leave 
the area and not return. And many were killed. Shortly thereafter, reprisal 
killings began, as the Kikuyu sought revenge. This violence escalated, 
threatening to spiral into a much larger clash.328 In Kisumu, violence was mostly 
in the form of rioting and looting in the city centre. While the mobs targeted 
Kikuyu-owned stores, the looters generally did not discriminate, destroying 
most of the property in the central business district. 
 
4.4  Power Sharing in Kenya 
 
The post-election violence in 2008 was the catalyst for a power-sharing deal. 
But debates  about power-sharing in Kenya predate the 2008 deal by several 
decades. Before examining the 2008 accord, it is therefore worth looking at 
earlier debates in order to place the current arrangement in context. 
 
4.4.1   Historical Background on Power Sharing in Kenya 
 
The first demands for power-sharing institutions were made by British settlers 
in the decade prior to Kenya’s independence, which was gained in 1963. 
Fearing that their interests would not be safeguarded once the black majority 
came to power, the settler community sought to create power-dividing 
institutions, in the form of a separate administration for their own areas. The 
settlers feared in particular that they would be subjected to excessive taxation 
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and that their land holdings might not be secure after the black majority came 
to power.329 In the lead-up to independence in the early 1960s the white 
settlers found common cause with KADU, which brought together leaders from 
several of Kenya’s smaller tribes, who were also concerned about the potential 
for majoritarian domination under Kenya’s unitary system. In particular, 
KADU’s leadership worried that the post-independence government would be 
dominated by Kikuyu and Luo elites who had emerged at the forefront of 
Kenyan politics in the pre-independence period. KADU advocated for a federal 
system in which regional authorities would have considerable power over 
policy and resources at the provincial level. Given that ethnic groups tend to be 
geographically concentrated in Kenya, the devolution of power to regional 
bodies would allow ethnic groups a greater degree of local control and 
autonomy. In the 1963 election that preceded the transition to independence, 
the central issue was whether the post-independence constitution would 
include power-dividing provisions, with KADU calling for a federal constitution 
and KANU arguing for the maintenance of the unitary state.330 KADU’s appeal 
resonated in particular with pastoralists and coastal people who were anxious 
about the migration of Luo and Kikuyu farmers into their home areas.331  
 
At the international level, Kenya was also engaged in debates with the British 
over the terms of independence during the early 1960s.332 Three rounds of 
negotiations were held in London between 1960 and 1963. Here again KADU 
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sought a federal constitution, while KANU took the opposite position, arguing 
that federalism would be cumbersome and excessively expensive for the new 
country. In the end, KANU ultimately conceded to the federal arrangement, 
though some of the party’s top leaders indicated that they had little intention 
of honouring the agreement after independence.333 Kenya was thus born on 
December 12, 1963 with a power-sharing, federal constitution that included 
provisions for elected regional bodies in each of the eight provinces. This 
arrangement was not to last. KANU had emerged victorious in the 1963 
elections, held just before independence. Under Kenya’s first president, Jomo 
Kenyatta, KANU was determined to undermine the regional assemblies before 
they could get off the ground. The central government refused to provide 
funds or other support to the Provincial bodies. Without resources and 
logistical or technical support, the regional bodies found themselves unable to 
function. At the same time, KADU was beginning to collapse, as several MPs 
crossed the isle to join with KANU. As the KADU leadership found its position 
rapidly deteriorating, they made a pragmatic decision to change course. In 
1964, the two leading KADU politicians, Ronald Ngala and Daniel arap Moi, 
formally joined KANU and dissolved their own party. With the collapse of 
KADU, calls for power-dividing structures ended. Shortly thereafter a bill was 
passed in parliament to do away with the provincial assemblies.334 During the 
subsequent years of single-party rule, demands for constitutional reform were 
muted. However, following the return to multi-party politics in 1991, calls for 
constructional reform resurfaced. Throughout the 1990s a wide range of actors 
opposition parties, civil society groups, and religious leaders called for 
constitutional changes. In the main, demands for reform were aimed at limiting 
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the powers of the president and increasing checks and balances between 
branches of government.335 At the same time, reformers once again called for 
power-sharing innovations, in the form of devolution. In 1997, demands for 
reform led to the creation of the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG), a 
working-group of opposition and government MPs. While a minimal set of 
reforms, primarily dealing with electoral laws, were passed in that year, no 
major changes were made to the basic structure of the constitution.336 
Following the 1997 election, the government endorsed the creation of the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, which was ostensibly mandated to 
create a revised constitution, though again no reforms were actually 
implemented in the following years. In the subsequent election, held in 2002, 
debates about constitutional reform once again played a central role. The 
opposition party, led by Mwai Kibaki, made constitutional reform a core 
campaign issue, promising to provide a new constitution within 100 days of 
taking office, if elected. Kibaki and his party, the National Alliance Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC), handily won the election. The clamour for a new constitution 
was principally driven by the need to check the powers of the executive 
through a devolved system of government. 
 
However, once in office promises for constitutional reform quickly faded.337 
Kibaki’s new government set up the National Constitutional Conference, which 
was charged with seeking public input on reform and drafting a new 
constitution that could be put before the public in a national referendum. 
                                            
335  Anderson, David 2005 “’Yours in Struggle for Majimbo’. Nationalism and the Party 
Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 1955-64,” Journal of Contemporary History 40 (3) 
pp. 547-564. 
336  Id. 
337  Id 
 
194 
However, the constitutional review process became highly contentious and 
ultimately produced a draft which came to be known as the Bomas draft a 
document that divided the political elite. The draft contained both devolved 
system of government and power-sharing provisions. It sought to devolve 
resources and authority to regional bodies and also envisioned the creation of 
a powerful prime minister who would share executive responsibilities with the 
President, a measure designed to create a more inclusive central structure. This 
draft, however, was never put to a public vote. Before the referendum, which 
was held in 2005, the Attorney General modified the draft, stripping the main 
power-sharing features from the bill. The final referendum vote on the 
modified version of the draft, saw politicians and voters divide largely along 
ethnic lines, and failed by a wide margin.338 Once again, fundamental reform 
was deferred. In the 2007 election campaign, constitutional reform, power-
sharing and devolved government in particular again emerged as a central 
campaign theme.339 The opposition parties ODM and ODM-Kenya called for 
devolution as a way to increase local control over resources and reduce 
inequitable treatment by the central government. The debate was often cast in 
emotional and divisive ethnic terms, as the opposition argued that devolution 
then being referred to as “majimbo” in Kiswahili would provide marginalized 
groups with more autonomy while decreasing domination by those tribes that 
controlled the central government. Views on these reforms were highly 
polarized by ethnic group. In the past, calls for majimbo had served as a pretext 
for ethnic cleansing, particularly in the Rift Valley and on the Coast.340 Many 
voters, particularly the Kikuyu, were deeply concerned about the opposition’s 
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promises to implement such a policy, fearing that it would lead to the creation 
of homogenous ethnic zones in which the Kikuyu would not be welcome. 
 
4.5  The 2008 Power Sharing Deal 
 
In the weeks following the post-election violence, a long list of foreign 
personalities visited the country to try to restore stability and resolve the 
political impasse between PNU and ODM. This list included Bishop Desmond 
Tutu, John Kufuor, President of Ghana and outgoing head of the African Union 
(AU), UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, and US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, among others. At the same time, foreign heads of state and 
international donors put pressure on the two main political parties to bring an 
end to the violence. Despite these efforts, little progress was made prior to the 
arrival on January 23 of the negotiating team headed by former UN Secretary 
Kofi Annan. The negotiations began with a wide gulf in the positions of the two 
sides. For its part, the opposition party, ODM, believed that it had rightly won 
the presidential election. ODM’s position was that an interim government 
should be created for a period of six months, after which time the presidential 
election would be re-run.341 On the other side, PNU was unwilling to consider a 
re-run of the election, and argued instead that ODM should submit any 
complaints regarding election fraud to the courts. Once it became clear that a 
re-run of the election was unlikely, the negotiations shifted to seeking terms 
for a power-sharing arrangement between the two sides. Annan sought to 
create “inclusionary” power-sharing structures that would divide power and 
authority between the two parties within the existing unitary state. While ODM 
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sought to include devolution provisions. As the negotiations proceeded, ODM 
advanced several core demands.342 First was the creation of a prime minister, 
who would serve as Head of Government and have the authority to appoint 
and remove government officers, including Cabinet members. Second, ODM 
demanded that cabinet portfolios be divided equally and that high profile 
ministries – e.g., Interior and Finance – be shared between the two parties. 
Third, ODM called for proportionality at all levels of government. Lastly, ODM 
sought to have the deal entrenched in the constitution. On the other side, PNU 
demanded that the President remain as Head of Government and retain the 
authority to determine the composition of the cabinet. The Prime Minister 
position would oversee the ministries but would not have executive functions 
related to hiring or firing. At several points during the negotiations, which 
lasted for five weeks, the intransigence of the two sides threatened to derail 
the bargaining. The personal dedication and adroit management of the lead 
mediator, Annan, was of considerable importance in maintaining progress. 
Early on Annan managed to end the acrimonious war of words that was being 
waged between the two sides in the media by demanding that both sides stop 
airing their grievances to the press. At a critical point, Annan also sequestered 
the entire negotiations process for several days in Tsavo, one of Kenya’s 
wildlife preserves, to remove the process from the limelight in Nairobi, the 
nation’s capital. Finally, in the last stages, when the negotiations were stalled 
over key details, Annan bypassed the negotiation teams appointed by each 
party and appealed directly to the principals, the heads of the two parties.  
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This move marginalized hardliners within the two camps and led to an 
agreement. Given the bitterness and distrust that existed at the start of the 
negotiations, the fact that a deal was reached is a credit to Annan’s skilful 
management of the process. The final deal, reached on February 28, addressed 
many key issues but left others unresolved.343 The main provisions related to 
the creation of a Grand Coalition government. Other more fundamental 
changes regarding the political system or the deeper grievances that 
contributed to post-election violence were deferred. The deal called for the 
creation of a coalition government that included PNU and ODM as equal 
partners. The position of Prime Minister (PM) would be created and would be 
filled by the party or coalition with the largest number of seats in Parliament. In 
practice, this meant that ODM’s presidential candidate, Raila Odinga, would fill 
the seat. Second, two deputy prime minister positions would be created, one 
to be appointed by ODM and the other by PNU. In appointing cabinet 
ministers, the principle of “portfolio balance” whereby the number of seats 
would be assigned in proportion to the parties’ strength in parliament would 
be followed. To safeguard against the possibility of reneging, guarantees were 
provided to ODM. The Prime Minister would only be removed through a vote 
of no confidence passed by a majority in parliament. Given that ODM held the 
largest share of Parliamentary seats, this provision meant that it would not be 
possible to remove the PM without ODM’s consent. Similarly, cabinet Ministers 
would be removed from office only with concurrence from both parties. And 
the agreement would be entrenched in the constitution, through a bill passed 
by Parliament. Other aspects of the agreement remained vague. The first was 
the powers of the new Prime Minister. The accord stipulated that the PM 
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would “co-ordinate and supervise” affairs of government, without specifying 
exactly what power and authority would be vested in the position and how 
executive powers would be divided between the PM and the President. 
Second, the accord left unresolved the question of how long the coalition 
government would last and what would happen if it collapsed. The agreement 
stipulated that the coalition could be dissolved if the parliament were 
dissolved, if the parties agreed in writing, or if one coalition partner withdrew 
from the coalition. However, the agreement did not specify what would 
happen if the coalition were to collapse before the next election in 2012. 
Finally, although not formally part of the power-sharing agreement, the parties 
to the negotiations also agreed to create investigatory committees to look into 
allegations of fraud during the election, causes of the post-election violence, 
and the sources of long-standing grievances in Kenyan society.  
 
4.6   Implementation of the Power sharing Deal 
 
Given the ambiguities in the power-sharing agreement, its success would hinge 
on the political will of the two sides to the accord. The early signs were not 
encouraging. The first major task under the accord was the assignment of 
cabinet posts in the new Grand Coalition government. While both parties were 
prepared to honour the principal of portfolio balance, as agreed in the accord, 
initial negotiations deadlocked over which ministries would go to each party. 
Both sides sought control of the key ministries, such as Finance, Internal 
Security, and Public Service, among others. The stalemate, which dragged on 
for several weeks, threatened to undermine the recently-signed accord. In 
frustration over the delays and PNU’s perceived hard-line position, ODM 
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supporters in Kisumu and Nairobi returned to the streets for several riots in 
early April.7 Equally frustrated with the impasse, the European Union 
threatened to cut off aid if a deal was not reached.344 After several tense weeks 
of negotiations, the parties finally called on mediator Annan to help broker a 
deal. The final deal, which was announced on April 13, allowed the PNU to 
keep Internal Security and Finance, while ODM gained other key ministries, 
including Public Service, Local Government, and Agriculture.345 The cabinet was 
expanded to 42 posts, in order to accommodate the expanded coalition. The 
second aspect of implementation concerned the review committees. The first 
of the three committees of enquiry to get underway, the Independent Review 
Committee, was charged with looking at electoral fraud during the election. 
The committee, headed by former South African judge Johann Kriegler, issued 
what came to be known as the “Kriegler Report” in September 2008. The 
report ruled that it was not possible to conduct a re-count of the ballots in 
order to determine the actual winner of the 2007 election, a decision that 
frustrated some civil society organizations, which had wanted a more full 
investigation into alleged fraud in the vote counting process.346 The main 
recommendations of the report related to the overhaul of the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK), and particularly the adoption of measures to 
strengthen the ECK’s independence.  
 
The second investigatory committee, the Commission of Inquiry on Post-
Election violence, was mandated to examine the sources and perpetrators of 
the post-election violence. The Committee, which was headed by High Court 
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Justice Philip Waki, completed its work in October 2008. Its report, which 
provides a detailed account of the postelection violence, included a list of 
alleged perpetrators of the violence. Several current ministers and MPs are 
were included on the list. The Commission gave the Grand Coalition 
government 60 days to establish a tribunal to bring the alleged perpetrators to 
trial, after which time the list of perpetrators would be handed over to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) if no such tribunal was created. Given that 
several top government officials were on the list of alleged perpetrators, it was 
extremely unlikely that the government would support the creation of a local 
tribunal with substantive powers. The failure of the government to support a 
local tribunal has since seen the active involvement of the ICC with the Chief 
Prosecutor of the Court requesting for summons to issue for six personalities 
suspected to be behind the post election violence. With the real threat of 
summons and arrest warrants being issued the government, has backtracked 
and is lobbying for African Union support to get a deferral of the cases to a 
local tribunal that will be established. 
 
4.7    Effects of the Power Sharing Agreement 
 
By any measure the power-sharing agreement has been a success in achieving 
the primary goal of ending the conflict and restoring relative political stability. 
The violence that had engulfed the country ended with the signing of the 
agreement. An opinion poll conducted in April 2008, about a month after the 
power-sharing agreement was reached, showed broad support for the 
agreement, with 75% of respondents saying they approved of the accord.347 
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The poll also found strong support across partisan lines, with 75% of ODM 
supporters and 72% of PNU supporters approving. Moreover, the survey found 
significant optimism about the future of Kenya. In response to a question about 
the future of ethnic relations, the largest share of respondents (43%) said that 
they thought relations between communities would improve in the coming 
year, with 27% saying that they would get worse, and 30% saying that they 
would remain the same. At the same time, Kenyans remain concerned about 
the durability of the power-sharing agreement and the consequences if it were 
to collapse. Only 36% of respondents thought that the agreement would 
survive until the next election in 2012. Moreover, 47% of respondents said that 
there would be renewed violence if the power sharing agreement collapsed.348 
Despite the positive effects in terms of stability, the power-sharing agreement 
in Kenya may be prone to negative side effects. The authors of the larger 
project, of which this case study is a part, have identified three potential 
pathologies associated with power sharing. First is the concern that power-
sharing agreements may create excessive transaction costs in decision-making, 
due to supermajority or unanimity provisions, leading to inefficiencies or 
immobilism. In the Kenyan case, no such provisions were included in the 
agreement with regard to policy making. The only area in which guarantees 
were provided was with regard to the dismissal of cabinet ministers, which 
requires consent from both ODM and PNU. Otherwise, the legislative process is 
subject to the same rules that existed prior to the power-sharing agreement. 
Therefore, the concern that minorities may be able to extract an unreasonably 
high price for cooperation does not apply in the Kenyan case.  
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The inefficiencies that may exist in the legislative process are a function of the 
political system that existed before the agreement, not the agreement itself. A 
second concern is that power-sharing agreements may create an adverse 
selection problem whereby extremists and ethno-nationalists are favoured 
over moderates. Again, this does not appear to be the case in Kenya. On the 
contrary, the leaders of the two parties that signed the agreement, Mwai 
Kibaki and Raila Odinga, appear to be relatively moderate compared to the 
hardliners in each side’s camp. At several critical points in the negotiations 
process and after, these leaders have shown a willingness and ability to 
constrain hard-liners within their own ranks, facilitating compromise across 
party lines. For example, in the final stages of the negotiations over the accord, 
Kibaki and Odinga retreated with Annan in a private session to hammer out the 
last details of the agreement. Again during the negotiations over the 
distribution of cabinet portfolios, the two party heads retreated behind closed 
doors to break an impasse that threatened to destroy the Grand Coalition 
government. 
 
Finally, the third concern is that power-sharing agreements may create moral 
hazard problems by eliminating the oversight role played by opposition parties. 
Without an opposition party to check the government, corruption and theft 
may increase. It may not be time yet to offer a definitive assessment, however, 
there are signs that the entry into the Grand Coalition has not undermined the 
oversight role that ODM would have played if it had remained in the 
opposition. Joining the Grand Coalition does not require ODM to abdicate its 
oversight role. While ODM and PNU are partners in the governing coalition, 
they are also adversaries in the electoral arena, keenly aware that they are 
 
203 
likely to face each other again in the next election. For its part, ODM appears 
determined to demonstrate its competence as a partner in the Grand Coalition 
government in order to enhance its reputation between now and the next 
electoral round. The fact that ODM and PNU are likely to face off again in the 
not-too-distant future also creates an incentive for the two parties to expose 
instances of corruption in the other’s ranks. In June 2008, for example, a 
prominent ODM MP brought to light allegations that the Finance Minister, a 
senior PNU member, had acted improperly in selling off a government-owned 
hotel to a group of Libyan investors.349 In addition, while the power-sharing 
agreement eliminated the official opposition, it also created new opportunities 
for oversight within government bodies. Under the power sharing accord, the 
parties agreed to the principal of portfolio balance in the allocation of cabinet 
positions. In practice, this principle has been interpreted to mean that there 
would be balance in the distribution of Ministerial positions and that there 
would be balance within each Ministry. If a top position within a particular 
ministry was filled by PNU, the second position would be filled by ODM, and 
vice-versa. In principal, this system of balance within ministries allows each 
party to keep an eye on the other, making it difficult for any one party to create 
a fiefdom within a particular body.  
 
4.8    Potential for Future Conflict 
 
While the power-sharing agreement has restored stability in Kenya, the 
potential for renewed conflict remains high. First, the tension created by the 
election and the postelection violence has left Kenyans polarized along ethnic 
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lines. Many of the victims who were chased from their lands during the ethnic 
clashes have yet to return because of lingering fear and distrust. And the 
fundamental grievances over land distribution, inequalities in wealth, and 
perceived historical injustices have not yet fully been addressed despite the 
fact that a new constitution is in place. Equally troubling is the culture of 
impunity that has long existed in Kenya, whereby perpetrators of violence are 
not held to account. The periodic cycle of violence during elections now spans 
several election rounds, dating back to 1991. Many of the same politicians have 
been repeatedly implicated in violence, particularly in the Rift Valley. For these 
actors, violence and polarization are useful electoral strategies. The failure to 
punish political leaders means that they have little incentive to refrain from 
such behaviour in the future. 
 
Third, there is a danger of an escalation of forces prior to the next election in 
2012. Having suffered during the post-election violence, the affected 
communities may take precautionary measures in advance of the next election 
cycle. The danger is that the desire by each community to protect its members 
may result in a security dilemma in which both sides ratchet up their capacity 
to carry out violence. If this occurs, the potential for large-scale violence is 
certainly real. Finally, there is the danger that the Grand Coalition could 
collapse prior to the next election, sparking renewed conflict. The Grand 
Coalition’s durability is vital to the maintenance of peace in Kenya. To date, 
there have been disagreements between the Coalition partners, but none of 
these have so far jeopardized the coalition. However, the government is slated 
to address a number of divisive issues in the coming years, including 
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constitutional review, prosecution of alleged perpetrators, and land reform, 
among others. These issues will put the coalition to a test.  
 
4.9      Concluding Remarks on the Power-Sharing Arrangement 
 
With Kenya’s power-sharing accord being approximately three years old, some 
preliminary lessons can be drawn from it. The first lesson relates to the role 
played by the mediator in power-sharing negotiations. Kofi Annan’s 
extraordinary skill and dedication were extremely important, both in terms of 
reaching the agreement and sustaining it over time. At crucial junctures during 
the negotiations process, Annan proved particularly adept at breaking through 
stalemates, marginalising hardliners, and narrowing the focus of the agreement 
to issues that could realistically be resolved through negotiations. Moreover, 
Annan has been actively involved in the sustenance of the agreement since it 
was signed, returning to Kenya during the crisis over the naming of cabinet 
members and again to receive the findings of the commissions of inquiry.  
 
Secondly, the Kenyan experience illustrates the point that in post-conflict 
negotiations there is often a trade-off between short-term and long-term 
goals. In Kenya it proved expedient to defer many divisive issues during the 
negotiations, in order to limit the scope of the agreement and produce an 
accord. However, deferring fundamental issues, such as constitutional reform, 
land reform, and perceived inequalities between ethnic groups, means that 
such issues may not be addressed at all or may derail the peace accord in 
subsequent years. Thirdly, the temporary nature of the agreement appears to 
offer benefits while also creating risks. The current arrangement seems to have 
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succeeded in striking a healthy balance between competition and inclusion. By 
not allocating any fixed positions of power, the agreement forces the parties to 
continue competing in the electoral arena. This maintains the incentive for the 
parties to act as checks against each other within the government. Yet, the 
temporary nature of the agreement also raises the possibility that renewed 
conflict will occur over basic issues of political inclusion and exclusion in coming 
elections. The final lesson that emerges from the Kenyan case is that the 
success of the power sharing agreement in large part hinges on the political will 
of the two sides. Existing research on peace-keeping agreements suggests that 
a third-party enforcer is necessary because parties to such deals cannot be 
trusted to honour the agreement.350 No such third-party enforcer has been 
available in Kenya. It is therefore largely up to the signatories to determine 
whether the agreement will succeed or fail. Another line of research into the 
durability of power-sharing agreements suggests that the details of the 
agreement account for its success or failure.351 Yet, Kenya’s power-sharing 
agreement lacks most of the elements that have been found to sustain such 
arrangements elsewhere. Instead, the Kenyan deal includes only very minimal 
guarantees of inclusion and outlines broad principles for power-sharing. Again, 
this points to the importance of political leadership in sustaining the 
arrangement. Given that many guarantees are not specified in the agreement, 
its durability will depend on how it is implemented over time by the 
signatories.  
 
 
 
                                            
350  
351  
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4.10   Devolved Government and in the New Constitutional Law  
 
The debate over devolved government has been the single most highly 
contested and divisive question in the last two decades of Kenya’s history. In 
fact it has been considered as the remedy in agenda four of the power-sharing 
negotiations discussed above in that it will ensure equal distribution of the 
country’s resources. Preceding its inclusion in the recently promulgated 
Constitution and up till now, it had and continues to be advanced as the 
ultimate means of realising equitable distribution of resources, managing the 
country’s ethnic diversity amongst other equitable national goals. The 
divisiveness surrounding devolved government has centred on a lack of 
agreement on what form such devolution should take. At long last, so it seems, 
a design, enunciated under chapter eleven of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, 
has been agreed upon. This piece examines this design; its potential perils and 
possibilities for success. Given that such an examination cannot bypass the 
historiography of Kenya’s post-independence discourse, only a skeletal and 
targeted mention of this historical narrative will be provided for here. In 
conclusion, this chapter finds that the efficacy of a devolved system of 
government does not lie in the beauty and intricacy with which it is tailored but 
more with the resolute and dedicated practice of constitutional principles; in 
the essence constitutionalism. 
 
4.11     Devolved Government as a Form of Decentralisation  
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In the most general of terms, decentralisation refers to the transfer of 
authority from a central government to a sub-national entity.352 Beyond this 
general definition, the process of decentralisation is a complex undertaking, 
taking on different meanings in different contexts and according to the desires 
and plans of those in charge of its design and implementation.  
 
4.11.1  Forms of Decentralisation  
 
There are various ways in which a government may decentralise power to the 
sub-national level. These are deconcentration, delegation and devolution or 
devolved government. Deconcentration is the delegation of certain decision 
making powers to lower, provincial or local levels of the central government.353 
It has a peculiar characteristic in that it is one and at the same time a form of 
centralisation and decentralisation. In this case, decision making authority is 
shifted from one locality (the capital) and one individual (the president) to 
lower levels of the government.354 However, although financial and 
management responsibility may be shifted to the local units, there remains the 
hierarchical dependence of the local authority to the central government for 
appointments, assignments and salaries.355 Deconcentration is the weakest for 
of decentralisation used mostly in unitary states. This is the typical system of 
government that Kenya operated under since 1979. Despite its limitations, 
                                            
352  Boko, Sylvain, Decentralization and Reform in Africa, Kluwer Academic Publishers,. 
2002, G S Boko, Sylvain, Decentralization and Reform in Africa, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers,. 2002 and D A Rondinelli (Eds.) Decentralisation and Development: Polity 
Implementation in Developing Countries (1983) at 19. 
353  Boko as note 1 above. 
354  Id 
355  R Crook & J Manor Democracy and Decentralisation in South-East Asia and West 
Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance (1998) 11- 12. See also Boko as 
note 1 above; Cheema and Rondinelli as note 1 above. 
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deconcentration, if properly carried out (e.g. if the central government 
provides its local representatives with the means to adequately carry out their 
devolved functions) can help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
good provision and service delivery. The case of Rwanda is often given as a case 
in point. The presumption under a deconcentrated arrangement is that the 
central government’s local representatives are closer to the local populations 
and can better respond to the local interests than decision makers in the 
capital city. However, as illustrated above, it does not involve any real transfer 
of authority; and does not involve independent local governments that are 
wholly elected or accountable to the local populations. As such any benefit of 
deconcentration in responding to the preferences of the local communities is 
limited and largely dependent of political will.   
 
In the case of delegation, the responsibility for decision making with respect to 
public functions administration is transferred to the semi-autonomous 
organisations or units that are not wholly under the control of government.356 
Such organisations as housing or transportation authorities, public enterprises, 
regional development corporations etc. may enjoy ample discretion in decision 
making and may not be subject to the same constraints as regular service 
personnel.357 They may even be able to charge user fees. Delegation remains a 
limited form of decentralisation with the difference between it and full political 
decentralisation being that the lower level organisations to which power is 
transferred remain ultimately accountable to the central government. 
Delegation is a more extensive form of decentralisation than deconcentration 
                                            
356  W Oyugi ‘Decentralisation for Good Governance and Development’ (2000) 21 
Regional Development Dialogue 3. 
357  Id. 
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and it is one way to balance local and national government interests. It some 
cases it may involve a principal-agent type of a relationship in which the central 
government is the principal and local organisations are the agents.358 In that 
case an issue that arises concerns finding ways to provide incentives that will 
induce the local, self-interested agent to behave in ways that are as close as 
possible to the central government’s wishes, the principal situation.  
 
Devolution or devolved government is a form of decentralisation in which the 
authority for decision making with respect to finance and management is 
transferred to quasi-autonomous units of local government.359 In other words, 
devolution is a political concept that denotes the transfer of political, 
administrative and legal authority, power and responsibility from the centre to 
lower level units of government created by the national constitution. In a 
devolved political system, the lower level units of government to which power, 
authority and responsibility has been transferred (devolved) are more or less 
autonomous from each other.360 This means that any one level of government 
is not under any obligation to refer to or seek authority from the centre in 
order to make and or implement decisions that fall within their exclusive 
jurisdiction. Devolution forms the foundation for political decentralisation in 
that it usually involves the transfer of responsibilities to municipalities that 
elect their own mayors and councils, raise their own revenues and are able to 
make investment decisions independently of the central government. In such a 
                                            
358  Oyugi as note 5 above. 
359  J C Ribot, African Decentralisation: Local Actors, Powers and Accountability, 
Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Paper Number 8, 2002 7. 
360  Id. 
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system, local governments have legally recognised geographical boundaries 
within which they exercise their authority and perform public functions.  
 
4.11.2 The Content of Devolution  
 
Decentralisation may be political, administrative, fiscal or economic. Given that 
this chapter deals with devolved government as the form of decentralisation 
under the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the following segment discusses these 
three methods of decentralisation under  the banner of devolution. 
Administrative devolution refers to the transfer of responsibility for the 
planning, financing and management of selected public functions from the 
central government to lower tier units of the government.361 These might be 
field units of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations 
or regional authorities. Political devolution consists of the creation of sub-
national levels of government that are endowed with autonomous decision 
making power.362 Generally, political devolution is more likely to be successful 
when conducted within the framework of a multiparty, participatory, 
grassroots-based system. The sub-national entities (state, provincial district 
governments, municipalities or counties as the case may be) to which power is 
devolved in the course of political devolution must be legitimately elected local 
governments which have legal authority conferred onto them by the people 
who elected them and enjoy financial autonomy. Constitutional or statutory 
reforms are often required to strengthen political devolution and establish the 
credibility of the process. These reforms must confer upon local communities 
the abilities to freely elect their representatives and the right to self 
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determination within the law. For example the Constitution of Benin, adopted 
in December 1990, engages the country on the path of devolved government 
through elected councils.363 Subsequently, five different laws have been passed 
to facilitate the implementation of this process.364 In the Constitution of Mali, 
under Articles 97 and 98, the autonomy of local communities is provided for 
and a subsequent implementation law determines the specific structure and 
functions of devolved local communities.365 Likewise, the Constitution of 
Burkina Faso devotes Articles 143-145 to the creation of autonomous local 
communities and various legislative pieces thereafter spell out the specifics of 
the devolution process.366 The Constitution of Kenya 2010, is the most explicit 
of the examples so far given devoting an entire chapter comprising of 27 
Articles to “Devolved Government”. In the Kenyan case as well, Article 200 
provides for the enactment of legislation to specify the details of the process of 
devolution but a fairly comprehensive outline of the structures and functions of 
autonomous local governments is constitutionally enshrined lending the 
ensuing process hefty weight by reducing the possibility of political 
manipulation through various interpretations of the constitution.  
 
Fiscal devolution refers to the definition and alignment of monetary functions 
among the different levels of government.367 The responsibilities of which level 
of governments sets and collects taxes or which tier undertakes what 
                                            
363  Boko as note 1 above at 17. 
364  Boko as note 1 above at 18. 
365  Same as above 
366  Same as above. 
367  P Smoke, Fiscal Decentralisation in Developing Countries: A Review of Current 
Concepts and Practice United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 
Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper Number 2, February 
2001, 9. 
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expenditures ought to be clearly spelt out. Fiscal devolution if not clearly 
structured may altogether derail an otherwise plausible devolution program; 
that is if is not made clear how local governments are to raise the revenues 
that they need to face their new responsibilities. A fiscal devolution program 
must in a straightforward way delineate whether and on what basis local 
governments can self-finance or recover costs through user charges. It must 
clearly specify what types and what levels of intergovernmental transfers are 
undertaken; whether municipalities or counties as the case may be can expand 
local revenues through property taxes, sales taxes or indirect taxes; whether 
there is to be any type of co-financing arrangements between the central 
government and local government; and whether municipalities have the 
authority to borrow and mobilise funds from local, national or international 
sources. Economic or market devolution consists of privatisation and 
deregulation.368 Both of these forms of reforms shift the responsibility for 
provision of goods and delivery of services from the central government to the 
private sector. When a government undertakes economic or market devolution 
reforms, it allows functions that had previously been the primary responsibility 
of the state to be carried out by private corporations, community groups, 
cooperatives and non-governmental organisations.369 Generally, economic 
devolution takes place within the framework of an economic liberalisation 
program. It can only succeed if the legal constraints on private sector 
participation in service provision and delivery are removed, thereby allowing 
competition to take hold between the different private providers. More often 
than not, these different styles of devolution are carried out simultaneously 
making it a fairly complex process. In the end, a well designed program of 
                                            
368  Id. 
369  P Smoke as above. 
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devolution must contain all four approaches to devolution. Political devolution 
without administrative devolution is possible but probably ineffective. By the 
same token, the devolution of administrative and political decision making 
powers to the lower tiers of government without proper financial authority is 
most likely short lived. Finally, economic devolution is important because the 
private sector is often more creative than government entities in devising 
efficient ways of producing and providing a given good or service, making 
government provision of such a good or service an inefficient use of societal 
resources. 
 
4.12 The Road Towards Devolved Government in Kenya: Brief 
Historical Narrative 
 
Kenya’s journey towards the present day devolved system can be traced to a 
decentralised arrangement in the form of deconcentration or the designation 
of certain decision making powers to lower, provincial or local levels of the 
Central Government. Kenya has operated under this deconcentrated system 
through a local government system (provided for under the Local Government 
Act Cap 265 Laws of Kenya) which had a majority of the structures of a 
devolved system save for the lack of autonomy of the local levels and a their 
immense subordination to the central government. This local government 
system has its roots in the colonial period with the passing into law of the 
Village Headmen Ordinance in 1902 giving Provincial Commissioners (PCs) 
powers to appoint locals to be official headmen of a village or group of 
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villages.370 The headmen were charged with the maintenance of law and order, 
help in the collection of taxes and in the arbitration of minor cases in the 
village. In 1903, the colonial government introduced the Township Ordinance 
for the areas of Nairobi and Mombasa (which were the exclusive preserve of 
the white settlers) to be run by a District Commissioner (DC).371 In 1912 the 
Local Authority Ordinance was passed setting up a native authority system 
which failed to be implemented because the colonial government and the 
settler community could not agree on the actual mechanics, functions and 
compositions of the authority system.372 In 1924, the Local Native Councils 
were established under the Native Authority Ordinance. Their main objectives 
were to encourage and develop a sense of responsibility and duty towards the 
upcoming state amongst the chief elders and the native population. The Local 
Native Council was composed of the DC, Assistant DC, Headmen and other 
locals appointed by the PC.373 In 1926, a Local Government Commission was 
established to make recommendations on the structure and functions of a local 
government system in Kenya. Some of its recommendations were: 
 
i. A  policy of separate development based on the segregation of the 
different races; 
 
ii. The establishment of District Councils in the settled area 
comprising of elected officials; 
                                            
370  Njogu Gathata, Local Government System in Kenya Cap 265, Laws of Kenya: A 
Presentation to the North South Cooperation Between Municipal Council of 
Nyahururu and the Municipalities of Hatulla and Janakal of Finland on the 23rd 
August to 7th September (Unpublished)  
371  Id. 
372  Njogu as note 19 above. 
373  Njogu as note 19 above. 
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iii. The exclusion of Townships from the District Councils which were 
to have their own advisory committees.374 
 
In 1928, the Local Government District Councils Ordinance was passed 
establishing District Councils in settled areas. The Municipal Councils Ordinance 
was also passed elevating Nairobi and Mombasa to the status of Municipalities. 
In 1930, the Revised Township Ordinance was passed creating two grades of 
Townships A and B. The DC was mandated to run the grade B Townships 
exclusively and grade A Townships with the help of an advisory committee. In 
1937, a new Native Authority Ordinance was passed providing that Councillors 
to the Local Native Councils had to be elected by the people. In 1946, 
Locational Councils were created within the Local Native Councils to provide 
lower level self rule for the locals.375 In 1950, the Local Government African 
District Ordinance was passed elevating the Local Native Councils to African 
District Councils giving the African District Councils a number of powers like 
that to enter into contracts on their own behalf.376 In 1952, the County Councils 
Ordinance created the District Councils, County Councils, Urban District 
Councils and Rural District Councils.377 In 1963, Local Government Regulations 
were passed establishing a new system of African District Councils.378 
Thereafter in 1968, the Transfer of Functions Local Government Act was passed 
stripping the Local authorities of key responsibilities and transferring them to 
the Central Government.379 Some of the powers withdrawn from the local 
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authorities were those of public health, education and road services. The only 
authorities that maintained a measure of power in these areas were the 
Municipalities and County Councils. In 1977, the Central Government officially 
became the major provider of these responsibilities with the enactment of the 
Local Government Act. Additionally, local authorities lost their financial stability 
with the abolishment of the Graduated Personal Tax (GPT).380  
 
4.13   Present Day (Transitional) Local Government System 
  
The present day local government system in Kenya is created under the Local 
Government Act Cap 265 of the Laws of Kenya (LGA) which establishes the 
various categories of local authorities. These categories comprise of Municipal 
Councils, County Councils and Town Councils. Municipal Councils are urban 
local authorities which are larger than County Councils and Town Councils. 
County Councils cover the rural country sides and are formed along district 
administrative boundaries. They provide services to rural area residents and 
have a structure similar to that of the Municipal Councils except that they are 
presided over by Chairmen instead of Mayors.381 Town Councils are towns 
whose physical and population structure are a notch lower than those of 
Municipal Councils. They are towns waiting to be elevated to Municipal status 
upon attaining improved attributes.382 
 
4.14    Local Government Structure 
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The local authorities are structured along civic and administrative functions. 
The civic functions are vested in elected and nominated councillors, the latter 
who should not exceed one third of the total number. Administrative functions 
are vested in the Town Clerks in the case of Municipal Councils and Town 
Councils and County Clerks in the County Councils.383 Other key administrative 
officers include the Treasurers, Engineers and Public Health Officers. Each local 
authority has the clerks department, treasurers department, work department 
and the environment department. In smaller local authorities, the environment 
and work department are fused into one. Its noteworthy that Municipal 
Councils are headed by Mayors while County and Town Councils are headed by 
Council Chairmen.  
 
4.15  The Functioning of Local Government: The Committee and Full 
Council System  
 
The local authorities function under a committee and full council system.384 
Under this system, each local authority has a committee comprising members 
of the council supervised by the various relevant departmental heads. Matters 
pertaining to each of these departments are brought before the committee 
through notices of motion where they are deliberated upon and resolutions 
made.385 The manner and conduct of the debate is provided for by the LGA. 
Resolutions made at the committee level have to be tabled before a full council 
meeting which is the highest organ in the council under the chairmanship of 
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the Mayor or Council Chairman and comprised of the elected and nominated 
councillors. Once such a resolution is adopted at the full council meeting, it 
becomes policy. This policy then has to be approved by the Minister for Local 
Government, in the essence the Central Government.  
 
4.16     Local Government’s Power to Legislate: By-Laws 
 
Local authorities can enact by-laws which are prohibitions on the conduct of 
persons within the various authorities that may disrupt public order and 
smooth running of socio-economic activities therein.386 These laws cover areas 
of general nuisance, health, environment and conduct of business. The 
supervisory and regulatory role of the council is performed through the 
application of these laws. As typical in a deconcentrated system of 
government, the Minister for Local Government in this case representative of 
the Central Government has immense powers rendering the system far from 
any resemblance of a devolved arrangement.. The Minister under the LGA has 
the powers in effect to approve or disapprove all matters resolved by the local 
authorities. With the enactment of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 which 
provides for a more comprehensive system of devolved government under 
Chapter 11, the current law is likely to be repealed and new legislation on the 
new system put in place. In fact, ostensibly foreseeing such a move, section 18 
of the new Constitution provides that all local authorities established under the 
LGA existing immediately before the effective date continue to exist subject to 
any law that might be enacted.  
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4.17     Devolution in the New Constitution  
 
The principle of devolution or devolved government involves shared 
governance at the national level and self governance at the devolved level.387 
At the national level, concise sharing mechanisms ensure that the concept of 
shared governance is realised while the same can be said of the devolved level 
which is fitted with similar self-governance mechanisms. The degree of 
devolution varies from one system to another. In certain instances, all three 
conventional national government functions i.e. executive, legislative and 
judicial are shared between the various tiers of government. In other instances, 
there is only a partial devolution of these functions. The choice as to what 
extent these functions are devolved depends on the specific needs of the 
society for which they are so being devolved. With the enactment of the new 
Constitution of Kenya 2010, central to the organisation of government in Kenya 
is the principle of devolved government. Under this principle, Kenya operates 
under two constitutionally autonomous levels of government: the National 
Government and the County Government. This division plays an important role 
in determination and implementation of public policy and the management of 
public finances. This segment discusses the basic framework and operation of 
devolved government in Kenya with specific emphasis on the different level of 
government, the formal division of powers, the operation of fiscal devolution 
and the key means of interaction or relationship between the 
different governments.  
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4.18     National Government in Kenya 
 
While there isn’t a specific section defining the National Government as exists 
for example in the Canadian Constitution388, a concerted reading of Article 1(3) 
outlines the National Government as comprising of the Executive, Legislature 
and Judiciary. It is noteworthy that save for the Judiciary, certain Executive and 
Legislative functions are shared between the National Government and the 
County Governments. This chapter discusses chapter eleven of the new 
Constitution which focuses on the County Government and will refer to the 
National Government in so far as it seeks to explain how the devolved system is 
intended to function. The National Government is examined in more detail 
under chapter dealing with separation of powers. 
 
4.19   County Government System 
 
The County Government comprises of the County Assembly and the County 
Executive Committee.389 The County Assembly is comprised of elected 
members representing the various wards within the county and has legislative 
authority conferred upon it by Article 185(1). County Assembly members are 
not explicitly referred to as councillors in the chapter it remains to be seen the 
term to be accorded to the elected representatives of the various wards as 
envisaged in the constitution. The County Assembly has the power to make any 
laws necessary for or incidental to, the effective performance of the functions 
                                            
388  “Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982.” Government of Canada. 17 November 2007.  
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and exercise of the powers of the County Government as stipulated under the 
Fourth Schedule.390 Additionally, a County Assembly, while respecting the 
principle of the separation of powers, may exercise oversight over the County 
Executive Committee and any other county executive organs.391 It may also 
receive and approve plans and policies for the management and exploitation of 
the county’s resources and the development and management of its 
infrastructure and institutions.392 The County Executive Committee is headed 
by a Governor, deputised by a Deputy Governor (who are both directly elected 
by the electorate) and other members appointed by him with the approval of 
the County Assembly, from among persons who are not members of the 
Assembly.393 The Committee is mandated to; 
  
a) implement county legislation; 
b) implement, within the county, national legislation to the extent that the 
legislation so requires; 
c) manage and coordinate the functions of the county administration and 
its departments;  
d) perform any other functions conferred on it by the Constitution or 
national legislation.394 
 
The County Executive Committee may also prepare proposed legislation for 
consideration by the County Assembly and provide the Assembly with full and 
regular reports on matters relating to the county.395 
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4.20  Distribution of Functions Between the National Government and 
the County Governments 
 
The Fourth Schedule to the Constitution grants various powers to the National 
and County Governments. The National Government has control over foreign 
affairs, foreign policy and international trade, the use of international waters 
and water resources, immigration and citizenship, the relationship between 
religion and state, language policy and the promotion of official and local 
languages, national defence and the use of the national defence services, 
courts, intellectual property rights, labour standards, consumer protection, 
including standards for social security and professional pension plans, 
education policy, standards, curricula, examinations and the granting of 
university charters.396 Other powers of the National Government include 
agricultural policy, universities, tertiary educational institutions and other 
institutions of research and higher learning and primary schools , special 
education, secondary schools and special education institutions. The County 
Governments share Executive and Legislative functions (the exact degree of 
both functions to be determined by implementing legislation) with the National 
Government in areas of agriculture, health services, education, transport and 
communications, veterinary policy, housing and public works just to mention a 
few.397 In these areas of shared jurisdiction decisions on the structure and 
management will have to be based on the principle of shared governance 
earlier discussed. These areas can be referred to as those in which concurrent 
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powers are vested both levels of government. The nature of these powers will 
presumably be detailed in implementing legislation which is to follow as 
provided for in the Fifth Schedule. 
 
International constitutional practice has shown that distribution of functions in 
a devolved system of government, Kenya included, are not cast in stone and 
may be changed either through constitutional amendments or judicial 
interpretation of these functions.398 On changes through constitutional 
amendments, Chapter 16 provides for the procedure to be followed to effect 
such a change. Given that an amendment relating to the distribution of 
functions between the two levels of government touches on the structure of 
the devolved system of government as envisaged under Article 255(1)(i), such 
procedure must involve the introduction of a Bill in either Houses of Parliament 
and its passing in both Houses. After Presidential Assent, the Bill must be put 
before a national referendum in which a simple majority is required to make 
the Bill law.399 As for changes through judicial interpretation, the Courts under 
Chapter 10 are given a constitutional role to make decisions on issues touching 
on the Constitution including its interpretation. As is the case in the 
Commonwealth, these judicial decisions can in turn, have transformational 
impacts on the nature and operation of Kenya’s devolved system of 
government. 
 
4.21   Key Elements of Fiscal Devolution in the Kenyan System 
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Fiscal devolution refers to the complex interrelationship between the National 
Government and the County Governments in the area of finance.400 Four 
elements are central to this financial interrelationship namely national-county 
taxation powers, revenue allocation, financial equalisation and county revenue 
funds.   
 
4.21.1  National-County Taxation Powers 
 
Both the National and County Governments have the constitutional power to 
impose certain direct forms of taxation. Under Article 209, only the National 
Government may impose income tax, value-added tax, customs duties and 
other duties on import and export goods and excise tax. County Governments 
on the other hand may impose property rates, entertainment taxes and any 
other tax that it is authorised by law. From the foregoing provisions, it is 
apparent that the responsibility for revenue generation is unequally distributed 
between the national, county spheres of government. The National 
Government’s taxation power is much more far-reaching while the County 
Government has limited taxation and borrowing powers. Under Article 212, a 
County Government has the power to borrow funds from whatever source so 
long as the sum to be borrowed can be guaranteed by the National 
Government in addition to being approved by its local Assembly.  
 
4.21.2  Revenue Allocation: Commission on Revenue Allocation  
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Part 4 of Chapter 12 provides for the equitable sharing of revenue raised by the 
National Government. Article 215 establishes a Commission on Revenue 
Allocation for this purpose.401 The Commission consists of a chairperson, 
nominated by the President and approved by the National Assembly; two 
persons nominated by the political parties represented in the National 
Assembly according to their proportion of members in the Assembly; five 
persons nominated by the political parties represented in the Senate according 
to their proportion of members in the Senate and the Principal Secretary in the 
Ministry of Finance.402 Article 216 which provides for the functions of the 
Commission stipulates that its principal function is to make recommendations 
concerning the basis for the equitable sharing of revenue raised by the National 
Government between the National and County Governments; and among the 
County Governments. The Commission is also mandated to make 
recommendations on other matters concerning the financing of, and financial 
management by, County Governments, as required by the Constitution and 
national legislation.403 
 
The basis for allocating a share of the national revenue to the counties is 
determined by the Senate once every five years by resolution.404 In 
determining the basis of revenue sharing, the Senate is required to take into 
account take the criteria under Article 203 (1) into account (which provides a 
detailed list of criteria for determining the “equitable shares”). The Senate is 
also required to request and consider recommendations from the Commission 
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on Revenue Allocation, consult the County Governors, the Cabinet Secretary 
responsible for finance and any organisation of County Governments; and 
invite members of the public, including professional bodies, to make 
submissions to it on the matter. 
 
4.21.3 Financial Equalisation in the New Constitution 
 
The purpose of the introduction of the concept of financial equalisation in the 
Constitution is in line with a commitment to fairness and equity which are 
central to the overall objective of devolved government under Article 174.405 In 
an ethnically diverse country like Kenya, financial equalisation is meant to 
ensure that across the country, people have access to reasonably comparable 
public services at reasonably comparable levels. Kenya is not the only country 
that provides for a mechanism for redistributing national revenues and 
addressing disparities among Counties or Provinces in other jurisdictions. In 
fact, many countries that are federations or practice some form of devolved 
government involving a central government and several regional governments 
have similar equalisation systems. Examples are Germany, Switzerland, 
Australia, India, Pakistan, and South Africa. The United Kingdom for example, 
has an equalisation approach that takes into account the special fiscal needs of 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.406 The following can be deduced as the 
basics behind the incorporation of financial equalisation as provided for in the 
Kenyan Constitution:   
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a) In accordance with Article 204 (1), the equalisation programme is funded 
entirely by the national government using taxes paid by Kenyans across the 
country and not from one or more regions; 
 
b) The objective of the programme is to address the economic marginalisation 
of to be defined areas of the country. Article 204 (2) provides that the 
Equalisation Fund established there under shall only be used to provide 
basic services including water, roads, health facilities and electricity to 
marginalised areas to the extent necessary to bring the quality of those 
services in those areas to the level generally enjoyed by the rest of the 
nation. In the essence, those areas or groups that have less ability to pay for 
public services are entitled to equalisation payments. 
 
 
c) According to Article 204 (2) read together with 204 (3) (b), the equalisation 
payments an area or group receives from the National Government may be 
conditional; that is they may have strings attached. In such instance the 
areas or groups have to account to the National Government on how these 
funds are put to use.  
 
d) Equalisation is only designed to raise the areas or groups up to a common 
standard. Areas that enjoy provision of basic services above the common 
standard do not see any reductions as a result of equalisation. 
 
 
e) Equalisation is designed to fill the gap between an area’s own capacity to 
provide basic services to its inhabitants and a common standard across the 
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country. It is not designed as a permanent entitlement. As an area’s or 
group’s wealth increases, the principle dictates that it should receive less 
money in equalisation payments and none whatsoever if its capacity to 
provide attains the common standard.407  
 
4.21.4  County Revenue Funds 
 
Article 207 (1) establishes a Revenue Fund for each County Government, into 
which all moneys raised by or on behalf of the County Government are paid 
into with the exception of money reasonably excluded by an Act of Parliament. 
These moneys can only be withdrawn from the Revenue Fund only as a charge 
against the Fund that is provided for by an Act of Parliament or by legislation of 
the county or as authorised by an appropriation by legislation of the county.408 
Furthermore, money shall not be withdrawn from the Fund unless the 
Controller of Budget has approved the withdrawal. An Act of Parliament may 
make further provision for the withdrawal of funds from a County Revenue 
Fund and provide for the establishment of other funds by counties and the 
management of those funds. 
 
4.22  Issues for Consideration in the Enactment of Implementation 
Legislation 
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4.22.1 Financial Equalisation and Composition of the Revenue 
Allocation Commission 
 
In a devolved system of governance with a financial equalisation program, the 
most important institution in the realisation of the concept of equalisation is 
the Revenue Allocation Commission which may be referred to differently 
depending on the jurisdiction. Given that the function of this Commission is 
normally to make recommendations to both  Parliament and Provincial or 
County Legislatures (in the case of Kenya) on the equitable sharing of national 
revenue between the national and local spheres of government, its structure 
and composition is of paramount importance. In the case of South Africa, the 
creation of a Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) with a membership drawn 
from all the nine provinces of the country, enabled the depoliticisation of the 
revenue sharing process and averted a stalemate in the promulgation of the 
1996 Constitution.409 It was argued that whereas political parties are engines 
through which the people express their values and views on governance, 
pegging revenue allocation on political party representation in Parliament 
would be unsound because this would mean subjecting the peoples of minority 
party representations in to the desires of those of majority party 
representation. For example, if the Western Cape Province is a Democratic 
Alliance Party (DP) zone but the majority party in Parliament is the African 
National Congress (ANC), the FFC would be structured with a majority ANC 
representation. In this way, the DP and its followers in the Western Cape, 
would subject to the wishes of ANC representation irrespective of their 
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majority support for the DP within their own province defeating the object and 
purpose of devolved governance. 
 
Precariously,  in Kenya, Article 215 of the Constitution which establishes the 
Commission on Revenue Allocation provides that its membership shall 
comprise of inter alia persons nominated by the political parties represented in 
the National Assembly and Senate according to their proportion of members in 
the Assembly or Senate respectively.410 While it may be explicable that this 
provision must have been arrived at owing to the political temperatures at the 
time, so as to reach a compromise, it is gravely erroneous. Just as in the case of 
South Africa illustrated above, pegging the membership of the Kenyan 
Commission on Revenue Allocation on political party representation in either 
house of Parliament, would subject counties with minority party 
representation to the desires of the majority party irrespective their majority 
stature within their counties. An example would be where the Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM) has a majority in both houses of Parliament and 
the Party of National Unity (PNU) has a minority in the same. Taking an 
example of a PNU stronghold County such as Nyeri County, ODM through its 
numerical advantage in the Commission would have the power to influence 
revenue allocation to Nyeri County overriding the wishes and concerns of bona 
fide representatives of the County. In as much as this influence may be 
legitimate in its own right, it is subject to party politics thereby leaving the 
county residents and their representatives subject to the majority irrespective 
of how well informed their concerns may be. This state of affairs would go 
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against the fundamental concept of shared governance which is central to any 
devolved system. 
 
4.22.2 Developmental Devolved Government  
 
Devolved government has been introduced into Kenya’s constitutional 
landscape with numerous promises chief amongst them is the equal 
distribution of national resources and the reduction of poverty.411 This section 
explores the potential contribution of fiscal devolution in alleviating poverty in 
Kenya. In 2001, recognizing the need to assist impoverished nations more 
aggressively, United Nations (UN) member states adopted the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs are eight international development 
goals that all 192 UN member states and at least 23 international organisations 
have agreed to achieve by the year 2015. They include eradicating extreme 
poverty, reducing child mortality rates, fighting disease epidemics such as AIDS, 
and developing a global partnership for development. Whereas Kenya has 
some of the continent’s wealthiest individuals, it is home to one of the world’s 
largest slums. The Kenya Household Budget Survey (KHBS) suggests that in 
2005/6 almost half of the population (47 percent) lived in poverty, of which 85 
percent were in rural areas.412 The eradication of poverty, and of related 
conditions such as inequity and unequal access to basic social needs, is an 
essential part of Kenya’s development agenda, following the government’s 
recognition that long-term political and social stability will otherwise be 
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unattainable. Some elements require action by the National Government, while 
others put the onus on County Governments. Within the framework of fiscal 
devolution County Governments are set to play an important role in the growth 
and development of Kenya and by implication in the alleviation of poverty 
going by the objectives of devolution as set out in the Constitution. In exploring 
the responsibilities of County Governments in alleviating poverty, this section 
will provide a workable definition of the pro-poor development concept, 
conceptualise fiscal devolution as a key component of poverty alleviation 
strategy and discuss the sharing of social responsibilities among the two levels 
of government in the context of poverty alleviation. Finally, it will examine the 
relationship between fiscal devolution and the principles of good governance. 
 
4.22.3 Devolved Government and Poverty Eradication 
 
Poverty, which has been defined as the inability to attain a minimal standard of 
living, has been measured in terms of basic consumption needs or the income 
required to meet these needs. An important rationale for devolved 
government is that County Governments, are closer to the people and 
therefore better equipped to obtain information on local preferences and 
needs at lower cost and are more likely to conceive and implement pro-poor 
policies.413 Fiscal devolution is meant to boost public-sector efficiency in service 
delivery, so that the scarce public resources expended on health, education 
and other social services. It can generate gains in financing, efficiency and 
quality by devolving resources and decision-making powers to subnational 
governments for the delivery of services. Fiscal devolution also enhances the 
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accountability and transparency of public institutions in policy-making by 
bringing expenditure assignments closer to revenue sources and hence to the 
citizenry. The quality of service provision can also be enhanced since County 
Governments will be more sensitive to variations in local requirements and 
open to feedback from the users of services.  
 
Therefore, fiscal devolution can be applied in poverty alleviation strategies in a 
number of ways. Firstly, to provide opportunities to the poor. Secondly, to 
empower the poor to take advantage of these opportunities And thirdly, to 
protect the poor against their own vulnerability.414 All these steps involve the 
implementation of pro-poor interventions within the framework of 
cooperation between the two levels of government. However, the flipside of 
this argument is that if not properly implemented devolved government can be 
a way for the National Government to avoid carrying out its responsibilities. 
Fiscal devolution can be financially attractive to National Governments because 
by so doing they shift part of their burden of financing services to County 
Governments and private providers. In the quest to use fiscal devolution as a 
pathway to poverty eradication, Kenya could borrow leave from the South 
African experience, in which an important feature of public finance in the South 
African devolved system is the pro-poor budgeting. Pro-poor budgeting is 
financial planning in a manner that poor people are poised to benefit in 
absolute terms, as reflected in some agreed measure of poverty such as the 
headcount index. Pro-poor budgeting on the expenditure side is used to 
address social inequalities and inequities at all levels of government to enhance 
effective redistribution. The rationale here is that if public goods and services 
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are available to all citizens, then people with no income can consume as much 
as anyone else. The reasoning here is that if essential goods and services 
become increasingly available to the poor, not only is their state of relative 
poverty lessened but so is their inequality in relation to others who already 
have access to these goods and services. An example would be where a newly 
opened public clinic makes it possible for a previously vulnerable poor child to 
be immunised against a disease, then, in relation to that disease, the child 
would be fully equal to all other vaccinated children, rich or poor. Furthermore, 
the child’s life expectancy would be prolonged, closing another gap relative to 
wealthier children.  
 
4.22.4  Good Governance and Devolved Government  
 
Governance refers to the complex mechanisms and processes used in 
implementing policy and institutionalising rules and norms within any 
organisation, institution or society.415 It involves a combined effort and 
participation of all stakeholders including state institutions and civil society. 
Existing literature views good governance as a government’s responsiveness to 
the needs and wishes of citizens for example, bringing the responsibility for 
providing public services closer to citizens.416 Former UN Secretary General has 
referred to good governance as a sine qua non for economic and social 
development.417 Further, that it is perhaps the single most important factor in 
eradicating poverty and promoting development. Good governance entails the 
existence of efficient and accountable institutions. According to this view, 
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governance has to do with the manner in which responsibilities are devolved to 
government bodies.418 At all levels, governments must take responsibility and 
be accountable. In the context of Kenya’s devolved system of government, this 
means that the National Government must enable the County Governments to 
fulfil these obligations.  
 
The principles of good governance require government institutions to be 
efficient, effective and consistent. This approach is closely connected to the 
concepts of transparency, integrity and policy coherence. Good governance 
mechanisms and rules aim at promoting development, protecting human 
rights, guiding the respect for the rule of law and accommodating all 
stakeholders including people to participate in decision-making processes that 
affect their lives. In theory, the reduction of poverty is more likely to be 
assured when the people for whom pro-poor interventions are meant are 
allowed, through empowerment, to effectively participate in these 
interventions.419 Therefore devolved government is assumed to facilitate 
redistribution and poverty alleviation since it brings greater local level control 
over resources and their utilisation. However, good governance requires 
institutional capacity and mechanisms to ensure accountability through the 
capacity to monitor and enforce rules and to regulate societal activities in the 
public interest. Such requirements involve assigning responsibilities to other 
state institutions in controlling and verifying that government decisions are 
formulated and implemented in line with its legal commitments. These 
institutions will have to include an integrated public sector and relevant 
administrative legislation, efficient parliamentary oversight, an independent 
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judiciary system and an adequate and independent auditing body. Under a 
devolved fiscal system, good governance ought to ensure that public resources 
are effectively and efficiently managed. Additionally, it must ensure effective 
and sustainable resource mobilisation and its efficient use. In this regard, 
government and public institutions must ensure greater transparency, 
predictability, and accountability in the decision-making process. They must 
provide reliable, relevant and timely information about their activities. 
 
4.22.5  The Promises of Devolved Government: Enhanced Public Service 
Delivery?  
 
The success of a devolved system of government goes beyond its architecture 
and design as outlined in the Constitution and Legislative Acts. In fact there is 
no automatic assurance that a devolved system of government, no matter how 
well designed, will lead to improvements in public service delivery.420 Where 
institutional and technical capacity is lacking at the county or local level to 
deliver even the most basic services coupled with difficulties that local political 
elites may pose, public service delivery may be dismal if not non-existent. 
Secondly, even with a plausible pro-poor budgeting scheme in place, the 
National Government may be risk-taking on the macro-economic level and 
thereby increasing its vulnerability to financial deficit and an over-expansion of 
its public sector.421 Other problematic issues relating to devolved governance 
are agreement on a universal quality standard of service provision, which 
would then enable adequate financial planning for mechanisms like financial 
                                            
420  Boko as note 1 above. 
421  Boko as note 1 above 
 
238 
equalisation.422 Finally, where national resources are inadequate, to ensure 
efficiency, coverage and quality of public service delivery, the efficacy of the 
devolved system is likely to be hampered despite the fact that financial 
responsibility for service provision has been delegated from National to County 
governments. This evidence suggests that the National Government’s challenge 
is to identify the conditions in which increased participation by County 
Governments enhances the equity, quality and efficiency. Robinson has 
pointed out the following leading requirements for the success of a devolved 
system of governance in addition to its design: 
 
a) Political commitment, for the reason that successful pro-poor devolved 
service delivery is associated with governing parties that are politically 
committed to providing opportunities to the poor; 
 
b) Effective leadership plays a role in fostering local innovation in response 
to local needs and priorities; 
 
 
c) Mobilisation (of political parties, civil society organisations, trade unions 
and social movements) is essential, in order to take advantage of 
increased powers and resources, to take part in consultative arenas and 
to engage in public protest over inadequate service delivery; 
 
d) Institutionalised participation in decision-making, through consultative 
bodies designed to provide civic oversight over particular services, 
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facilitating and widening public deliberation, planning and 
implementation; 
 
 
e) Adequate national resources are critical to ensure the equity, quality and 
efficiency of public services. Inadequate resources often result in poor 
service outcomes no matter the beauty of design and political 
commitment; 
 
f) Technical and managerial capacity is a key determinant of the 
performance of local officials in relation to service delivery. In other 
words, the County Governments must be capable of optimising the use 
of available resources. This also assumes well functioning mechanisms 
with which the community can voice demands, channels through which 
authorities can translate these demands into action and instruments of 
government accountability. 
 
4.22.5 Devolved Government: Bringing Governance Closer to the People  
Through Citizen Participation 
 
On of the banners under which devolved government was campaigned for, was 
that it would bring governance closer to the citizenry. The first way in which a 
devolved system of government does this is by the election of local 
governments by citizenry. However, fiscal devolution may  pose a particular 
challenge for citizen participation in local governance in view of its technical 
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complexity and critical significance for the delivery of public services.423 
Participation in this area of devolved governance is likely to be restricted to 
select groups and individuals with the technical knowhow and would therefore 
tend to exclude the vast majority of ordinary citizens who pay taxes and 
consume services provided by local governments. Therefore, fiscal devolution 
ought to be perceived in its broadest sense as a process which is expected to 
enhance the opportunities for citizen participation as plainly bringing the 
decision-making processes closer to people. In so doing, it is then an important 
step towards creating an environment with opportunities for regular 
interactions between citizens and county levels of government. Robinson has 
suggested that despite its complexity, citizens and civil society can participate 
in fiscal devolution through:  
 
a) the rules and formulae governing the allocation of grants and revenue-
raising powers to local governments; 
 
b) the decision-making processes concerning the sources and level of locally 
generated revenues; 
 
 
c) the allocation, utilisation and monitoring of earmarked financial 
transfers; 
 
d) decisions on the allocation of untied funds and locally generated 
resources; 
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e) Resources allocated for supporting participatory processes in local 
governance activities, i.e. capacity-building for civil society and local 
government actors in participatory techniques.424 
 
4.22.6  Devolved Government and Affirmative Action 
 
Affirmative action is a deliberate policy or programme that is a deliberate 
policy or programme that seeks to remedy past discrimination by increasing 
the chances of the affected to participate in what they were previously denied. 
The object of affirmative action otherwise known as positive discrimination is 
to enhance the participation of marginalised groups in decision making and 
implementation and make a difference in the political climate and culture.425 
The protection of rights for minorities and marginalised groups is classically 
provided for under the Bill of Rights. However, the Bill of Rights of itself is 
inadequate because experience has shown that its efficiency depends on 
access to courts and capacity of the judiciary give redress.426 That many 
questions relating to the Bill of Rights border on politics , their justiciability is 
more often than not impugned. The reasonable implication of this reality is 
that the Bill of Rights of itself need to be complemented by other devices such 
as is done by the concept of affirmative action.  
 
The system of devolved government created under chapter eleven of the 
constitution, acknowledges and employs the principle of affirmative action. The 
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chapter makes references to considerations based on gender, minorities and 
marginalised communities in its provisions. It may be strongly argued from the 
foregoing that women and ethnic minorities are implicitly considered as special 
groups in need of constitutional protection and affirmative action.427 Indeed a 
central theme of devolution the protection of minorities and marginalised 
groups. Some of the provisions that seek to foster and promote affirmative 
action include article 175 (c) which requires that no more than two-thirds of 
the members of representative bodies in each county government shall be of 
the same gender. This is bolstered by Article 177 (1)(c) through which the 
membership of the devolved units (county assemblies) must comprise of the 
number of members of marginalised groups, including persons with disabilities 
and the youth, prescribed by an Act of Parliament. 
 
4.23  A Legislative Framework and Proposals for Incorporation in the 
Devolved Government Statute 
 
Article 200 of the Constitution envisages the enactment of legislation by 
Parliament to give effect to the system of devolved government created. The 
chapter on devolved government is basically the foundation of a much more 
complex structure that is to be erected in more detail by the legislation 
envisaged under article 200. Given the skeletal nature of the provisions in the 
Constitution, this article cannot at the time generate fairly comprehensive 
model Devolution Act. However, in the following segment,  the key issues that 
ought not go overlooked in the drafting of the Act are outlined.   
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4.24   Concluding Remarks 
 
The Devolved Government Act which is set to be enacted should contain a 
preamble broadly setting out the principles and objectives of devolution 
expounding or explicating the general principles of devolved government under 
articles 174 and 175 of the Constitution. The preamble should also set out the 
vision and aspirations of the people in creating a devolved government and in 
particular recognise the sovereignty of the people as the basis for devolution of 
state powers. The preliminary part should provide for the short title of the 
legislation on devolution and a concise section on interpretation to define the 
meaning of the key words and phrases used in the Act. The section on 
interpretation ought to be thorough so as to avoid ambiguities that would see 
the provisions subjected to numerous court cases for clarification. The part on 
the County Governments should comprise of articles or chapters on the County 
Executive Committees and County Assemblies. This chapter should designate 
the person(s) and title/name of the authority in whom executive power of the 
regional government is vested in. for purposes of this Section we shall suppose 
such person or authority shall be known as the Regional County Executive (RCE) 
This chapter should provide for ways or methods of appointing or electing the 
RCE, his terms of office and the qualification and condition for holding the said 
office. Provision for the powers, functions and privileges of the RCE should be 
made including the oath or affirmation the RCE must make or subscribe before 
entering upon his office. There should be provision for a Council of Ministers to 
aid and advise the RCE and setting out its powers, functions and privileges. The 
modalities for the appointment or election of the Council of Ministers should 
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be stipulated. It is prudent to make provision for appointment of an Auditor-
General for the Region to advise the regional government on legal matters. 
 
This Chapter should provide for the composition of the legislature and state 
whether the RCE will be a member, and if so, how he will relate to the 
legislature. The number of members of the regional legislatures should be 
stipulated. Provision on how the regional legislatures will discharge the 
functions and powers specified in the Constitution should be made. The 
Chapter should contain provision for duration of regional legislatures and the 
qualification for membership. Provisions on when and by whom the regional 
legislatures shall be summoned should be made including provisions on 
prorogation and dissolution of the regional legislatures. Provision should also 
be made on whether the RCEs will have the right to address the regional 
legislatures and send messages with respect to a Bill then pending in the 
legislature or otherwise. The Chapter should make provisions for the 
appointment or election, of the Speakers and Deputy Speakers of the regional 
legislatures. Their powers and privileges should be provided for. It should be 
provided how the Speaker or Deputy Speaker may vacate his office, resign or 
be removed. Provision should be made for other staff of the regional 
legislatures. The Chapter should make provision for how the regional 
legislatures shall conduct their business and provide for the powers, privileges 
and immunities of regional legislatures and their members. The provisions on a 
devolved system of government under the Constitution of Kenya 2010 are well 
thought out and provide a sound foundation upon which a more 
comprehensive piece of legislation may be enacted. Save for the issues 
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surrounding the Revenue Allocation Commission, namely its composition, it is a 
promising institution.  
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5.   CHAPTER FIVE: THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR A LASTING SOLUTION IN 
SOMALIA: MAKING A CASE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AUTONOMOUS 
ARRANGEMENT 
 
5. 1    Introduction 
 
Somalia is often considered a failed state.428 It is indisputable that the project 
to build and sustain a modern state, with internal and external sovereignty as 
its defining characteristics has failed in Somalia. However, the continuous 
framing of Somalia as a case of state failure is an analytical strategy that must 
have definite limits. It must be pointed out that there exist two relatively 
peaceful and functioning regions of Somaliland and Puntland in the North and 
North-eastern regions respectively. The fact that Southern Somalia has been 
war torn for over a decade, has rendered the whole country to be considered 
failed principally because of the lack of a centrally functioning government. 
Today the larger part of Southern Somalia is ravaged by famine and civil war. 
Up until recently, much attention has been given to Somali clan relations and 
Islamic radicalism as being the root cause of the tragedy. While drought, Islam 
and clans are repeated themes in Somali history, famine and anarchy as has 
characterised the South are not. The reality is that a confluence of external 
forces along with external arms and the internal disruption of the clan system 
have contributed to the extreme condition of Southern Somalia as witnessed 
today. This chapter approaches the study of Somalia from a different angle. 
Instead of taking the modern sovereign state as a universal norm for political 
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organisation and assuming that it is the only imaginable alternative, the 
chapter approaches Somalia as a socio-political order. Doing so entails an 
investigation of the structures and logics that sustain the current order as well 
as those that may change it. This chapter is a journey through time in the quest 
for a feasible proposition to the current impasse in Somalia and the 
advancement of a federated Somalia Republic with three autonomous regions. 
 
5.2   Somalia’s Civil War: Assessing The Interplay of Factors  
 
On January 19th 1991, Mohammed Siad Barre, President of Somalia since 
assumption of power in a military coup in 1969, a former ally of both the Soviet 
Union and the United States and member of the Marehan clan, fled the capital 
city Mogadishu with the armies of the United Somali Congress (USC) in hot 
pursuit.429 He had been ousted from power by a coalition of the USC, the 
Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF). In due 
course and after the deposition of Siad Barre, the three rebel groups which had 
come together only in the final stages of the rebellion, could not agree upon 
new leadership for Somalia.430 The Northern based SNM with the Isaak clan as 
its power base was the first to be formed in 1981. The SNM were not consulted 
about the composition of the new government by the Southern USC and SPF. 
Faced with the fact that a united Somalia would most likely be dominated by 
the Southern factions, the North seceded and declared independence as the 
Republic of Somaliland on May 18th 1991. Following this action, by November 
17th the current civil war in the South had begun.  
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Despite the nationalist or Somali trappings of each faction’s name, they have 
each been confined to one or more geographic region and have predominantly 
comprised of one or more clans. The Hawiye who inhabit Southern and Central 
Somalia including the area around Mogadishu made up the largest part of the 
USC. The Ogaden inhabiting South-western Somalia and Ethiopia, formed the 
majority of the SPF. The Isaak clan inhabiting the northern Somaliland area 
composed the SNM.431 Most of the analyses of the Somali clan structure have 
attributed the “clan” as the wellspring of today’s horrors. However, clans are 
not necessarily the cause of contemporary violence but one of many factors 
that are and have been at play. The present state of Somalia results from a 
complex interaction of the clan factor, colonial history, the role of Islam 
superpower interference and failed leadership. I will examine these elements 
in turn. 
 
5.2.1   The Clan Factor in Somalia’s Conflict 
 
The Somali people can be considered amongst the most homogeneous in 
Africa, both ethnically and religiously with Islam being the prevalent religion of 
choice.432 However, they are strictly divided by an ancient family or clan system 
that developed in response to the needs of survival in the relatively barren 
horn of Africa. About 85% of the population are ethnically Somali (the 
remainder being Bantu and Arab). The Somali people can roughly be divided 
into six major clan families namely, the Dir, Isaaq, Daarood, Hawiye, Digil and 
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the Rahanwiin.433 There are further divisions amongst the Daarood into 
Majerteen, Ogaden, Marehan, Dulbahante and Warsengeli. These structures 
stand to date as the foundation of political and social life. In a nomadic society 
in which individuals maintained no fixed address and in which boundaries were 
by nature fluid, clan allegiance was and remains to date the only form of 
identification outside of one’s name. It was the means to determine one’s 
social standing, their region of origin and who their family and friends were.  
 
The clan structure has a relatively peaceful history demonstrating that the 
system is not inherently given to intra-clan fighting and especially anarchic 
violence. In this context, recent clan warfare can be considered unusual 
because of the presence of intra-clan fighting (between sub-clans). Prior to the 
recent reign of Al Shaabab in the larger parts of Mogadishu, the civil war in the 
region was between Mohammed Farrah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohammed 
both members of the Hawiye clan. 
 
5.2.2   The Colonial Factor 
 
During the colonial period of the 19th century, the area in which ethnic Somalis 
are today found was divided between Britain, Italy, Ethiopia and France.434 As 
European powers increased their trade presence in East Asia, ports along the 
Red Sea and the Indian Ocean became important refuelling stations. In 1839, 
the British established a military garrison and coaling station at Aden on the Al-
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Yemen coast of the Arabian Peninsula. France established its own fuelling 
station at Obock in northern Djibouti in 1862 and later added the port of 
Djibouti, while in 1869 Italy opened a consulate and trade office in the port of 
Aseb on the Eritrean coast.435 In the late 1800s, Britain signed protectorate 
treaties with Somali chiefs and, in 1888, signed an agreement with France 
regarding the boundaries between both countries’ claims.436 As British 
Somaliland became a protectorate of Britain, vice consuls were sent to 
maintain order and control trade. The first years saw rebellions led by 
Mohammed “Mad Mullah” Abdullah that ended with the 1920 bombing of 
Abdullah’s base.437 
 
In addition to earlier possessions along the Red Sea coast gained through the 
Treaty of Wichale, Italy acquired portions of southern Somalia on lease from 
Zanzibar. Italian Somaliland extended south to the Juba River and east to 
Ethiopia. In 1897, Italy and Ethiopia agreed on the eastern border of Italian 
Somaliland. Italy and Britain, which held the land south of the Juba in British 
East Africa, reached an agreement on the boundaries of their holdings in 
1908.438 Some of this land, east of the Juba River, joined Italian Somalia in 
1925. In 1936, the newly appointed governor of Italian Somaliland annexed 
Abyssinia (Ethiopia), forming Italian East Africa, which surrounded French and 
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British Somaliland.439 The tensions between the allies and axis powers that led 
to World War II had a significant impact on the Horn of Africa. Italy declared 
war on the United Kingdom and seized British Somaliland by force in 1940.440 
However, in 1941, the British recaptured British Somaliland as well as Italian 
Abyssinia (Ethiopia/Eritrea), gaining much of Italian Somaliland in the process. 
During the time of British control from 1941 to 1948, Somalia was primed 
toward self-government. Italy formally renounced its claim to territorial 
possession in Somalia in 1947. In 1949, the whole area of Italian Somaliland 
came under international trusteeship. The UN directed Italy to help the Somalis 
work toward independence during the ten-year period from 1950 to 1960.441 
 
An independent Somalia came in 1960 with British Somaliland gaining 
independence on 26th June and Italian Somaliland following suit on 1st July. The 
two portions of the country joined to form the Somali Republic. A 
constitutional conference held in April of the same year established that 
Mogadishu would be the capital city of the newly formed country. However, 
the placement of the capital in the South increased the number of southern 
Somalis employed in government positions, leading to a Southern-dominated 
central government.442 A year later, the people of Somalia adopted the first 
constitution based on European models. The idea of a unified Somalia that 
incorporated all communities of Somalis dominated the government’s first 
years. This feeling of pan-Somalism existed not only in Somalia itself but also in 
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French Somaliland (present-day Djibouti), Northern Kenya, and Somali 
communities in Ethiopia. Pan-Somalism was so strong that when the Somali 
communities in Kenya were not given self determination in 1963, guerrilla 
warfare raged in the area for the next five years. In 1967, the Prime Minister, 
Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, encouraged the government to renounce its claims on 
Somali communities outside of the country, thereby strengthening relations 
with its neighbouring countries. However, many Somalis did not agree with the 
reconciliation between Somalia and its long-time adversary, Ethiopia.443 A 
combination of national and municipal elections held in March of 1969 was 
dominated by the Somalia Youth League (SYL), the country’s first political party 
and an outgrowth of the British movement, Somalia Youth Club, of 1943. It was 
a predominantly socialist front that united the clans of the country and had 
extensive ties to Somali groups in Kenya and Ethiopia. Discontent over the 
outcome of early national elections and allegations of government election 
fraud is thought to be the main cause of the coup on 21 October, 1969. The 
army, supported by the police, arrested top government officials and formed a 
new governing body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). Major General 
Mohamed Siad Barre, an early disciple of African socialism, was elected 
president by the SRC. In addition, the SRC suspended the constitution, banned 
all political parties, eradicated the National Assembly, and renamed the 
country the Somali Democratic Republic.444 
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5.2.3   The Islamic Factor 
 
During a serious famine in 1912, Mohammed Abdille Hassan known by the 
British as the “mad Mullah” was leading a religious rebellion against foreign 
intervention: British, Italian and Ethiopian.445 In the mid-1890s during a 
pilgrimage to Mecca, Sheikh Mohammed Abdille Hassan met Sayyid 
Mohammed Salih, founder of the militant Islamic Salihiya Order. Hassan 
already a fervent believer, adopted the Salihiya teachings. He changed his 
name to Sayyid Mohammed and returned to Somalia to preach Islamic 
reform.446 At Berbera, where Sayyid Mohammed settled briefly, he began to 
zealously teach the new Salihiya Order admonishing his fellow countrymen to 
turn away from their soft living and follow a strict path of Muslim devotion. He 
denounced smoking, chewing of the narcotic Khat plant and generally 
condemned hedonistic practices. Over the course of his teaching, Sayyid 
Mohammed came into contact with European, Christian colonizers and he 
became gradually convinced that they were bent on destroying the Muslim 
faith in Somalis. He asserted that Somalia was in danger of foreign influence 
and exhorted his countrymen to get rid of the English men and other 
missionaries. His militant version of Islam and assertion of Somali nationalism 
met opposition from many of the people he wanted o lead. He encountered a 
great deal of resistance from adherents of the established Qadiriya Order-the 
dominant strain of Islam in Somalia since the eleventh century. They resented 
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the messianism of Sayyid Mohammed’s teaching and criticism implicit in it; that 
Qadiriya practices were stodgy and stale.447 
 
By the same token, the North coast where Sayyid had began his teaching was 
experiencing the benefits of contact with the British for example expanded 
markets and had yet to experience much of the negative aspects of that 
contact namely colonisation and exploitation since the British presence was 
relatively small. In this vein, few Somalis who benefited from this new 
prosperity cared to listen to Sayyid’s message of austerity and piety. In 1898, 
he moved from the coast into the interior to settle with the Dulbahante, his 
maternal clan. Significantly, the region he moved to although entirely ethnically 
Somali, is part of present day Ethiopia. Unlike the coastal dwelling Isaak and Dir 
clans, the Dulbahante had not signed a treaty with the British. In this regard, he 
was able to travel widely preaching to pastoral nomads against the Christian 
missionary efforts. He exploited the external threat of Christianity to encourage 
peace between warring clans. Everywhere along the way he enhanced his 
image. He acquired a reputation as a gifted poet and gathered a personality 
cult around him. His efforts gave birth to the twenty year jihad of the 
“Dervishes” conducted against all Christian colonizers (“dervish was used to 
refer to any adherent of the Salihiya Order and therefore applied to Sayyid’s 
followers) between 1900-1920. The successful results of Sayyid’s campaign 
dealt a devastating blow to British Protectorate Administration. By 1908, 
having spent funds totally out of proportion to Somaliland’s Protectorate’s 
strategic and colonial importance as beef supplier to the port of Aden. The 
British decided to abandon their settlements and operations in the interior and 
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withdraw entirely to the coast. The Administration also armed the Isaak clan 
and left them to protect themselves against the Dervishes. This withdrawal was 
met with Italian protests as it left the Sayyid Mohammed problem solely in 
their hands. Italy and Ethiopia were also concerned about the eruption of 
uncontrolled clan warfare with such withdrawal. The British had 
misunderstood the Sayyid movement. They saw him as an ordinary clan leader 
acting within the system of inter-clan struggle. They assumed that with the 
impending Dervish threat, the Protectorate clans would unite, as was the norm 
among the Somalis and a leader would emerge to guide them. However, the 
truth of the matter was that Sayyid’s movement had transcended the tradition 
clan structures. Religion, in particular Islam provided the movement with the 
pan-Somali appeal. This is not to downplay the importance of the clan factor – 
Sayyid’s support was limited primarily to the Ogaden region and it is true that 
certain inter-clan rivalries did threaten the brittle unity he had established 
among the Dervishes; and his followers were of a different religious order than 
most Somalis – nevertheless, the members of the Salihiya Order were Muslims. 
With the British withdrawal together with their bequeathing of a massive 
supply of arms, the clans were left free to pursue old clan feuds and so they 
did. During this period, any kind of social organisation disintegrated reducing 
much of the population to starvation. Sayyid’s jihad continued until its abrupt 
end in 1920 with is death.  
 
An even-handed analysis can be drawn between the period of 1900 through to 
1900 to today that is by comparing the radical Dervish Islamic movement to the 
plethora of Islamic movements that have in the last decade and over jostled for 
control of Mogadishu and Somalia as a whole. These are the Union of Islamic 
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Courts, Hizbul Islam and the Al Shaabab who are currently in control of the 
larger part of Mogadishu. In the same way that the Dervish movement was 
against foreign intervention in Somali affairs, these groups have used the same 
argument against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the attempts 
by the African Union to protect the same government and secure its control 
over Mogadishu. 
 
5.2.4  The Role of Superpower Rivalries in Somalia’s Clutter: Scientific 
Socialism, the Ogaden War, Soviet Union Fallout and United 
Sates Involvement 
 
Right from his early years as head of state Barre enjoyed Soviet Union support. 
In fact, one of his first actions was to introduce the concept of “Scientific 
Socialism” in the management of Somalia’s affairs. According to Barre, this 
incorporated Islam, socialism based on Marxist principles, and the idea of 
community development through self reliance.448 Siad Barre helped established 
the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) in 1976 which was meant to 
serve as an ideological vehicle for his policy. At the same time, Siad Barre began 
the nationalization of Somalia’s medical services, schools, banks, electricity, 
and transportation and the government took full control of all the country’s 
exports and imports. In 1975, land was nationalized with farmers received 
holding on 50 year renewable leases from the government. During the Siad 
Barre regime, the Somalia’s military dependence on Soviet Union equipment 
and training greatly increased Soviet influence in Somalia. The Soviet Union 
acquired a variety of military facilities, notably at the northern port of Berbera. 
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During this time, in 1974 to be precise, Siad Barre led Somalia to join the Arab 
League.  
 
One of the primary goals of Siad Barre was to establish a “Greater Somalia” one 
whose boundaries would have predated those of the colonial partition; this 
would include the Ogaden, some of Kenya and the whole of Djibouti and would 
have encompassed an all ethnically Somali territory. However, these efforts 
were coldly regarded by other African countries the majority of which are 
multi-ethnic conglomerations. A recognition of Somali claims would have 
implicitly led to the recognition of the right of every minority ethnic group to 
declare its independence in pursuit of an ethnically homogeneous entity-
declarations that would massively and probably disastrously destabilise Africa. 
Indeed Siad Barre’s ambitions the Somalia’s calamitous Ogaden war of 1977-
1978 which cost Siad Barre his friendly relationship with the Soviet Union. In 
pursuit of his goal of uniting all Somalis, Barre invaded the Ogaden region of 
Ethiopia between 1976-1978 using the Western Somali Liberation Front 
(WSLF). In as much as the Soviet Union supported Barre’s “Scientific Socialist” 
government, in the same way it did support Mengistu’s Ethiopian Marxist 
government. The Soviets began supplying the Ethiopian forces with weapons to 
defeat the Somali incursion and in November 1977, Somalia abrogated its 
treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and expelled 6,000 Soviet advisers 
and experts. Because of this action Somalia basically lost most of its economic 
and military assistance. By March of 1978, a Soviet and Cuban-led counter 
attack had re-established Ethiopian control in the main areas of the Ogaden 
and the Somali government announced the withdrawal of its forces. 
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The defeat of at Ogaden War and the break with the Soviet Union was followed 
by a gradual increasing in links with the United States. This was mainly 
attributable to the United States strategy in the Gulf, following the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979. Somalia signed a defence agreement 
with the United States in 1980, which permitted the use by the latter’s military 
personnel of the air and naval facilities at Berbera. The United States provided 
Somalia with substantial amounts of aid during the 1980’s when the country 
had to deal with the massive influx of refugees from the Ogaden region but 
remained hesitant about providing the military aid that was often asked by the 
Siad Barre regime. An influx of an estimated 80,000 refugees from Ethiopian 
Ogaden at the end of 1978 led to a regional ethnic imbalance in the North of 
Somalia. Attempts by the central government in Mogadishu to quell the unrest 
brought about greater regional turmoil.449 Civil unrest eventually led to civil 
war. The deaths of thousands of civilians prompted a United States led 
intervention in 1992–93. Operation Restore Hope involved more than 34,000 
United States troops sent to help restore order and end starvation.450 This 
mission and its accomplishments were short-lived, however, when the 
unexpected deaths of 18 United States soldiers was flashed across 
international media in ghastly fashion in October 1993,  the United States and 
other European nations were forced to negatively reconsider their 
deployments. Foreign troops were withdrawn by the spring of the following 
year.  
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5.2.5   Somalia’s Failed Leadership: Personality Cult Syndrome 
 
Over the course of his presidency, Siad Barre had built a cult of personality 
recreating himself as the father of Somalia. Radio newscasts and public 
appearances would begin with a song dedicated to “Our Father, the Father of 
Knowledge.” Initially, Barre had constructed a multi-clan framework that strove 
to develop Somali national consciousness and end clan importance. However, 
as his power waned later in his rule, he came to rely more and more heavily on 
his own clan support, he persecuted certain clans and played games of divide 
and rule with the others. In October 1970, on the first anniversary of the 
military coup that brought Siad Barre to power, he announced the introduction 
of Scientific Socialism as already discussed above. This was coupled with a 
denunciation of tribalism. Barre outlawed clan identifications – in itself a crucial 
attack on nomadic Somali culture. Somalis engaging in traditional clan activities 
were subject to fine and/or imprisonment. The government also took over 
communal activities such as funerals and marriages forcing Somalis to hold 
these ceremonies at state orientation centres. The importance of the clan and 
a corresponding ambivalence towards nationalism may be indicated buy the 
method used towards the end of the colonial period and during the first nine 
years of independence (1960=1969) to establish clan relationships. It had 
become fashionable etiquette among the European educated Somali elite not 
to reveal one’s clan in favour of the all-purpose appellation “Somali” referring 
to clan loyalties in the past tense. While it was simple enough to reject the 
supposedly primitive, pre-colonial identification system, this rejection then 
posed the problem of a new method of identification. Rather than create or 
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discover an entirely new system, Somali’s increasingly accepted the term “ex-
clan” as a way of politely inquiring into or replying about family allegiance. 
 
However, Siad Barre’s subsequent action namely empowering his own 
Marehan clan at the expense of other clans and exploiting clan rivalries would 
seem to manipulate his cynical manipulation of socialist rhetoric to prevent 
sectional conflicts from interfering with his rule. Although it was illegal to 
mention clan affiliations publicly, Siad Barre’s power base was a tripartite clan 
allegiance known by the code name M.O.D. It consisted of the Marehan, the 
Ogaden and the Dulbahante clans. The M.O.D was cunningly constructed to 
maintain a tight grip upon sectional tensions that could divide the Somali state. 
The Ogaden inhabit western Somalia and Ethiopia. Through his mothers kin 
ties, he could control Somali relations with Ethiopia. Since the Dulbahante 
occupy both sides of the boundary between former British and Italian 
Somalilands, his son-in-law could minimise friction between north and south 
and the Italian and British colonial traditions.  
 
In May 1986, a near fatal car accident involving Siad Barre shattered the 
longstanding illusion of invincibility of the “Great Leader” persona he had so 
painstakingly constructed. Consistent with the Somali Constitution, Senior Vice 
President General Mohammed Ali Samatar stepped forward to be interim 
leader and declared a state of emergency. In as much as Samatar did not try to 
undermine Siad Barre’s position during this time, the damage had already been 
done to the President’s authority. For the first time in his reign, there was open 
speculation about who would succeed him. Furthermore, the prematurely de-
hospitalised Siad Barre was still physically weak and vulnerable to his own 
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kinsmen who were frantically trying to shore up their own positions in case 
Barre lost power. In September 1986, the Central Committee of the Party 
proposed another seven years for Siad Barre as President. He won 99% of the 
vote in national elections on December 23rd. After the election, Siad Barre 
promoted a number of Marehan to the senior ranks of the army and reshuffled 
the cabinet to give the Marehan stronger control of the Ministry of defence. In 
February 1987, General Samatar was appointed First Minister in the new 
government. Because the vital ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence 
reported directly to the President instead of the newly created First Minister, 
Samatar was effectively removed from the chain of command. In fact his office 
and official residence were quickly taken over by the new Minister of Defence. 
 
Siad Barre had constructed two governments, one officially constituted around 
General Samatar and the other conducted around the final authority, the 
President himself. Barre’s increasing reliance upon the Marehan destroyed the 
fragile poly-clan framework he had formerly constructed, leaving him open to 
opposition from every clan other than his own. This alienation led to brutal 
repression of opposition which combined with the loss of strategic value after 
the cold war as already discussed above, left Siad Barre without an ally and led 
to his quick downfall. Numerous opposition groups proliferated. Army officers, 
unhappy with the government, formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
(SSDF), while the Isaaq clan formed SNM. One additional group that weighed 
into the fray was the USC made up of people from the Hawiye clan. The fighting 
between these groups and the Barre government worsened an economic crisis 
and resulted in the division of Somalis along clan lines.451 As Somalia disrupted 
                                            
451  Ahmed, Ali Jimale as note 447 above. 
 
263 
into greater turmoil, Barre retreated to Mogadishu. Somali opposition 
consisting of USC and SNM forces, based in neighbouring Ethiopia, forced Barre 
from power on 26 January 1991. As Barre went into exile, the central 
government in Mogadishu collapsed and the SNM took control of Northern 
Somalia. Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia remained under control of 
the USC.452 
 
5.3   The Transitional Federal Government 
 
Over the next five years, several attempts to resolve the conflict and spark 
reunification were undertaken. Djibouti hosted a major regional conference in 
2000. As a result of this, a three-year transitional national government was 
created.453 This government was headed by Abdulqasim Salad Hassan. Its goal 
was to create a permanent national government uniting all of Somalia. Somali 
Peace talks, held in 2002 in neighbouring Kenya, attempted to forge a 
reconciliation between the government and 20 warlords. Two years later an 
interim reconciliation took place. On 28 January 2004, Somali leaders agreed 
on a charter that would establish a new, five-year transitional parliament with 
275 members.454 In October of that same year, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was 
elected President of the new Transitional Federal Government.455 Despite the 
creation of a transitional government, Mogadishu was still run by warlords in 
the first years of this century. However, those warlords were overthrown in 
June 2006 by the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). This 
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group, made up of clerics, business leaders and organized militia, overpowered 
much of southern Somalia. As they grew in power, they sought to overthrow 
the TFG but were driven from power by joint Ethiopian–TFG forces.456 
 
Following the defeat of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (UIC), the TFG 
moved to Mogadishu with the support of Ethiopian forces in January 2007.457 
Material support from its one-time hostile neighbour continued to pour into 
Mogadishu as Ethiopia deployed troops throughout 2007. These forces, along 
with African Union (AU) peacekeeping troops, have made progress in 
combating the rebels seeking to overthrow the provincial Somali 
government.458 Nonetheless, continuous fighting has taken its toll on the TFG 
and on civilians.459 The UN reports that 60% of Mogadishu’s residents have fled 
the city due to the fighting, adding to the estimated 1 million displaced 
Somalis.460 According to the director of security at Somalia’s National Security 
Ministry, the TFG controls only 20% of the country, making it easy for the 
Islamic rebels to regroup and grow.461 Presently, the struggle centres on the 
TFG in its effort to re-establish a permanent central government, with 
international support mainly from the AU to create a unified Somalia. 
 
5.4   Autonomy as a Feasible Solution to the Somalia Impasse 
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This study proposes a paradigm shift from considering Somalia as a unitary 
state to its conceptualisation as an entity with constituent autonomous 
regions. This assertion is grounded on history and the present day political 
configuration of the country. Autonomy is diffusion of powers in order to 
preserve the unity of state while respecting the diversity of population. There 
are two aspects of autonomy, territorial and personal autonomy, I will concern 
myself with territorial autonomy as it is the one of relevance to the study at 
hand. Territorial political autonomy is an arrangement aimed at granting to a 
group that differs from the majority of the population in the state but that 
constitutes the majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its 
distinct identity mostly through a large measure of self government. The 
degree of such self government varies depending on the peculiar circumstances 
of any given case. A main issue involved in the establishment of a regime of 
autonomy is the division of powers between central authorities and the 
autonomous entity. There are different degrees of autonomy and the extent of 
the powers transferred to the autonomous authorities varies accordingly 
ranging from very limited to larger and up to a high concentration of major 
powers in the above areas. Usually foreign relations and external security are 
reserved for the central government however in a few cases the autonomous 
body has limited powers with the consent of the central government to enter 
into international agreements and to become a member of a particular 
international organization. In order to avoid disputes, it is crucial that powers 
of a regime of autonomy be defined as clearly as possible when it is 
established. In summary, there are four different areas of powers to be 
considered; powers reserved for the central authorities, those fully transferred 
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to the autonomous entity, parallel powers and powers that can be exercised 
jointly. 
 
5.5    Implementation of Autonomy in Somalia 
 
This work makes a case for a comprehensive autonomous arrangement for the 
Republic of Somalia. The proposition is for an arrangement that is similar to the 
one that was brokered for Sudan between the North and South but with 
adjustments to meet the peculiar circumstances of Somalia. A starting point is 
the identification of some central or key differences between the two cases. 
Whereas in Sudan, there is a central government from which the autonomous 
arrangement was built, in Somalia such central and functioning government 
has been lacking since 1991. This effectively means that the kind of 
autonomous arrangement required would be the kind I referred to above that 
is one in which there is a predominance of parallel powers and powers 
exercised jointly. First things first. In Somalia we have three regions. Somaliland 
with a longer history of autonomy with a strong emphasis for total self 
government and secession from the larger part of Somalia, Puntland relatively 
stable area with self government and an emphasis for a measure of self 
government for the regions but within a united Republic of Somalia and 
Southern Somalia a region in chaos largely due to an attempt to impose an 
unpopular government on them and a refusal by the international community 
to accommodate the character of their cultural or religious orientation. 
 
Somaliland is internationally regarded as being an autonomous region of the 
Republic of Somalia.  Since 1991, it has been governed by a secessionist 
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administration as the Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland declared 
independence in May 1991, but remains unrecognised by any state or 
international organisation. However, many foreign governments maintain 
informal ties with the state, with an increasing number of foreign delegations 
and embassies having been established in the capital Hargeisa. It is still far from 
full diplomatic recognition. The Puntland State of Somalia was established in 
August 1998 after a decision made by local political and traditional leaders 
following several failed national reconciliation efforts in the wake of the Somali 
Civil War. 
 
As stipulated in Article 1 of the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali 
Republic, Puntland is a part of the Federal State of Somalia. As such, the region 
seeks the unity of the Somali people and adheres to a federal system of 
government. Unlike the secessionist region of Somaliland to its west, Puntland 
is not trying to obtain international recognition as a separate nation. However, 
both regions have one thing in common: they base their support upon clan 
elders and their way of organization along lines based on clan relationships and 
kinship. Since 1998, Puntland has also been in territorial disputes with 
Somaliland over the Sool and Sanaag regions. Both the Sool and Sanaag regions 
have declared themselves autonomous parts of Somalia as Northland State 
(2008)[25] and Maakhir State (2007), respectively, but Maakhir has rejoined 
Puntland. 
 
The area I refer to as Southern Somalia is that area south of Puntland that has 
been under the control of what the international community refers to as 
Islamists. At present there are three main religious groupings in Southern 
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Somalia namely: Al Shaabab Mujahidin, Hizbul Islam and traditional Sufi 
groups, organised under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ). 
These exist after another grouping, the Islamic Military Courts were defeated 
and ousted from control in 2006 by the TFG with the support of Ethiopian 
troops. Without going deep into the intricate politics of the Southern Somalia 
to date I will hereafter to explain my support for an autonomous arrangement. 
Somalia is ripe for an autonomous arrangement. The problem has been that 
the country has continuously been under pressure to take the form of a unitary 
state with the transitional federal government as the central functioning 
government. Despite the intense resistance that this idea has received from 
Southern Somalia, the international community backed by AMISOM, seem 
intent on imposing this government on Southern Somalia including Somaliland 
under one umbrella of Republic of Somalia. It is my contention this approach is 
utterly misconceived and if there is a persistence on its implementation, it may 
lead to further destruction of the relatively identifiable configuration of 
Southern Somalia. Southern Somalia risks becoming a haven of international 
criminal activity far from its present state of a region under the dominion of 
Islamic groupings each seeking recognition of their political demands. It can be 
recalled that recently, Hizbul Islam a religious group that had previously not 
expressed any intention to engage or participate in the illegal lucrative piracy 
trade off the southern coasts, recently started demanding a share of the loot 
obtained from the trade. 
 
Secondly, the rising trend of extremism seen in the religious groupings is a 
direct response, a form of rebellion against the imposed government in the 
style of the TFG supported by AMISOM. Only through a fair appreciation and 
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invitation to negotiation of the groups in Southern Somalia can there be hope 
for a sustainable peace arrangement. The call to the negotiation table ought 
not have any pre-conditions. The opposing parties at least in the first instance 
must be accepted for what they are and stand for. So important is this position, 
that recently the US has started bending away from its original hardliner stance 
regarding the Taliban in Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan. There have been 
insinuations of bringing the Taliban or at least part of their leadership to the 
negotiation table.  
 
This is because it has been realised that a military approach is rarely the 
solution to ethnic conflict and secondly that compromise must begin by 
accepting at least for negotiation purposes the original hardliner positions of 
opposing parties. There can be no success when one group seeks either total 
annihilation of the other or a complete alteration of their ideological 
foundation. It ought to be recalled that the situation or agreement in Sudan 
was arrived at after both parties accepted the existence of the other and 
bargained for agreement on other issues like share of the revenues obtaining in 
the country. The North had to back peddle on its original conception of the 
SPLM as a terrorist organisation but came to acknowledge it as a liberation 
movement. On their part, the SPLA on receiving some recognition from the 
North softened its intentions to annihilate the Northern government by all 
means. The result was a mutually acceptable autonomous arrangement with 
the option of secession. 
 
In the same vein, all the groups in Somalia ought to be brought together at the 
negotiating table. These groups are: 
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i. Representation from Somaliland: Have traditionally wanted complete 
self government from the larger republic. Secession in effect 
 
ii. Representation from Puntland (Ideally the Transitional Federal 
Government) and from  Ahlu Sunnna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ): Have 
traditionally advocated for a Federal Republic of Somalia governed from 
a central government in Mogadishu ASWJ is much more tolerant of 
ideological differences, but it remains deeply divided along clan lines. 
 
iii. Representation from Al Shaabab Mujahidin, Hizbul Islam  
 
Initially, Al-Shaabab and Hizbul Islam shared a similar vision and model of 
Sharia, but they are divided on two crucial issues, pan-Somali nationalism and 
the political utility of clans. Hizbul Islam’s two traditional leaders, Sheikh 
Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Hassan Abdullahi Hirsi, “Hassan Turki”, are 
nationalists and strong advocates of the creation of a greater Somalia, which 
incorporates all the Somali-inhabited regions into one state. Al-Shaabab sees 
its agenda as much broader than the Somali-inhabited regions of the Horn of 
Africa. It aspires to creating a new global Islamic Caliphate, with undefined 
geographical boundaries. Hard-liners in the organisation see nationalism as a 
legacy of colonialism and part of the problem. They argue that modern 
nationalism and the idea of a nation-state are alien concepts meant to 
fragment the Umma (the global Islamic community). The other difference is 
views about clans. Hizbul Islam also takes a pragmatic view of the clan system, 
which it tries to exploit to achieve its strategic aims. The four main Hizbul Islam 
affiliates were chosen with a view to achieving some semblance of clan 
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balance. Views on the clan system within Al-Shaabab are mixed. The hardliners 
are ideologically opposed to it and see any manifestation of “clan bias” as proof 
of insufficient commitment to Islam. Less extreme figures sometimes 
manipulate the clan system to mobilise and achieve short-term objectives but 
are equally uneasy about getting sucked into Somalia’s clan politics. ASWJ is 
predominantly a clan alliance that brings together major Hawiye sub-clans 
inhabiting the central regions of Somalia. ASWJ say that their alliance is 
animated by the extremist brand of Islam espoused by Al-Shaabab and in 
defence of traditional Sufi practices. However, territorial and clan calculations 
also motivate it. 
 
5.6   Conclusion 
 
Engine: IGAD in conjunction with the African Union as was the case with Sudan: 
Policy Paper. 
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6.       Basic Premises 
 
This thesis has explored the concepts of powersharing, devolution, federalism 
and autonomy devolution as mechanisms for the management and settlement 
of ethnic conflicts. In so doing it has posed and answered the following 
questions; Why do ethnic groups mobilise for political aims? Why do identity 
conflicts seem so severe and intractable? What are the patterns of ethnic 
conflict escalation and de-escalation and in what way are they manifested? Are 
identity conflicts amenable to management and if so what principles apply? 
 
In summary, broadly construed with regard to ethnic conflict in particular, 
there are two schools of thought to explain the phenomenon of ethnic conflict. 
The first school termed as primordialism explains ethnicity in terms of inherited 
group behavioural characteristics argued to be biologically based, that is ethnic 
group identity passed on from one generation to the next. The other school 
known as instrumentalism, argue that ethnicity is contextual, fluid and a 
function of structural conditions in society. Instrumentalists assert that ethnic 
identities are malleable, that they wax and wane, contingent on a number of 
variables, including the capacity and skills of political entrepreneurs who can 
effectively mobilise groups for collective aims and articulate beliefs about 
common ancestry and destiny. Some instrumentalists alternatively known as 
structuralists suggest that ethnic identity is socially constructed often created 
or de-emphasised by power seeking political elites. Instrumentalists often view 
ethnic conflict as less a matter of inherent incompatible identities and more as 
a consequence of differential rates and patterns of modernisation between 
groups; competition where relations among groups vary according to wealth 
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and social status. In short ethnicity is often a guise for the pursuit of essentially 
economic interests.  
 
In the debate about the nature of ethnicity, two important facts should be kept 
in mind or noted. Firstly, each ethnic conflict occurs in its own context and as a 
result of unique historical developments, structural conditions (especially the 
structure of intergroup economic relations) and regional and international 
contexts. It would be hazardous to generalise across all cases with an all-
encompassing theory. However the allegiance of scholars to either of these 
schools, one which sees ethnicity as immutable, innate and another that views 
it as  socially constructed will influence the type of political systems put in place 
to ameliorate conflict. For example where ethnicity is viewed as immutable and 
innate, a consociational approach or power sharing and autonomy is likely to 
be advanced. On the other hand, if ethnic relations are considered socially 
constructed and more so along intergroup economic relations, the political 
system advanced may be an integrative mechanism such as devolved 
government.  
 
What is important is not whether ethnic group identity is innate immutable and 
fixed or contrived and manipulable, it is that members of an ethnic group 
perceive the ethnic group to be real. Perceptions are critical in understanding 
the extent to which intergroup relations can be peaceful or violent. Donald 
Rothchild has rightly focused on ethnic group perceptions of each other, 
identifying three basic types: an essentialist perception in which groups 
perceive physical cultural, or social threats to their vital interests thereby 
making compromise seem a sign of weakness; pragmatic perceptions in which 
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conflicts of interest remain acute but compromise is possible on the margins 
and; reciprocative perceptions in which groups seek to transform the structure 
of relations to achieve mutual interest primarily through the state as a 
mediator. Essentialist perceptions are likely to lead to violent intergroup 
conflict, pragmatic perceptions allow for an occasional truce or cooperation in 
limited spheres and reciprocative perceptions lay the foundation for long term 
peaceful cooperation amongst groups. 
 
Patterns of identity politics can be discerned that can help clarify the 
distinction between successfully regulated multiethnic societies an the violent 
intercourse of deeply divided societies. A clear perception of the basic patterns 
that identity politics takes may lead to more consistent policy prescriptions 
about what type of practices can help alleviate or manage tensions. In this 
analysis three issues are of central concern;  
 
a) the structure of social cleavages;  
b) the relationships between ethnic groups and the state and;  
c) the stages of phases of conflict escalation or de-escalation.  
  
The salience or prominence of ethnicity as a social differentiator and the 
intensity of ethnic ties are very critical predictors of violence. Salience and 
intensity are tied closely to the perceived stakes of ethnic relations. The 
questions that may be posed in this regard are; What are the expected costs of 
defeat? What threats to group survival or well being are perceived? The stakes 
are arguably highest when group identity is threatened or challenged, in 
particular symbols of ethnic identity and destiny that are held sacred to the 
group and are neither divisible nor amenable to compromise or trade-off. 
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Horowitz has given as an example of such symbol language which is considered 
as an incommensurate good not easily amenable to compromise. There is a 
broad scholarly consensus that when social cleavages are reinforcing rather 
than overlapping , the potential for conflict is more acute. This is more so when 
segments of a society are hierarchically arranged that is when there is one 
distinct group or coalition of groups dominating the others. Dual societies such 
as Rwanda and Sri Lanka where the politics often takes the form of zero sum 
game are especially intractable or difficult. An exception often advanced by 
scholars is the case of South Africa in which the structure of social cleavages 
was strongly reinforcing along the lines of race and class but which nonetheless 
proved tractable or solvable over the long term. Another example is that of 
Northern Ireland with better prospects of peace today than in the past thirty 
twenty five years or so. Two scholars Rabushka and Shepsle have offered a 
simple and useful typology of multiethnic societies based on the structure of 
social cleavages and power relationships. In this regard, a differentiation can be 
made amongst four types of deeply divided societies as follows: 
 
i. Fragmented Societies. In a fragmented society, there are more 
than four major mobilised ethnic groups none of which is clearly 
dominant. Examples of fragmented societies are Afghanistan, 
India, Nigeria and DRC. 
 
ii. Balanced Societies: Balanced societies are those with four or fewer 
clearly identifiable groups and they can either be bipolar e.g. 
Cyprus and Northern Ireland or multipolar e.g. Bosnia. 
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iii. Dominant Minority Societies: In this societies a dominant minority 
can wield power to the exclusion of a significant majority. 
Examples include Rwanda, Burundi, Syria and apartheid South 
Africa. 
 
iv. Dominant Majority Societies: These are societies in which a 
majority group dominates ethnic minorities e.g. Croatia, Russia, 
Estonia, Sri Lanka and Israel. 
 
6.1   Mechanisms for Management of the Identity Question 
 
This piece has examined the following constitutional mechanisms for ethnic 
conflict management in light of the cases of Kenya, Sudan and Somalia. 
 
6.1.1   Powersharing Arrangements 
 
Nearly all the peace accords negotiated in the past fifteen years have included 
powersharing in one form or. As powersharing gains popularity as a mode of 
conflict management and its frequency increases, it becomes increasingly 
important to assess its foundational principles. Power sharing or consociation 
has been defined by Arend Lijphart as a set of principles that when carried out 
through practices and institutions provide every significant identity group or 
segment in a society representation and decision making abilities on common 
issues and degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group. 
 
The main institutional features of a consociation or power sharing arrangement 
are a grand coalition executive which is inclusive of the polity’s main segments; 
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segmental autonomy, which can be either territorial or corporate in form; 
mutual vetoes on matters of vital importance to the segments; and the 
promotion of the principle of proportionality throughout the public sector, 
including the electoral system. These can be summarised in a more succinct 
way as follows: 
 
a) Grand Coalition Government Including Representatives of All Major 
Linguistic and Religious Groups 
 
b) Cultural Autonomy for these Groups 
 
c) Proportional Representation In Political And Civil Service Appointments 
 
d) Minority Veto With Regard To Vital Minority Rights And Autonomy 
 
6.1.2   Devolution 
 
In the most general of terms, devolution refers to the transfer of authority 
from a central government to a sub-national entity.462 Beyond this general 
definition, the process of devolution is a complex undertaking, taking on 
different meanings in different contexts and according to the desires and plans 
of those in charge of its design and implementation.  
 
6.1.2.2   Forms of Devolution  
 
                                            
462  Boko, Sylvain, Decentralization and Reform in Africa, Kluwer Academic Publishers,. 
2002, G S Boko, Sylvain, Decentralization and Reform in Africa, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers,. 2002 and D A Rondinelli (Eds.) Devolution and Development: Polity 
Implementation in Developing Countries (1983) at 19. 
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Devolution or devolved government is a form of decentralisation or 
decentralised government in which the authority for decision making with 
respect to political, administrative and legal authority is transferred to quasi-
autonomous units of local government.463 In other words, devolution is a 
political concept that denotes the transfer of political, administrative and legal 
authority, power and responsibility from the centre to lower level units of 
government created by the national constitution. In a devolved political 
system, the lower level units of government to which power, authority and 
responsibility has been transferred (devolved) are more or less autonomous 
from each other.464 This means that any one level of government is not under 
any obligation to refer to or seek authority from the centre in order to make 
and or implement decisions that fall within their exclusive jurisdiction. 
Devolution forms the foundation for political devolution in that it usually 
involves the transfer of responsibilities to municipalities that elect their own 
mayors and councils, raise their own revenues and are able to make 
investment decisions independently of the central government. In such a 
system, local governments have legally recognised geographical boundaries 
within which they exercise their authority and perform public functions.  
 
6.1.3       Federalism as a Conflict Management Tool 
 
Any scholar of federalism would acknowledge the complexity in defining 
federalism in view of the various ways in which it has been employed.465 
                                            
463  J C Ribot, African Devolution: Local Actors, Powers and Accountability, Democracy, 
Governance and Human Rights Paper Number 8, 2002 7. 
464  Id. 
465  J Anton American federalism and public policy (1989) 3. 
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Indeed, one researcher has identified 267 different conceptions of the term.466 
Nevertheless, federalism or the federal principle in this thesis refers to the 
philosophical or ideological idea that a political organisation should seek to 
achieve both political integration and political freedom by combining shared 
rule on some matters and self-rule in various forms on others.467 Federalism is 
a normative and philosophical concept based on the notion that the greatest 
human fulfilment is to be found through participation in a wider community 
that at the same time favours diversity and protects individuality.468 The 
practice of federalism links individuals or groups within various political 
entities, forming part of a broader single entity, in a lasting but limited union in 
such a way as to provide for the pursuit of common ends, while maintaining 
their respective integrities usually through permitting some level of discretion 
in policy making on their part.469 This thesis discusses the application of the 
federal principle in Sudan. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
466  See W Stewart Concepts of federalism (1984). 
467   J Madison, A Hamilton, and J Jay The federalist (1987) 515 opine that as a normative 
concept federalism entails both elements of self-rule and shared rule. See also D 
Elazar Exploring federalism (1987). 
468  On this definition of federalism see B De Villiers “Federalism in South Africa: 
Implications for individual and minority protection” (1993) South African Journal of 
Human Rights 375. For the same definition see P King Federalism and federation 
(1982) 159. 
469   D Elazar Exploring federalism (1987) 5; A Gaili “Federalism and the tyranny of the 
religious majorities: Challenges to federalism in Sudan” (2004) Harvard International 
Law Journal 513; R Lapidoth Autonomy: Flexible solutions to ethnic conflicts (2000) 
50; D Elazar “Federalism v. decentralisation: The drift from authenticity” (1976) 6 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 12. 
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6.1.4   Autonomy 
 
Autonomy has been defined as a means for the diffusion of powers in order to 
preserve the unity of a state while respecting the diversity of its population. A 
territorial political autonomy is an arrangement aimed at granting to a group 
that differs from the majority of the population in the state but that constitutes 
the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the majority in 
a specific region, a means by which it can express its distinct identity. A main 
issue involved in the establishment of a regime of autonomy is the division of 
powers between the central authorities and the autonomous entity. The 
powers of the autonomy are usually related to matters of culture, economics 
and social affairs. There are however different degrees of autonomy and the 
extent of the powers transferred to the autonomous authorities varies 
accordingly ranging from a very limited to a larger and up to a high 
concentration of major powers in the above areas. Usually foreign relations 
and external security are reserved for the central government; however in a 
few cases the autonomous body has limited powers with the consent of the 
central government to enter into international agreements and to become a 
member of a particular organisation. For example Aland is a member of the 
Nordic Council and with the approval of Finland is permitted to conclude 
agreements with the Nordic countries. 
 
In order to avoid disputes and misunderstandings it is important that the 
powers of a regime of autonomy be defined as clearly as possible when it is 
established. There are usually four different areas of powers to be considered: 
powers reserved for the central authorities, those fully transferred to the 
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autonomous entity, parallel powers and powers that can only be exercised 
jointly. In certain cases the central authorities determine a general policy in a 
number of areas in which the autonomous entity may act and the local 
authorities are authorised to operate within the limits of this general policy. 
There is usually a need for cooperation, coordination and consultation between 
central authorities and the autonomous entity. This is crucial because there is 
likely to be a close link between their respective powers. In addition certain 
powers are likely to require joint action. Even if the transferred powers are 
carefully and meticulously described when the autonomy is established future 
difficulties cannot always be prevented. For example there may be differences 
of opinion regarding to which category of powers a certain practical matter 
belongs. Similarly a question may arise in an area of powers that had not been 
considered beforehand or a question may arise that encompasses different 
areas one of which is within the jurisdiction of the centre and the other within 
that of the autonomy.  
 
In many cases in order to ensure cooperation the parties establish a joint organ 
in which both the central government and the autonomous entity are 
represented such as is the case with the Aland Delegation. In addition the 
parties may agree upon a special procedure for settling disputes between the 
centre and autonomous body for example the documents that established the 
autonomy of the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Memmel. As already noted 
above, the powers of the autonomous entity usually include legislation, 
adjudication and administration in those spheres of responsibility that have 
been transferred to the autonomous entity. In some cases however 
adjudication remains fully within the authority of the central government. The 
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legislative acts of the autonomous area usually requires confirmation by the 
central authorities but this confirmation by the central authorities must be 
given except in severe cases defined in advance for example when those 
legislative acts amount to an excess of power or undermine the security of the 
state. The assumption is that the representatives of the population in the 
autonomous area exercise the relevant powers. Nevertheless coordination is 
often needed between the centre and the autonomous authorities regarding 
the appointment of one or more high ranking officials like the representatives 
of central government in the autonomous region or the head of local 
administration. In most cases the official is either appointed jointly or by the 
local authorities with the consent of the centre or vice versa. The acts of the 
autonomous entity in the areas for which it has jurisdiction are normally not 
subject to any control by the central authorities except as mentioned in such 
cases as excess of jurisdiction. In certain cases the inhabitants of the 
autonomous region participate fully in the public life both in their region and in 
the framework of the central government for example in Southern Sudan. A 
regime of autonomy can be established by an international treaty, by a 
constitution by a statute or by a combination of instruments of these 
categories; probably it may even be established by a custom.  
 
Redslob has described personal autonomy as the attribute of a community 
whose members are connected by individual characteristics such as ethnic 
consciousness or language and irrespective of their location or abode. In other 
words this type of autonomy applies to all members of a certain group within 
the state regardless of the place of their residence. Personal autonomy is 
usually granted to ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities. In the case 
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of personal autonomy, the state grants minorities the right to take the 
necessary steps through their own institutions in order to protect and 
implement their own rights. They may act upon their own discretion but within 
the limits of the laws of the state. In principle each individual should be able to 
decide whether or not to belong to the minority group; however certain groups 
in particular religious ones and indigenous populations tend to establish 
conditions for membership. In certain situations, it may also be difficult to 
leave a particular group. Personal autonomy has a great advantage over 
territorial autonomy: As mentioned it usually applies only to people who opt to 
be members of the group for which it is established. Territorial autonomy on 
the other hand may apply to all inhabitants of a certain region thus including 
those who are not members of the group for whose benefit the regime is 
established and who may even resent it. Territorial has another disadvantage: 
Since people tend to move from one place to another, the composition of the 
population of a given region may change; the former majority in the region 
might become a minority and consequently the regime of autonomy may lose 
its raison d’être. This may be problematic is the relocation that changes the 
composition of the population is encouraged by the central government. On 
the hand territorial autonomy has the advantage that in addition to cultural 
matters, it can also apply to a wide range of social and economic affairs 
whereas personal autonomy has usually been limited to matters of culture, 
language, charity, religion and education. Personal autonomy has the 
advantage of applying to all members of an ethnic group in a country 
regardless of their location. 
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6.2        Findings on the Case Studies 
 
6.2.1  Sudan  
 
This chapter examines Sudan’s experience in grappling with the ethnic 
question, in particular its resort to federalism and autonomy and finally the 
Southern Sudanese decision to secede. On the whole, this chapter traces the 
debate on federalism, which has featured all through Sudan’s quest for peace 
and unity. Apart form investigating the manner and content of federalism as 
has been employed, in particular, the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement470 
(the Addis Agreement) and the Constitution of 1998 (the 1998 Constitution), 
the political, sociological, anthropological and psychological issues revolving 
around these endeavours are considered. This chapter lays the foundation for a 
discussion of the present Sudanese political and constitutional order, the re-
introduction of autonomy in Sudanese politics and the decision to secede from 
the North. In the essence, this chapter serves to bring the recent political and 
constitutional developments in Sudan into perspective. In doing this, it 
provides historical insight into the character of the conflict, highlighting the key 
issues that have been at the heart of the civil war. This chapter equips the 
reader with a factual background that will enable the ensuing analysis of 
feasibility present day political order.  
 
On secession, important political acts like secession cannot be entirely confined 
to deontological considerations of justice. Certainly one of the strongest 
arguments used against secessionist movements in the past has been that they 
                                            
470  The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan, Appendix B in M Beshir 
The Southern Sudan: From conflict to peace (1975) 158.  
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would divide the state into two fragments one or both of which would be 
severely crippled economically and scarcely able to survive as a viable 
nation.471In addressing the question what the odds and evens are for secession 
in Sudan the economic effect of such secessionist movement is of critical 
importance.472 Given the fact that Southern Sudan recently overwhelmingly 
voted for an independent state of Southern Sudan, one of the major challenges 
still o be faced and overcome remains the fact that most of the economic 
activity and infrastructural institutions to manage any wealth exists in the 
North. Without proper support from Kenya and other African and international 
friends, the looming secession of Southern Sudan would effectively be like 
farmer with a grade cow who is no longer able to feed it and puts it up for sale. 
It would be extremely difficult for Southern Sudan to sustain itself.  
 
6.2.1.1  Is Southern Sudanese Secession Therefore Justifiable? 
 
Given the difficult and tumultuous journey from independence to date that 
Sudan has experienced, the question as to whether the looming secession in 
Sudan is justifiable or not has been answered by the voting patterns of 
Southern Sudanese in the January 2011 referendum. Other constitutional 
mechanism such as federalism which was a long time employed proved 
ineffective in the long run and thereby justifying the secession of Southern 
Sudan.  
 
 
 
                                            
471  Russell and McCall, as above. 
472  See in this regard P Collier and A Hoefflier The political economy of secession (2002). 
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6.2.2   Kenya 
 
This chapter assesses the nature and impact of institutions of power-sharing 
and devolved government in Kenya. The focus of the discussion is on the 2008 
agreement signed between the country’s two main political parties, PNU (Party 
of National Unity) and ODM (Orange Democratic Movement) and the 
enactment of a new constitution that has seen the creation of comprehensive 
devolved system of government. The agreement was agreed upon after a 
disputed election that sparked a wave of ethnic clashes in which more than 
1,000 people were killed and another 300,000 were internally displaced. Signed 
in March 2008, it has been largely successful in its primary goal: ending the 
violence and restoring peace in Kenya. Since the implementation of the 
agreement there has been little inter-communal violence and some of the 
people displaced by the post-election clashes have been able to return home. 
Moreover, the agreement has enjoyed wide-spread support from across 
partisan and ethnic lines. The agreement similar to that of South Africa during 
its transition from apartheid to a democratic system, is temporary in nature 
and does not guarantee permanent positions of power to any groups or 
parties. While the parties to the accord are collaborators in its implementation, 
they are also foes in the electoral arena that expect to compete vigorously in 
the next election cycle. The power-sharing agreement, therefore, does not 
undermine the electoral incentives that the parties would otherwise face in its 
absence. The main accomplishment of the power-sharing agreement has been 
the creation of a Grand Coalition government in which executive functions and 
cabinet positions are shared between the two main parties. Long-term 
grievances and underlying issues have not been addressed and remain latent 
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sources of conflict.  So far the parties have shown a willingness to work 
together and compromise. But the Grand Coalition government is facing many 
serious challenges. Currently, the issue of whether to prosecute perpetrators of 
the violence domestically or internationally following the International Criminal 
Courts (ICC) involvement in the PEV is a potentially explosive issue that 
threatens to destabilise the agreement. The structure of this chapter is as 
follows. The first section describes the 2008 power-sharing agreement, placing 
it in the context of long running debates about constitutional reform in Kenya. 
The next section takes an in depth look at the devolved system of government 
under Kenya’s new constitutional dispensation. In conclusion, the 
powersharing arrangement in Kenya has so far proved effective in at least 
bringing about a period of peace just as was the case in South Africa during the 
transition period. In addition it has facilitated the enactment of a new 
constitutional order in which a devolved system of government has been put in 
place. What remains to be seen is whether Kenya will transit peacefully into the 
new order come the next general elections in 2012. 
 
6.2.3   Somalia 
 
Somalia is often considered a failed state.473 It is indisputable that the project 
to build and sustain a modern state, with internal and external sovereignty as 
its defining characteristics has failed in Somalia. However, the continuous 
framing of Somalia as a case of state failure is an analytical strategy that must 
have definite limits. It must be pointed out that there exist two relatively 
                                            
473  David A Lake and Donald Rothchild (Eds.) The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1998). 
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peaceful and functioning regions of Somaliland and Puntland in the North and 
North-eastern regions respectively. The fact that Southern Somalia has been 
war torn for over a decade, has rendered the whole country to be considered 
failed principally because of the lack of a centrally functioning government. 
Today the larger part of Southern Somalia is ravaged by famine and civil war. 
Up until recently, much attention has been given to Somali clan relations and 
Islamic radicalism as being the root cause of the tragedy. While drought, Islam 
and clans are repeated themes in Somali history, famine and anarchy as has 
characterised the South are not. The reality is that a confluence of external 
forces along with external arms and the internal disruption of the clan system 
have contributed to the extreme condition of Southern Somalia as witnessed 
today. This chapter approaches the study of Somalia from a different angle. 
Instead of taking the modern sovereign state as a universal norm for political 
organisation and assuming that it is the only imaginable alternative, the 
chapter approaches Somalia as a socio-political order. Doing so entails an 
investigation of the structures and logics that sustain the current order as well 
as those that may change it. This chapter is a journey through time in the quest 
for a feasible proposition to the current impasse in Somalia and the 
advancement of a federated Somalia Republic with three autonomous regions. 
This work makes a case for a comprehensive autonomous arrangement for the 
Republic of Somalia. The proposition is for an arrangement that is similar to the 
one that was brokered for Sudan between the North and South but with 
adjustments to meet the peculiar circumstances of Somalia. A starting point is 
the identification of some central or key differences between the two cases. 
Whereas in Sudan, there is a central government from which the autonomous 
arrangement was built, in Somalia such central and functioning government 
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has been lacking since 1991. This effectively means that the kind of 
autonomous arrangement required would be the kind I referred to above that 
is one in which there is a predominance of parallel powers and powers 
exercised jointly. First things first. In Somalia we have three regions. Somaliland 
with a longer history of autonomy with a strong emphasis for total self 
government and secession from the larger part of Somalia, Puntland relatively 
stable area with self government and an emphasis for a measure of self 
government for the regions but within a united Republic of Somalia and 
Southern Somalia a region in chaos largely due to an attempt to impose an 
unpopular government on them and a refusal by the international community 
to accommodate the character of their cultural or religious orientation. 
 
Somaliland is internationally regarded as being an autonomous region of the 
Republic of Somalia.  Since 1991, it has been governed by a secessionist 
administration as the Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland declared 
independence in May 1991, but remains unrecognised by any state or 
international organisation. However, many foreign governments maintain 
informal ties with the state, with an increasing number of foreign delegations 
and embassies having been established in the capital Hargeisa. It is still far from 
full diplomatic recognition. The Puntland State of Somalia was established in 
August 1998 after a decision made by local political and traditional leaders 
following several failed national reconciliation efforts in the wake of the Somali 
Civil War. 
 
As stipulated in Article 1 of the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali 
Republic, Puntland is a part of the Federal State of Somalia. As such, the region 
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seeks the unity of the Somali people and adheres to a federal system of 
government. Unlike the secessionist region of Somaliland to its west, Puntland 
is not trying to obtain international recognition as a separate nation. However, 
both regions have one thing in common: they base their support upon clan 
elders and their way of organization along lines based on clan relationships and 
kinship. Since 1998, Puntland has also been in territorial disputes with 
Somaliland over the Sool and Sanaag regions. Both the Sool and Sanaag regions 
have declared themselves autonomous parts of Somalia as Northland State 
(2008)[25] and Maakhir State (2007), respectively, but Maakhir has rejoined 
Puntland. 
 
The area I refer to as Southern Somalia is that area south of Puntland that has 
been under the control of what the international community refers to as 
Islamists. At present there are three main religious groupings in Southern 
Somalia namely: Al Shaabab Mujahidin, Hizbul Islam and traditional Sufi 
groups, organised under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ). 
These exist after another grouping, the Islamic Military Courts were defeated 
and ousted from control in 2006 by the TFG with the support of Ethiopian 
troops. Without going deep into the intricate politics of the Southern Somalia 
to date I will hereafter to explain my support for an autonomous arrangement. 
Somalia is ripe for an autonomous arrangement. The problem has been that 
the country has continuously been under pressure to take the form of a unitary 
state with the transitional federal government as the central functioning 
government. Despite the intense resistance that this idea has received from 
Southern Somalia, the international community backed by AMISOM, seem 
intent on imposing this government on Southern Somalia including Somaliland 
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under one umbrella of Republic of Somalia. It is my contention this approach is 
utterly misconceived and if there is a persistence on its implementation, it may 
lead to further destruction of the relatively identifiable configuration of 
Southern Somalia. Southern Somalia risks becoming a haven of international 
criminal activity far from its present state of a region under the dominion of 
Islamic groupings each seeking recognition of their political demands. It can be 
recalled that recently, Hizbul Islam a religious group that had previously not 
expressed any intention to engage or participate in the illegal lucrative piracy 
trade off the southern coasts, recently started demanding a share of the loot 
obtained from the trade. 
 
Secondly, the rising trend of extremism seen in the religious groupings is a 
direct response, a form of rebellion against the imposed government in the 
style of the TFG supported by AMISOM. Only through a fair appreciation and 
invitation to negotiation of the groups in Southern Somalia can there be hope 
for a sustainable peace arrangement. The call to the negotiation table ought 
not have any pre-conditions. The opposing parties at least in the first instance 
must be accepted for what they are and stand for. So important is this position, 
that recently the US has started bending away from its original hardliner stance 
regarding the Taliban in Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan. There have been 
insinuations of bringing the Taliban or at least part of their leadership to the 
negotiation table.  
 
This is because it has been realised that a military approach is rarely the 
solution to ethnic conflict and secondly that compromise must begin by 
accepting at least for negotiation purposes the original hardliner positions of 
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opposing parties. There can be no success when one group seeks either total 
annihilation of the other or a complete alteration of their ideological 
foundation. It ought to be recalled that the situation or agreement in Sudan 
was arrived at after both parties accepted the existence of the other and 
bargained for agreement on other issues like share of the revenues obtaining in 
the country. The North had to back peddle on its original conception of the 
SPLM as a terrorist organisation but came to acknowledge it as a liberation 
movement. On their part, the SPLA on receiving some recognition from the 
North softened its intentions to annihilate the Northern government by all 
means. The result was a mutually acceptable autonomous arrangement with 
the option of secession. 
 
In the same vein, all the groups in Somalia ought to be brought together at the 
negotiating table. These groups are: 
 
a) Representation from Somaliland: Have traditionally wanted complete 
self government from the larger republic. Secession in effect 
 
b) Representation from Puntland (Ideally the Transitional Federal 
Government) and from  Ahlu Sunnna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ): Have 
traditionally advocated for a Federal Republic of Somalia governed from 
a central government in Mogadishu ASWJ is much more tolerant of 
ideological differences, but it remains deeply divided along clan lines. 
 
c) Representation from Al Shaabab Mujahidin, Hizbul Islam  
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Initially, Al-Shaabab and Hizbul Islam shared a similar vision and model of 
Sharia, but they are divided on two crucial issues, pan-Somali nationalism and 
the political utility of clans. Hizbul Islam’s two traditional leaders, Sheikh 
Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Hassan Abdullahi Hirsi, “Hassan Turki”, are 
nationalists and strong advocates of the creation of a greater Somalia, which 
incorporates all the Somali-inhabited regions into one state. Al-Shaabab sees 
its agenda as much broader than the Somali-inhabited regions of the Horn of 
Africa. It aspires to creating a new global Islamic Caliphate, with undefined 
geographical boundaries. Hard-liners in the organisation see nationalism as a 
legacy of colonialism and part of the problem. They argue that modern 
nationalism and the idea of a nation-state are alien concepts meant to 
fragment the Umma (the global Islamic community). The other difference is 
views about clans. Hizbul Islam also takes a pragmatic view of the clan system, 
which it tries to exploit to achieve its strategic aims. The four main Hizbul Islam 
affiliates were chosen with a view to achieving some semblance of clan 
balance. Views on the clan system within Al-Shaabab are mixed. The hardliners 
are ideologically opposed to it and see any manifestation of “clan bias” as proof 
of insufficient commitment to Islam. Less extreme figures sometimes 
manipulate the clan system to mobilise and achieve short-term objectives but 
are equally uneasy about getting sucked into Somalia’s clan politics. ASWJ is 
predominantly a clan alliance that brings together major Hawiye sub-clans 
inhabiting the central regions of Somalia. ASWJ say that their alliance is 
animated by the extremist brand of Islam espoused by Al-Shaabab and in 
defence of traditional Sufi practices. However, territorial and clan calculations 
also motivate it. 
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Appendix 1: Text of the Power-Sharing Agreement of February 28, 
2008 
 
ACTING TOGETHER FOR KENYA AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 
PARTNERSHIP OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT 
Preamble: 
 
The crisis triggered by the 2007 disputed presidential elections has brought to 
the surface deep-seated and long-standing divisions within Kenyan society. If 
left unaddressed, these divisions threaten the very existence of Kenya as a 
unified country. The Kenyan people are now looking to their leaders to ensure 
that their country will not be lost. Given the current situation, neither side can 
realistically govern the country without the other. There must be real power-
sharing to move the country forward and begin the healing and reconciliation 
process. With this agreement, we are stepping forwarding together, as political 
leaders, to overcome the current crisis and to set the country on a new path. 
As partners in a coalition government, we commit ourselves to work together 
in good faith as true partners, through constant consultation and willingness to 
compromise. This agreement is designed to create an environment conducive 
to such a partnership and to build mutual trust and confidence. It is not about 
creating positions that reward individuals. It seeks to enable Kenya's political 
leaders to look beyond partisan considerations with a view to promoting the 
greater interests of the nation as a whole. It provides the means to implement 
a coherent and far-reaching reform agenda, to address the fundamental root 
causes of recurrent conflict, and to create a better, more secure, more 
prosperous Kenya for all. 
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To resolve the political crisis, and in the spirit of coalition and partnership, we 
have agreed to enact the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008, whose 
provisions have been agreed upon in their entirety by the parties hereto and a 
draft copy thereof is appended hereto. 
 
The key points are: 
a. There will be a Prime Minister of the Government of Kenya, with 
authority to coordinate and supervise the execution of the 
functions and affairs of the Government of Kenya. 
b. The Prime Minister will be an elected member of the National 
Assembly and the parliamentary leader of the largest party in the 
National Assembly, or of a coalition, if the largest party does not 
command a majority. 
c. Each member of the coalition shall nominate one person from the 
National Assembly to be appointed a Deputy Prime Minister. 
d. The Cabinet will consist of the President, the Vice-President, the 
Prime Minister, the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the other 
Ministers. The removal of any Minister of the coalition will be 
subject to consultation and concurrence in writing by the leaders. 
e. The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers can only be 
removed if the National Assembly passes a motion of no 
confidence with a majority vote. 
f. The composition of the coalition government will at a] I times take 
into account the principle of portfolio balance and will reflect their 
relative parliamentary strength. 
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g. The coalition will be dissolved if the Tenth Parliament is dissolved; 
or if the parties agree in writing; or if one coalition partner 
withdraws from the coalition. 
h. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act shall be entrenched in 
the Constitution.  
 
Having agreed on the critical issues above, we will now take this process to 
Parliament. It will be convened at the earliest moment to enact these 
agreements. This will be in the form of an Act of Parliament and the necessary 
amendment to the Constitution. We believe by these steps we can together in 
the spirit of partnership bring peace and prosperity back to the people of Kenya 
who so richly deserve it. Agreed this date 28 February 2008 
 
Signed by: 
Hon. Raila Odinga, Orange Democratic Party 
H.E. President Mwai Kibaki, Government/Party of National Unity 
Witnessed by: 
H.E. Kofi A. Annan, Chairman of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities 
H.E. President Jakaya Kikwete, President of the United Republic of Tanzania 
and Chairman 
of the African Union. 
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The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 
 
Preamble: 
There is a crisis in this country. The Parties have come together in recognition 
of this crisis, and agree that a political solution is required. 
 
Given the disputed elections and the divisions in the Parliament and the 
country, neither side is able to govern without the other. There needs to be 
real power sharing to move the country forward. 
 
A coalition must be a partnership with commitment on both sides to govern 
together and push through a reform agenda for the benefit of all Kenyans. 
Description of the Act: 
 
An Act of Parliament to provide for the settlement of the disputes arising from 
the presidential elections of 2007, formation of a Coalition Government and 
Establishment of the Offices of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and 
Ministers of the Government of Kenya, their functions and various matters 
connected with and incidental to the foregoing. 
 
1. This Act may be cited as the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008. 
 
2. This Act shall come into force upon its publication in the Kenya Gazette  
which shall not be later than 14 days from the date of Assent. 
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3. (1) There shall be a Prime Minister of the Government of Kenya and two 
Deputy Prime 
Ministers who shall be appointed by the President in accordance with this 
section. 
 
(2) The person to be appointed as Prime Minister shall be an elected member 
of the National Assembly who is the parliamentary leader of - 
 
(a) the political party that has the largest number of members in the National 
Assembly; or 
 
(b) a coalition of political parties in the event that the leader of the political 
party that has the largest number of members of the National Assembly does 
not command the majority in the National Assembly. 
 
(3) Each member of the coalition shall nominate one person from the elected 
members of the National Assembly to be appointed a Deputy Prime Minister. 
 
4.(1) The Prime Minister: 
a) shall have authority to coordinate and supervise the execution of the 
functions and affairs of the Government of Kenya including those of Ministries; 
 
b) may assign any of the coordination responsibilities of his office to the 
Deputy Prime Ministers, as well as one of them to deputise for him; 
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c) shall perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President 
or under any written law. 
 
(2) In the formation of the coalition government, the persons to be appointed 
as Ministers and Assistant Ministers from the political parties that are partners 
in the coalition other than the President's party, shall be nominated by the 
parliamentary leader of the party in the coalition. Thereafter there shall be full 
consultation with the President on the appointment of all Ministers. 
 
 (3) The composition of the coalition government shall at all times reflect the 
relative parliamentary strengths of the respective parties and shall at all times 
take into account the principle of portfolio balance. 
 
(4) The office of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister shall become 
vacant only if - 
 
(a) the holder of the office dies, resigns or ceases to be a member of the 
National Assembly otherwise than by reason of the dissolution of Parliament;  
 
or  
 
(b) the National Assembly passes a resolution which is supported by a majority 
of all the members of the National Assembly excluding the ex-officio members 
and of which not less than seven days notice has been given declaring that the 
National Assembly has no confidence in the Prime Minister or Deputy Prime 
Minister, as the case may be; or  
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(c) the coalition is dissolved. 
 
(5) The removal of any Minister nominated by a parliamentary party of the 
coalition shall be made only after prior consultation and concurrence in writing 
with the leader of that party. 
 
5. The Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime 
Minister, the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the other Ministers. 
 
6. The coalition shall stand dissolved if: 
 
(a) the Tenth Parliament is dissolved; or 
 
(b) the coalition parties agree in writing; or 
 
(c) one coalition partner withdraws from the coalition by a resolution of the 
highest decision-making organ of that party in writing. 
 
7. The prime minister and deputy prime ministers shall be entitled to such 
salaries, allowances, benefits, privileges and emoluments as may be approved 
by Parliament from time to time. 
 
8. This Act shall cease to apply upon dissolution of the tenth Parliament, if the 
coalition is dissolved, or a new constitution is enacted, whichever is earlier. 
 
 
 
